ebb22094a5 fix: promote to main (#878)
* fix: replace unsafe env::set_var with thread-safe inject_single_var in SIGHUP handler

Fixes race condition where SIGHUP handler modifies global environment variables
while other threads may be reading them via Config::from_env().

Changes:
- Replace unsafe { std::env::set_var() } with ironclaw::config::inject_single_var()
- Uses INJECTED_VARS mutex instead of unsafe global state modification
- All reads via optional_env() check the thread-safe overlay first
- Prevents data races between SIGHUP reload and concurrent config reads

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* fix: spawn webhook restart as background task to avoid blocking I/O across lock

Prevents holding Mutex lock during async I/O operations (TcpListener::bind,
task shutdown). The SIGHUP handler no longer blocks webhook processing during
listener restart.

Changes:
- Read old_addr and drop lock immediately
- Spawn restart_with_addr() as background task via tokio::spawn
- Lock is only held during the actual restart operation, not the signal handler

Benefits:
- SIGHUP handler returns immediately without blocking
- Webhook requests not delayed by listener restart I/O
- Lock contention significantly reduced

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* fix: add graceful shutdown mechanism for SIGHUP handler background task

Prevents unbounded loop without cancellation token. The SIGHUP handler now
listens for a shutdown signal and exits cleanly during graceful termination.

Changes:
- Create broadcast channel for shutdown signaling
- SIGHUP handler uses tokio::select! to wait for shutdown or SIGHUP
- Send shutdown signal to all background tasks after agent.run() completes
- Ensures clean task lifecycle and no orphaned background tasks

Benefits:
- Proper task cancellation during graceful shutdown
- Follows Tokio best practices for background task management
- No background tasks orphaned when runtime shuts down

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* refactor: replace stringly-typed parameter filtering with typed enum and single helper

Fixes DRY violation where unsupported parameter filtering was duplicated across
rig_adapter.rs and anthropic_oauth.rs using string contains checks.

Changes:
- Add UnsupportedParam typed enum in provider.rs (Temperature, MaxTokens, StopSequences)
- Create strip_unsupported_completion_params() helper function
- Create strip_unsupported_tool_params() helper function
- Update rig_adapter.rs to use shared helpers
- Update anthropic_oauth.rs to use shared helpers
- Replace 60+ lines of duplicate stringly-typed logic

Benefits:
- Type safety: parameter names checked at compile time
- Single source of truth: adding a new param updates one place
- Reduced maintenance burden: no duplicate logic to keep in sync
- Better code clarity: named enum variant is self-documenting

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* docs: clarify intentional parameter asymmetry between completion and tool requests

Add documentation explaining why strip_unsupported_tool_params does not handle
StopSequences: the field doesn't exist in ToolCompletionRequest.

Changes:
- Add clarifying comments to strip_unsupported_tool_params()
- Explain why StopSequences is only in CompletionRequest
- Note that ToolCompletionRequest only supports Temperature and MaxTokens
- Inline comment confirms no action needed for StopSequences

This addresses the appearance of incomplete implementation without changing logic,
as the asymmetry is intentional and correct (ToolCompletionRequest lacks the field).

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* perf: isolate webhook_secret to reduce lock contention on hot path

Move webhook_secret from shared HttpChannelState RwLock into its own Arc<RwLock<>>.
This eliminates contention between secret validation and other state operations.

Changes:
- Change webhook_secret field type from RwLock<Option<SecretString>> to Arc<RwLock<Option<SecretString>>>
- Update initialization in HttpChannel::new()
- Update comments to explain isolation rationale

Benefits:
- Reduce lock contention on webhook request hot path (secret validation)
- Rarely-changing field (SIGHUP only) isolated from frequent state accesses
- Other state operations (tx, pending_responses) no longer wait behind secret reads
- Minimal code change: only field declaration and initialization

The Arc wrapper allows cloning the RwLock handle to separate concerns. With this
change, every webhook request acquires its own isolated lock for secret validation,
not the shared HttpChannelState lock. This scales better under high request volume.

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* fix: prevent partial state corruption on SIGHUP restart failure

Ensure atomicity of configuration reload: if webhook listener restart fails,
secret update is skipped to prevent inconsistent state.

Changes:
- Wait for restart_with_addr() to complete (don't spawn background task)
- Track restart result with restart_failed flag
- Only update secret if restart succeeded or wasn't needed
- Ensure listener and secret stay synchronized

Problem addressed:
- Before: restart spawned as background task, secret updated immediately
- If restart failed, secret was changed but listener still on old address
- This left system in inconsistent state (partial corruption)

Solution:
- Make restart blocking (SIGHUP handler can wait, it's not on request hot path)
- Atomically update secret only after successful restart
- Flag prevents race between restart and secret update

Benefits:
- Configuration changes are atomic (both succeed or both fail together)
- No partial state corruption on restart failure
- Failed restarts don't silently leave inconsistent state
- Secret and listener address stay in sync

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* refactor: generalize hot-secret-swapping with ChannelSecretUpdater trait

Decouple SIGHUP handler from HTTP channel internals by introducing a trait
for channels that support zero-downtime secret updates.

Changes:
- Add ChannelSecretUpdater trait in channels/channel.rs
- Implement ChannelSecretUpdater for HttpChannelState
- Export trait from channels module
- Update SIGHUP handler to use trait-based secret updater collection
- Replace explicit HTTP channel knowledge with generic updater loop

Benefits:
- SIGHUP handler no longer depends on HttpChannelState details
- Tight coupling removed: main.rs doesn't need HTTP channel imports
- Extensible: new channels can opt-in by implementing the trait
- Scalable: multiple channels supported without main.rs changes
- Maintainable: adding channels requires only trait implementation, not SIGHUP handler edits

Pattern:
- ChannelSecretUpdater trait defines the interface for all updaters
- Channels that support hot-secret-swapping implement the trait
- SIGHUP handler loops through all registered updaters generically

Verification:
- All 2,787 tests pass
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

* feat: validate parameter names at deserialization time, not just tests

Add custom serde deserializer for unsupported_params that validates parameter
names at runtime when loading providers.json (or user overrides).

Changes:
- Add unsupported_params_de module with custom deserializer
- Only allows: "temperature", "max_tokens", "stop_sequences"
- Invalid parameter names cause immediate deserialization error
- Update ProviderDefinition to use custom deserializer
- Enhanced test with explicit parameter name validation
- Add new test that verifies invalid parameters are rejected

Problem solved:
- Before: Invalid param names (e.g., "temperrature") silently ignored
- Now: Rejected at deserialization time with clear error message
- Prevents runtime failures caused by typos in configuration

Example error:
  unsupported parameter name 'temperrature': must be one of: temperature, max_tokens, stop_sequences

Benefits:
- Fail-fast: errors caught when loading config, not at runtime
- Clear feedback: error message lists valid parameter names
- Type safety: validators run during deserialization
- Configuration errors detected immediately, not silently ignored

Verification:
- All 2,788 tests pass (including new validation test)
- Zero clippy warnings
- Code compiles successfully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Haiku 4.5 <[email protected]>
2026-03-10 11:15:49 -07:00
2026-03-10 11:07:56 -07:00
2026-03-05 17:12:49 -08:00
2026-02-04 22:09:52 -08:00
2026-03-10 11:15:49 -07:00
2026-02-11 08:31:25 +00:00
2026-02-09 03:00:35 +00:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-21 15:14:57 -07:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI

English | 简体中文

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but works with any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Popular options include OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, Ollama (local), and self-hosted servers like vLLM or LiteLLM.

Select "OpenAI-compatible" in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/LLM_PROVIDERS.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

S
Description
IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security
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