ibhagwanandGitHub bf35b59222 feat(signal) attachment upload + message tool (#375)
* feat(channels/signal): add attachment upload support

- Add attachments field to OutgoingResponse for carrying file paths
- Add with_attachments() builder method to OutgoingResponse
- Update build_rpc_params() to include attachments array in JSON-RPC
- Update respond() and broadcast() to handle attachments:
  - Text + attachments: sends text first, then each attachment
  - Attachments only: sends each attachment with path as message
  - Text only: original behavior (no change)
- Add tests for build_rpc_params with attachments
- Add tests for OutgoingResponse attachment builder

This enables the Signal channel to send files via signal-cli daemon's
JSON-RPC send method, matching the nullclaw implementation.

Risk: Low - uses existing JSON-RPC infrastructure
Tests: 85 signal tests pass, 1543 lib tests pass

* feat(tools): add message tool for cross-channel messaging

Add a new 'message' tool that allows the agent to send messages to
any connected channel (signal, telegram, slack, etc.) with optional
file attachments.

Features:
- Send messages to specific channel + target combinations
- Support for attachments (file paths)
- E.164 validation delegated to channel (signal expects +number,
  telegram accepts username/chat_id, slack uses #channels)
- Helpful error messages showing available channels on failure

Tool schema:
- content: message text (required)
- channel: target channel name (optional, defaults to current channel)
- target: recipient (E.164, group ID, chat ID) (optional, defaults to
  current user/group chat)
- attachments: optional file paths to send

This complements the recently added attachment upload support for the
Signal channel by giving the agent a proper way to specify attachments
when sending messages.

Tests: 4 new tests for message tool schema
Risk: Low - new tool with no breaking changes
Tests: All 1547 lib tests pass, clippy clean

* feat(llm): add conversation context to system prompt for Signal

Add conversation_context HashMap to Reasoning struct to pass channel-specific
metadata (sender phone, sender UUID, group ID) to the LLM. This helps the
agent know who/group it's talking to, preventing it from hallucinating
phone numbers or sending to wrong recipients.

Changes:
- Add conversation_context field and with_conversation_data() builder method
- Add build_conversation_section() to include current conversation info in system prompt
- Update dispatcher to extract Signal metadata (sender, sender_uuid, group) and pass to Reasoning
- Add signal_sender_uuid to Signal channel metadata for privacy mode users

* feat(tools): add secure attachment path validation with sandbox enforcement

Implement robust path validation for message tool attachments to prevent
directory traversal attacks and unauthorized file access. Attachments are
now sandboxed to ~/.ironclaw/ by default.

Key changes:
- Create shared path_utils module with validate_path() and is_path_safe_basic()
- Extract normalize_lexical() from file.rs for reuse
- MessageTool now enforces sandbox at ~/.ironclaw/ for all attachments
- Path validation includes: traversal detection, canonicalization, symlink resolution
- Error messages reveal the allowed sandbox directory for user clarity

Security improvements:
- Blocks path traversal attacks (../, URL-encoded, null bytes)
- Canonicalizes paths to resolve symlinks before validation
- Walks up to nearest existing ancestor for non-existent paths
- Prevents escape from sandbox directory

Backward compatibility:
- File tools continue to work with their configured base_dir
- Message tool defaults to ~/.ironclaw/ sandbox
- Tests updated to create files within sandbox

Tests added:
- path_utils module tests (9 tests for validation logic)
- message tool attachment validation tests
- All 1571 existing tests pass

* fix(channels/signal): use robust path validation with full security coverage

Signal channel's validate_attachment_paths() now uses path_utils::validate_path()
for consistent, secure path validation.

Fixes:
- Replaced weak path.contains('..') check with robust validate_path()
- validate_path() now includes is_path_safe_basic() as first-pass filter to
  block null bytes and URL-encoded traversal sequences (%2e%2e%2f)
- Error message now shows allowed sandbox directory (~/.ironclaw/)

Security coverage:
- Path traversal: ../, foo/../bar, ../../etc/passwd ✓
- URL-encoded traversal: %2e%2e%2fetc/passwd ✓
- Null byte injection: file\0.txt ✓
- Paths outside sandbox: /tmp/evil.txt ✓
- Symlink escape attempts (via canonicalization) ✓

Tests added:
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_path_outside_sandbox
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_url_encoded_traversal
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_null_byte
- Fixed broken assertion in rejects_double_dot test

* fix(llm): add Signal channel to build_channel_section to include message tool hint

The catch-all '_' arm was returning early before the message_tool_hint
section was constructed, which meant Signal users never got the
'## Proactive Messaging' section with examples for:
- Using attachments parameter
- Targeting different users/groups
- Cross-channel messaging

Now Signal will include the full message_tool_hint section with usage examples.

* fix(tools): use async locks in register_message_tools to prevent silent failures

The method was using register_sync which calls try_write() on self.tools.
If the lock was held, try_write() would return Err and silently skip
adding the tool to the registry, while self.message_tool already held
a reference. This creates an inconsistent state.

Fix: use async write locks directly instead of register_sync to ensure
the tool is always registered or the method fails explicitly.

* refactor(dispatcher): use Channel trait for conversation context

Replace hardcoded 'if message.channel == signal' block with generic
conversation_context() method on the Channel trait. This allows any
channel to provide context (sender, group, etc.) without hardcoding
channel names.

Changes:
- Add conversation_context() method to Channel trait (default: empty)
- Implement for SignalChannel: extracts sender, sender_uuid, group
- Add get_channel() to ChannelManager (returns Arc<dyn Channel>)
- Change ChannelManager storage from Box to Arc for shared access
- Update dispatcher to use new trait method
- Add tests for conversation_context extraction

Other channels (Telegram, Slack, Discord) can now implement this
method to provide conversation context without code changes in dispatcher.

* fix(tests): split message_tool_with_attachments into sandbox and channel tests

The original test was passing for the wrong reason - it expected an error
because the channel doesn't exist, but actually failed earlier during sandbox
validation because /tmp paths are outside ~/.ironclaw/.

Split into two tests:
- message_tool_with_attachments_outside_sandbox: verifies sandbox rejection
  with explicit error message check
- message_tool_with_attachments_inside_sandbox_no_channel: uses files within
  sandbox (like message_tool_passes_attachment_to_broadcast does) and verifies
  the channel-related error message

* security(message tool): add rate limiting, approval requirements, and audit logging

The message tool can send to ANY connected channel/target making it a significant
abuse vector if the LLM is compromised or prompt-injected. This commit adds:

1. Rate limiting: 10 messages/minute, 100/hour per user
2. Approval requirement: Always requires approval for cross-channel messages
   (when channel differs from the default conversation channel)
3. Audit logging: Every successful message send is logged with channel,
   target, and attachment count

The approval logic:
- If channel param is provided and differs from default -> Always require approval
- If no default channel is set and explicit channel provided -> Always require approval
- Otherwise (using default channel) -> UnlessAutoApproved

* fix(message tool): return explicit error for malformed attachments array

Previously, malformed attachments like {"attachments": [123, true]} would be
silently ignored via .ok().unwrap_or_default(), leaving users confused
when attachments weren't sent.

Now returns explicit error: "Invalid attachments format: ..."

* fix(message tool): verify attachment files exist before sending

Previously, non-existent paths would pass sandbox validation and surface
as confusing Signal RPC errors. Now returns clear "Attachment file not found" error.

* fix(test): create sandbox directory if it doesn't exist for CI

The test validate_attachment_paths_accepts_normal_paths uses
tempfile::tempdir_in() which requires the parent directory to exist.
In CI, ~/.ironclaw doesn't exist, causing test failure.
2026-02-26 18:06:21 +04:00
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2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but works with any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Popular options include OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, Ollama (local), and self-hosted servers like vLLM or LiteLLM.

Select "OpenAI-compatible" in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/LLM_PROVIDERS.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

S
Description
IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security
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