* feat: Add secure prompt-based skills system (Phase 1 MVP) Implement a skills system that extends the agent with prompt-level instructions from local directories. Skills declare activation criteria, tool permissions, and trust tiers that determine authority attenuation. Core security model: the minimum trust level of any active skill determines a tool ceiling -- tools above the ceiling are removed from the LLM's tool list entirely at the API level, preventing prompt-based manipulation. New modules: - skills/mod.rs: Core types (SkillTrust, SkillManifest, LoadedSkill) - skills/scanner.rs: Content scanner for manipulation detection - skills/registry.rs: Filesystem discovery and manifest parsing - skills/selector.rs: Deterministic two-phase prefilter (no LLM) - skills/attenuation.rs: Trust-based tool filtering Integration: - Agent loop selects skills per-turn and applies tool attenuation - Reasoning engine injects skill context with structural isolation - Config supports SKILLS_ENABLED, SKILLS_DIR, SKILLS_MAX_ACTIVE, SKILLS_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS environment variables - Disabled by default (SKILLS_ENABLED=false) 41 new tests covering all modules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address all adversarial review findings for skills system Security fixes: - Escape skill name/version in XML attributes to prevent trust spoofing - Escape prompt content to prevent </skill> tag breakout - Require integrity hash for Verified/Community tier skills - Validate skill names against [a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63} - Add 64 KiB file size limit on prompt.md Bug fixes: - Use actual SkillsConfig from AgentDeps instead of SkillsConfig::default() - Add skills_config field to AgentDeps, wired through from main.rs Performance: - Pre-compile regex patterns at load time (cached on LoadedSkill) - Selector uses pre-compiled patterns instead of recompiling per message - Switch all std::fs to tokio::fs for non-blocking async I/O Hardening: - Cap keyword score at 30 points to prevent keyword stuffing attacks - Enforce max 20 keywords and 5 patterns per skill - Normalize line endings (CRLF/CR to LF) before hashing - Also includes cargo fmt formatting fixes for adjacent code Tests: 54 skills tests pass (up from 41), zero new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address medium/low severity findings from adversarial review Fixes all 18 medium/low severity findings identified by the security review: - mod.rs: Add MAX_TAGS_PER_SKILL cap (10) in enforce_limits(); use RegexBuilder with 64 KiB size_limit to prevent ReDoS; replace case-enumerated escape_skill_content with regex matching all case variants plus whitespace/null byte injection between </ and skill; document allowed_patterns as unenforced until Phase 2; document Marketplace URL validation as Phase 3 concern - registry.rs: Add MAX_MANIFEST_FILE_SIZE (16 KiB) check before reading; add symlink detection via symlink_metadata to reject symlinks in discover_local; add MAX_DISCOVERED_SKILLS (100) cap; validate prompt_hash format (sha256: + 64 hex chars); warn on name collision before overwriting; accept SkillSource parameter in load_skill instead of always using Local; add InvalidHashFormat, ManifestTooLarge, SymlinkDetected error variants - selector.rs: Add MAX_TAG_SCORE (15) cap parallel to keyword cap; warn when declared max_context_tokens diverges >2x from actual prompt size - scanner.rs: Add mixed-script homoglyph detection (Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian unicode ranges); document token-boundary bypass and semantic paraphrasing as known limitations - attenuation.rs: Document READ_ONLY_TOOLS maintenance requirements - agent_loop.rs: Surface scan warnings via structured tracing; add structured audit events for skill activation and tool attenuation 61 tests pass, 0 new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address 12 findings from second adversarial security review HIGH: - Escape opening <skill tags in prompt content (prevents fake skill block injection) - Scan manifest metadata fields (description, author, tags, reasons) not just prompt - Block trust downgrade on name collision (existing Local can't be replaced by Community) MEDIUM: - Eliminate TOCTOU gap: read files then check size instead of metadata-then-read - Reject file-level symlinks in load_skill (prompt.md, skill.toml) - Truncate and filter manifest.skill.tags (prevent unlimited tag scoring) - Cap regex pattern score at 40 (prevent 5x20=100 dominating keyword+tag) - Add doc comment about skill_list tool exposing metadata (sanitization required) - Move Community disclaimer inside <skill> tags (not outside structural boundary) - Filter keywords/tags shorter than 3 chars (prevent broad matching) LOW: - Enforce minimum token_cost of 1 (max_context_tokens=0 can't bypass budget) - Remove redundant try_exists checks in discover_local (let load_skill handle errors) 70 skills tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add HTTP endpoint scoping for skills (Phase 1) Skills that declare an [http] section in skill.toml now have their HTTP requests constrained to declared endpoints at runtime. This addresses the gap where allowed_patterns was parsed but never enforced -- once the http tool was visible via attenuation, the LLM could reach any URL. Enforcement reuses EndpointPattern/AllowlistValidator from the WASM capability system. Semantics: if no active skill declares [http], all requests pass through (backward compat). If any skill declares [http], URLs must match at least one skill's allowlist (union). Community skills' [http] declarations are silently ignored (defense in depth). Shell commands using curl/wget are also validated against scopes. Scanner gains detection for known exfiltration domains (webhook.site, ngrok.io, etc.), overly broad wildcards, and credential/host mismatches. Closes #38 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: Apply cargo fmt to http_scoping.rs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: Apply cargo fmt across codebase Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add parameter-level permission enforcement for skills (Phase 2) Activates enforcement of `allowed_patterns` in skill.toml permissions. Previously these patterns were parsed but not enforced -- a Verified skill declaring `permissions.shell` with `allowed_patterns = [{command = "cargo *"}]` could still run any shell command. Now the enforcer validates tool parameters against declared glob patterns before execution. Key changes: - New `enforcer.rs` module with `SkillPermissionEnforcer`, `glob_to_regex()`, and `validate_tool_call()` with union semantics across active skills - Typed pattern enums (`ShellPattern`, `FilePathPattern`, `MemoryTargetPattern`) replace the previous `Vec<serde_json::Value>` in `ToolPermissionDeclaration` - Scanner gains `scan_permission_patterns()` detecting dangerous patterns (rm, sudo, curl, bare wildcards, command chaining, sensitive paths, identity files) - Registry blocks non-Local skills with critical permission pattern warnings - Agent loop threads enforcer into `execute_chat_tool` alongside HTTP scoping Trust interaction: Community patterns ignored, Verified enforced, Local without patterns unrestricted, Local with patterns enforced as guidance. Union semantics across skills -- tool call allowed if ANY skill's patterns permit it. 34 new tests. All 818 library tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: Add worker permission enforcement and LLM behavioral analysis (Phase 3+4) Phase 3 - Worker-side permission enforcement: - Add SerializedToolPermission/SerializedPattern DTOs for HTTP boundary crossing - Extend JobDescription, ContainerHandle, and orchestrator API to carry permissions - CreateJobTool snapshots and forwards skill permissions to spawned workers - Worker runtime builds SkillPermissionEnforcer and checks before tool execution - Load-time token budget enforcement rejects prompts exceeding 2x declared budget - Deduplicate enforcer construction: from_active_skills() delegates to from_serialized() Phase 4 - LLM behavioral analysis: - BehavioralAnalyzer with cached, LLM-based semantic content analysis - Structured output parsing (FINDING|CATEGORY|SEVERITY|DESCRIPTION or CLEAN) - Content-hash caching with bounded size (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES=256) - Graceful degradation when LLM unavailable - Integrated into load_skill() for non-Local skills; critical findings block loading Review fixes: - Real cache tests with CountingLlm mock (test_cache_hit, test_cache_miss, test_cache_bounded) - UTF-8-safe truncate() in worker runtime - Few-shot examples in behavioral analysis prompt - Documented max_context_tokens=0 opt-out and create_job() permission gap 848 tests passing, no new clippy warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: Address review feedback from serrrfirat on skills-phase2 - Fix truncate_cmd UTF-8 panic: use char-boundary-aware slicing - Remove redundant effective_tools branching in reasoning.rs - Document cache eviction as known limitation (arbitrary, not LRU) - Add safety comment on SkillTrust enum ordering (security-critical) - Simplify active_skills selection (prefilter_skills handles empty input) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address remaining skills review feedback * refactor: replace skills system with OpenClaw SKILL.md format + 2-state trust Replace the 5-gate, 3-tier trust hierarchy (scanner, behavioral analyzer, parameter-level enforcer, HTTP endpoint scoping) with a simplified 3-layer security model: gating -> attenuation -> Docker confinement. Key changes: - SKILL.md format (YAML frontmatter + markdown prompt) replaces skill.toml + prompt.md - 2-state trust (Installed/Trusted) replaces 3-tier (Community/Verified/Local) - New parser.rs for SKILL.md parsing with serde_yaml - New gating.rs for requirements checking (bins/env/config) - Simplified registry with 2-location discovery (workspace + user dirs) - Removed scanner, behavioral_analyzer, enforcer, http_scoping (~4,100 lines) - Removed skill_permissions propagation through job/orchestrator/worker pipeline - Added serde_yaml dependency for YAML frontmatter parsing Net: -5,298 lines, 59 skills tests pass, 907 total tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: add in-app skill management tools and ClawHub catalog integration Add 4 chat-callable tools (skill_list, skill_search, skill_install, skill_remove) plus matching web gateway endpoints for managing skills at runtime. The catalog fetches from ClawHub's public registry API at runtime rather than bundling entries at compile time. Key changes: - SkillRegistry gains mutation methods (install_skill, remove_skill, reload, find_by_name) with Arc<RwLock> for concurrent access - New catalog module queries ClawHub /api/v1/search with in-memory caching (5-min TTL, configurable via CLAWHUB_REGISTRY env var) - skill_list and skill_search added to READ_ONLY_TOOLS for safe use under Installed trust ceiling - Web gateway gets /api/skills, /api/skills/search, /api/skills/install, and /api/skills/{name} DELETE endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR #51 review feedback from ilblackdragon Security: - Add SSRF protection to fetch_skill_content: require HTTPS, reject private/loopback/link-local IPs and internal hostnames, disable redirects. Gateway install handler now reuses the same validation. - URL-encode slug in skill_download_url to prevent query injection. - Require X-Confirm-Action header on gateway skill install/remove endpoints (equivalent to chat tool requires_approval gate). Correctness: - Eliminate all block_in_place/block_on usage in skill tools and gateway handlers. Split install into prepare_install_to_disk (static async, no lock) + commit_install (sync, brief write lock). Same pattern for remove: validate_remove + delete_skill_files + commit_remove. - Write normalized content to disk in install_skill (was writing original un-normalized content, causing hash mismatch on re-read). - Fix token estimation from 0.75 to 0.25 tokens/byte (~4 chars per token) in registry.rs, selector.rs, and standalone loader. Dependencies: - Replace deprecated serde_yaml 0.9 with serde_yml 0.0.12. - Remove unused toml dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). All settings are saved to
~/.ironclaw/settings.toml.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
