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* feat: Add secure prompt-based skills system (Phase 1 MVP) Implement a skills system that extends the agent with prompt-level instructions from local directories. Skills declare activation criteria, tool permissions, and trust tiers that determine authority attenuation. Core security model: the minimum trust level of any active skill determines a tool ceiling -- tools above the ceiling are removed from the LLM's tool list entirely at the API level, preventing prompt-based manipulation. New modules: - skills/mod.rs: Core types (SkillTrust, SkillManifest, LoadedSkill) - skills/scanner.rs: Content scanner for manipulation detection - skills/registry.rs: Filesystem discovery and manifest parsing - skills/selector.rs: Deterministic two-phase prefilter (no LLM) - skills/attenuation.rs: Trust-based tool filtering Integration: - Agent loop selects skills per-turn and applies tool attenuation - Reasoning engine injects skill context with structural isolation - Config supports SKILLS_ENABLED, SKILLS_DIR, SKILLS_MAX_ACTIVE, SKILLS_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS environment variables - Disabled by default (SKILLS_ENABLED=false) 41 new tests covering all modules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address all adversarial review findings for skills system Security fixes: - Escape skill name/version in XML attributes to prevent trust spoofing - Escape prompt content to prevent </skill> tag breakout - Require integrity hash for Verified/Community tier skills - Validate skill names against [a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63} - Add 64 KiB file size limit on prompt.md Bug fixes: - Use actual SkillsConfig from AgentDeps instead of SkillsConfig::default() - Add skills_config field to AgentDeps, wired through from main.rs Performance: - Pre-compile regex patterns at load time (cached on LoadedSkill) - Selector uses pre-compiled patterns instead of recompiling per message - Switch all std::fs to tokio::fs for non-blocking async I/O Hardening: - Cap keyword score at 30 points to prevent keyword stuffing attacks - Enforce max 20 keywords and 5 patterns per skill - Normalize line endings (CRLF/CR to LF) before hashing - Also includes cargo fmt formatting fixes for adjacent code Tests: 54 skills tests pass (up from 41), zero new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address medium/low severity findings from adversarial review Fixes all 18 medium/low severity findings identified by the security review: - mod.rs: Add MAX_TAGS_PER_SKILL cap (10) in enforce_limits(); use RegexBuilder with 64 KiB size_limit to prevent ReDoS; replace case-enumerated escape_skill_content with regex matching all case variants plus whitespace/null byte injection between </ and skill; document allowed_patterns as unenforced until Phase 2; document Marketplace URL validation as Phase 3 concern - registry.rs: Add MAX_MANIFEST_FILE_SIZE (16 KiB) check before reading; add symlink detection via symlink_metadata to reject symlinks in discover_local; add MAX_DISCOVERED_SKILLS (100) cap; validate prompt_hash format (sha256: + 64 hex chars); warn on name collision before overwriting; accept SkillSource parameter in load_skill instead of always using Local; add InvalidHashFormat, ManifestTooLarge, SymlinkDetected error variants - selector.rs: Add MAX_TAG_SCORE (15) cap parallel to keyword cap; warn when declared max_context_tokens diverges >2x from actual prompt size - scanner.rs: Add mixed-script homoglyph detection (Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian unicode ranges); document token-boundary bypass and semantic paraphrasing as known limitations - attenuation.rs: Document READ_ONLY_TOOLS maintenance requirements - agent_loop.rs: Surface scan warnings via structured tracing; add structured audit events for skill activation and tool attenuation 61 tests pass, 0 new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address 12 findings from second adversarial security review HIGH: - Escape opening <skill tags in prompt content (prevents fake skill block injection) - Scan manifest metadata fields (description, author, tags, reasons) not just prompt - Block trust downgrade on name collision (existing Local can't be replaced by Community) MEDIUM: - Eliminate TOCTOU gap: read files then check size instead of metadata-then-read - Reject file-level symlinks in load_skill (prompt.md, skill.toml) - Truncate and filter manifest.skill.tags (prevent unlimited tag scoring) - Cap regex pattern score at 40 (prevent 5x20=100 dominating keyword+tag) - Add doc comment about skill_list tool exposing metadata (sanitization required) - Move Community disclaimer inside <skill> tags (not outside structural boundary) - Filter keywords/tags shorter than 3 chars (prevent broad matching) LOW: - Enforce minimum token_cost of 1 (max_context_tokens=0 can't bypass budget) - Remove redundant try_exists checks in discover_local (let load_skill handle errors) 70 skills tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add HTTP endpoint scoping for skills (Phase 1) Skills that declare an [http] section in skill.toml now have their HTTP requests constrained to declared endpoints at runtime. This addresses the gap where allowed_patterns was parsed but never enforced -- once the http tool was visible via attenuation, the LLM could reach any URL. Enforcement reuses EndpointPattern/AllowlistValidator from the WASM capability system. Semantics: if no active skill declares [http], all requests pass through (backward compat). If any skill declares [http], URLs must match at least one skill's allowlist (union). Community skills' [http] declarations are silently ignored (defense in depth). Shell commands using curl/wget are also validated against scopes. Scanner gains detection for known exfiltration domains (webhook.site, ngrok.io, etc.), overly broad wildcards, and credential/host mismatches. Closes #38 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: Apply cargo fmt to http_scoping.rs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: Apply cargo fmt across codebase Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add parameter-level permission enforcement for skills (Phase 2) Activates enforcement of `allowed_patterns` in skill.toml permissions. Previously these patterns were parsed but not enforced -- a Verified skill declaring `permissions.shell` with `allowed_patterns = [{command = "cargo *"}]` could still run any shell command. Now the enforcer validates tool parameters against declared glob patterns before execution. Key changes: - New `enforcer.rs` module with `SkillPermissionEnforcer`, `glob_to_regex()`, and `validate_tool_call()` with union semantics across active skills - Typed pattern enums (`ShellPattern`, `FilePathPattern`, `MemoryTargetPattern`) replace the previous `Vec<serde_json::Value>` in `ToolPermissionDeclaration` - Scanner gains `scan_permission_patterns()` detecting dangerous patterns (rm, sudo, curl, bare wildcards, command chaining, sensitive paths, identity files) - Registry blocks non-Local skills with critical permission pattern warnings - Agent loop threads enforcer into `execute_chat_tool` alongside HTTP scoping Trust interaction: Community patterns ignored, Verified enforced, Local without patterns unrestricted, Local with patterns enforced as guidance. Union semantics across skills -- tool call allowed if ANY skill's patterns permit it. 34 new tests. All 818 library tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add worker permission enforcement and LLM behavioral analysis (Phase 3+4) Phase 3 - Worker-side permission enforcement: - Add SerializedToolPermission/SerializedPattern DTOs for HTTP boundary crossing - Extend JobDescription, ContainerHandle, and orchestrator API to carry permissions - CreateJobTool snapshots and forwards skill permissions to spawned workers - Worker runtime builds SkillPermissionEnforcer and checks before tool execution - Load-time token budget enforcement rejects prompts exceeding 2x declared budget - Deduplicate enforcer construction: from_active_skills() delegates to from_serialized() Phase 4 - LLM behavioral analysis: - BehavioralAnalyzer with cached, LLM-based semantic content analysis - Structured output parsing (FINDING|CATEGORY|SEVERITY|DESCRIPTION or CLEAN) - Content-hash caching with bounded size (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES=256) - Graceful degradation when LLM unavailable - Integrated into load_skill() for non-Local skills; critical findings block loading Review fixes: - Real cache tests with CountingLlm mock (test_cache_hit, test_cache_miss, test_cache_bounded) - UTF-8-safe truncate() in worker runtime - Few-shot examples in behavioral analysis prompt - Documented max_context_tokens=0 opt-out and create_job() permission gap 848 tests passing, no new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address review feedback from serrrfirat on skills-phase2 - Fix truncate_cmd UTF-8 panic: use char-boundary-aware slicing - Remove redundant effective_tools branching in reasoning.rs - Document cache eviction as known limitation (arbitrary, not LRU) - Add safety comment on SkillTrust enum ordering (security-critical) - Simplify active_skills selection (prefilter_skills handles empty input) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address remaining skills review feedback * refactor: replace skills system with OpenClaw SKILL.md format + 2-state trust Replace the 5-gate, 3-tier trust hierarchy (scanner, behavioral analyzer, parameter-level enforcer, HTTP endpoint scoping) with a simplified 3-layer security model: gating -> attenuation -> Docker confinement. Key changes: - SKILL.md format (YAML frontmatter + markdown prompt) replaces skill.toml + prompt.md - 2-state trust (Installed/Trusted) replaces 3-tier (Community/Verified/Local) - New parser.rs for SKILL.md parsing with serde_yaml - New gating.rs for requirements checking (bins/env/config) - Simplified registry with 2-location discovery (workspace + user dirs) - Removed scanner, behavioral_analyzer, enforcer, http_scoping (~4,100 lines) - Removed skill_permissions propagation through job/orchestrator/worker pipeline - Added serde_yaml dependency for YAML frontmatter parsing Net: -5,298 lines, 59 skills tests pass, 907 total tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: add in-app skill management tools and ClawHub catalog integration Add 4 chat-callable tools (skill_list, skill_search, skill_install, skill_remove) plus matching web gateway endpoints for managing skills at runtime. The catalog fetches from ClawHub's public registry API at runtime rather than bundling entries at compile time. Key changes: - SkillRegistry gains mutation methods (install_skill, remove_skill, reload, find_by_name) with Arc<RwLock> for concurrent access - New catalog module queries ClawHub /api/v1/search with in-memory caching (5-min TTL, configurable via CLAWHUB_REGISTRY env var) - skill_list and skill_search added to READ_ONLY_TOOLS for safe use under Installed trust ceiling - Web gateway gets /api/skills, /api/skills/search, /api/skills/install, and /api/skills/{name} DELETE endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR #51 review feedback from ilblackdragon Security: - Add SSRF protection to fetch_skill_content: require HTTPS, reject private/loopback/link-local IPs and internal hostnames, disable redirects. Gateway install handler now reuses the same validation. - URL-encode slug in skill_download_url to prevent query injection. - Require X-Confirm-Action header on gateway skill install/remove endpoints (equivalent to chat tool requires_approval gate). Correctness: - Eliminate all block_in_place/block_on usage in skill tools and gateway handlers. Split install into prepare_install_to_disk (static async, no lock) + commit_install (sync, brief write lock). Same pattern for remove: validate_remove + delete_skill_files + commit_remove. - Write normalized content to disk in install_skill (was writing original un-normalized content, causing hash mismatch on re-read). - Fix token estimation from 0.75 to 0.25 tokens/byte (~4 chars per token) in registry.rs, selector.rs, and standalone loader. Dependencies: - Replace deprecated serde_yaml 0.9 with serde_yml 0.0.12. - Remove unused toml dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
142 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust
142 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust
//! Requirements gating for skills.
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//!
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//! Checks that a skill's declared requirements (binaries, environment variables,
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//! config files) are satisfied before the skill is loaded.
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use crate::skills::GatingRequirements;
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/// Result of a gating check.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct GatingResult {
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/// Whether all requirements passed.
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pub passed: bool,
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/// Descriptions of failed requirements.
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pub failures: Vec<String>,
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}
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/// Check whether gating requirements are satisfied.
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///
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/// - `bins`: checks that each binary is findable via `which` (PATH lookup).
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/// - `env`: checks that each environment variable is set.
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/// - `config`: checks that each config file path exists.
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///
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/// Skills that fail gating should be logged and skipped, not loaded.
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pub fn check_requirements(requirements: &GatingRequirements) -> GatingResult {
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let mut failures = Vec::new();
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for bin in &requirements.bins {
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if !binary_exists(bin) {
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failures.push(format!("required binary not found: {}", bin));
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}
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}
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for var in &requirements.env {
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if std::env::var(var).is_err() {
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failures.push(format!("required env var not set: {}", var));
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}
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}
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for path in &requirements.config {
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if !std::path::Path::new(path).exists() {
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failures.push(format!("required config not found: {}", path));
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}
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}
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GatingResult {
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passed: failures.is_empty(),
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failures,
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}
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}
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/// Check if a binary exists on PATH using `std::process::Command`.
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fn binary_exists(name: &str) -> bool {
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#[cfg(unix)]
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{
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std::process::Command::new("which")
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.arg(name)
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.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
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.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
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.status()
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.is_ok_and(|s| s.success())
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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{
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std::process::Command::new("where")
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.arg(name)
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.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
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.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
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.status()
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.is_ok_and(|s| s.success())
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn test_empty_requirements_pass() {
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let req = GatingRequirements::default();
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(result.passed);
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assert!(result.failures.is_empty());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_missing_binary_fails() {
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let req = GatingRequirements {
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bins: vec!["__ironclaw_nonexistent_binary_xyz__".to_string()],
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..Default::default()
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};
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(!result.passed);
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assert_eq!(result.failures.len(), 1);
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assert!(result.failures[0].contains("binary not found"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_missing_env_var_fails() {
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let req = GatingRequirements {
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env: vec!["__IRONCLAW_TEST_NONEXISTENT_VAR__".to_string()],
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..Default::default()
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};
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(!result.passed);
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assert!(result.failures[0].contains("env var not set"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_present_env_var_passes() {
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// PATH is always set on both Unix and Windows
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let req = GatingRequirements {
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env: vec!["PATH".to_string()],
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..Default::default()
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};
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(result.passed);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_missing_config_fails() {
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let req = GatingRequirements {
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config: vec!["/nonexistent/path/ironclaw_test.conf".to_string()],
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..Default::default()
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};
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(!result.passed);
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assert!(result.failures[0].contains("config not found"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_multiple_mixed_requirements() {
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let req = GatingRequirements {
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bins: vec!["__no_such_bin__".to_string()],
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env: vec!["__NO_SUCH_VAR__".to_string()],
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config: vec!["/no/such/file".to_string()],
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};
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let result = check_requirements(&req);
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assert!(!result.passed);
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assert_eq!(result.failures.len(), 3);
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}
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}
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