* feat: structured fallback deliverables for failed/stuck jobs (#221) When a job fails or gets stuck, build a FallbackDeliverable that captures partial results, action statistics, cost, timing, and repair attempts. This replaces opaque error strings with structured data users can act on. - Add FallbackDeliverable, LastAction, ActionStats types in context/fallback.rs - Store fallback in JobContext.metadata["fallback_deliverable"] on failure - Surface fallback in job_status tool output and SSE job_result events - Update mark_failed() and mark_stuck() in worker to build fallback - 8 unit tests covering zero/mixed actions, truncation, timing, serialization Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address review comments on fallback deliverables - Fix doc comment: "200 chars" -> "200 bytes (UTF-8 safe)" since truncate_str operates on byte length, not character count. - Add code comment documenting that SSE fallback_deliverable is currently always None (forward-compatible infrastructure). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * refactor: take Option<&FallbackDeliverable> instead of &Option<…> Addresses Gemini review feedback: idiomatic Rust prefers Option<&T> over &Option<T> for borrowed optional values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: guard against non-object metadata and add fallback test - store_fallback_in_metadata now resets metadata to {} when it's any non-object type (string, array, number), not just null. Prevents panic on index assignment. - Add test_job_status_includes_fallback_deliverable to verify the fallback field is surfaced in job_status tool output. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: use sanitized output in fallback preview + add integration tests Security fix: FallbackDeliverable::build() now uses output_sanitized instead of output_raw, preventing secrets/PII from leaking through the job_status tool and SSE job_result events. Also adds: - test_fallback_uses_sanitized_output: proves raw secrets don't leak - test_store_fallback_in_metadata_roundtrip: full serialize/deserialize - test_store_fallback_handles_non_object_metadata: edge case coverage - test_store_fallback_none_is_noop: None input is safe Addresses serrrfirat review feedback on PR #236. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: harden fallback deliverables against review findings - Truncate failure_reason to 1000 bytes to prevent metadata bloat - Add tracing::warn on fallback serialization failure (was silently discarded) - Fix module/struct docs to cover stuck jobs, remove stale SSE claim - Fix job.rs test to use real FallbackDeliverable field names - Add tests for failure_reason truncation and completed_at=None elapsed time - Fix pre-existing clippy warning in settings.rs (field_reassign_with_default) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address Copilot review findings on fallback deliverables - Fix output_raw/output_sanitized field swap in ActionRecord::succeed() so sanitized data actually goes into the sanitized field (security) - Return None instead of empty Memory when get_memory fails in build_fallback, with tracing::warn for observability - Replace manual elapsed calculation with ctx.elapsed() which already clamps negative durations Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: resolve rebase conflicts and update tests for parameter swap - Add fallback field to SseEvent::JobResult in job_monitor - Fix type annotation in fallback deliverable test - Update test_action_record_succeed_sets_fields for new parameter order - Use create_job_for_user in test (API changed on main) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * chore: trigger CI re-check after rebase * fix: fall back to error message for failed action output_preview When the last action is a failed tool call, output_sanitized is None, leaving output_preview empty. Now falls back to the action's error message so users see what went wrong. [skip-regression-check] * ci: add safety comments to test code for no-panics check The CI no-panics grep check cannot distinguish test code inside src/ files from production code. Add // safety: test annotations to .unwrap(), .expect(), and assert!() calls in #[cfg(test)] modules. * fix: clarify succeed() doc and avoid clone in output_preview - Fix doc comment: output_raw is stored as pretty-printed JSON string, not a raw JSON value - Borrow string slice directly in fallback preview to avoid cloning potentially large sanitized outputs before truncation * refactor: reuse floor_char_boundary in truncate_str Replace hand-rolled UTF-8 boundary logic with existing crate::util::floor_char_boundary to reduce duplication. * fix: rename SSE fallback field to fallback_deliverable for consistency The SSE JobResult field was named `fallback` while everywhere else (metadata key, job_status tool) uses `fallback_deliverable`. Align the SSE wire format to avoid forcing clients to handle two names. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語
Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/LLM_PROVIDERS.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
