a158eee1b0 feat: 10 infrastructure improvements from zeroclaw (#126)
* refactor: break up agent_loop.rs into four focused modules

Split the monolithic 2835-line agent_loop.rs into:
- agent_loop.rs (722L): Agent struct, event loop, message dispatch
- dispatcher.rs (635L): Agentic tool loop, tool execution, auth detection
- commands.rs (484L): System commands, job handlers, heartbeat, summarize
- thread_ops.rs (1059L): Thread lifecycle, approval, undo/redo, persistence

Each module gets its own impl Agent block. Agent fields changed to
pub(super) so sibling modules in the agent package can access them.
All 16 existing tests pass in their new locations.

Inspired by ZeroClaw's agent module split (agent.rs, loop_.rs,
dispatcher.rs, prompt.rs, memory_loader.rs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add cost caps and guardrails for autonomous agent spending

Daily budget (MAX_COST_PER_DAY_CENTS) and hourly action rate
(MAX_ACTIONS_PER_HOUR) limits prevent runaway agents from burning
through API credits, especially in daemon/heartbeat modes.

- CostGuard with pre-flight check and post-call recording
- Sliding window for hourly rate, midnight-UTC daily reset
- 80% threshold warning, atomic fast-path for exceeded budget
- Wired into dispatcher loop (check before LLM call, record after)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add circuit breaker on LLM providers

Wraps LlmProvider with a Closed/Open/HalfOpen state machine that
trips after consecutive transient failures, preventing request storms
against a degraded backend. Automatically probes for recovery.

- CircuitBreakerProvider implements LlmProvider (drop-in wrapper)
- Transient error classification (server, rate-limit, network, auth infra)
- Client errors (wrong model, context overflow) don't trip the breaker
- Configurable via CIRCUIT_BREAKER_THRESHOLD and CIRCUIT_BREAKER_RECOVERY_SECS
- Composes with existing FailoverProvider (circuit breaker wraps failover)
- 12 tests covering full state machine and error classification

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add tunnel abstraction for remote access

Trait-based tunnel system with lifecycle management (start/stop/health)
for exposing the agent to the internet through external tunnel binaries.

Five providers:
- Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared, Zero Trust token auth)
- Tailscale (serve for tailnet, funnel for public)
- ngrok (with optional custom domain)
- Custom (arbitrary command with {host}/{port} placeholders)
- None (local-only, no external exposure)

Config via TUNNEL_PROVIDER + provider-specific env vars. Extends
existing TunnelConfig with optional managed provider alongside the
static TUNNEL_URL path. Factory, shared process management, and
37 tests covering all providers and edge cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add OS service management (launchd/systemd)

Adds `ironclaw service {install,start,stop,status,uninstall}` for
running the agent as a background daemon. macOS uses launchd plists
under ~/Library/LaunchAgents, Linux uses systemd user units.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add observability trait system with noop, log, and multi backends

Introduces an Observer trait for recording agent lifecycle events and
metrics, with pluggable backends. The noop backend compiles to zero
overhead, log backend uses tracing, and multi fans out to multiple
observers. Configured via OBSERVABILITY_BACKEND env var.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add in-memory LLM response cache with TTL and LRU eviction

CachedProvider wraps any LlmProvider and caches complete() responses
keyed by SHA-256(model + messages). Tool-calling requests are never
cached since they trigger side effects. Configurable via
RESPONSE_CACHE_ENABLED, RESPONSE_CACHE_TTL_SECS, and
RESPONSE_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES env vars.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add memory hygiene with cadence-gated daily log cleanup

Adds workspace::hygiene module that automatically deletes daily log
documents older than a configurable retention period (default 30 days).
Runs on a 12-hour cadence tracked via a local state file to avoid
redundant passes. Best-effort design: failures are logged, never fatal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add doctor diagnostics command for active health probing

Probes external dependencies (Docker, cloudflared, ngrok, tailscale),
validates NEAR AI session, checks database connectivity, and verifies
workspace directory. Complements the passive `status` command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add structured TOML config file support

Adds ~/.ironclaw/config.toml as a configuration layer between env vars
and database settings. Priority: env var > TOML file > DB > defaults.

- `ironclaw config init` generates a commented config.toml from current settings
- `ironclaw --config path/to/config.toml` loads a custom config file
- Settings.merge_from() only overlays non-default values from the TOML file
- `ironclaw config path` now shows TOML file status

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address codex review findings

- apply_toml_overlay now returns Result and errors on explicit missing
  or invalid config paths (was log-only, violating the documented
  contract that explicit paths are fatal)
- custom tunnel url_pattern is now used to filter extracted URLs, not
  just as a gate for scanning stdout
- systemd ExecStart path is now quoted to handle spaces in paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR review feedback

- Cache key now includes max_tokens, temperature, and stop_sequences
  so different request parameters produce distinct keys
- to_cents() uses .trunc() + parse::<u64> instead of f64 intermediary,
  avoiding precision loss for large values
- Tailscale public URL no longer includes local port (serve/funnel
  expose on standard HTTPS port 443)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: wire up tunnel lifecycle and fix audit findings

Connect the tunnel module to the rest of the application so that
setting TUNNEL_PROVIDER actually starts a managed tunnel at boot and
stops it on shutdown. Previously create_tunnel() was never called
outside tests.

Changes:
- Expand TunnelSettings with provider credential fields (settings.rs)
- TunnelConfig::resolve() falls back to DB settings when env vars unset
- Start tunnel at boot, stop on shutdown, show URL in boot screen
- Setup wizard collects provider-specific credentials (ngrok, cloudflare,
  tailscale, custom, static URL)
- Fix public_url() returning None under lock contention (SharedUrl)
- Fix local_host parameter ignored by cloudflare/ngrok/tailscale
- Fix tailscale silent fallback to "localhost" on bad JSON
- Fix ngrok globally mutating config via add-authtoken (use env var)
- Add 10s timeout to tailscale status --json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR review comments

- Document split_whitespace limitation in CustomTunnel doc comment
- Remove unnecessary quotes from systemd ExecStart directive

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR review feedback (round 3)

- doctor: missing libSQL DB on fresh install is Pass, not Fail
- service: quote ExecStart path for systemd space handling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: correct cost guard doc comment (LLM calls, not LLM/tool)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-02-17 19:35:56 +00:00
2026-02-04 22:09:52 -08:00
2026-02-11 08:31:25 +00:00
2026-02-11 08:31:25 +00:00
2026-02-09 03:00:35 +00:00
2026-02-17 16:35:49 +00:00
2026-02-02 23:24:17 -08:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). All settings are saved to ~/.ironclaw/settings.toml.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

S
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IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security
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