* feat: receive relay events via webhook callbacks instead of SSE Replace the SSE pull model with push-based webhook callbacks from channel-relay. Eliminates the reconnect loop, stream token auth, and SSE parser — events arrive via HTTP POST to /relay/events. - Add webhook handler with HMAC signature verification - Simplify RelayChannel to use mpsc from webhook handler - Remove SSE connect/reconnect/parse logic from RelayClient - Add register_callback() to RelayClient for callback URL registration - Update activation flow to create event channel and register callback - Wire relay webhook endpoint into web gateway * fix: address review feedback on webhook callback PR - Return 503 when relay event channel is full/closed (enables retry) - Reject malformed timestamps with 400 instead of proceeding - Allow relay activation without settings store (no-store/ephemeral mode) - Check installed_relay_extensions set in is_relay_channel for no-db mode - Fix staging test constructors for new RelayChannel signature * security: adapt relay client to new channel-relay auth model Adapts the relay integration to the hardened channel-relay security model: - Switch from X-API-Key header to Authorization: Bearer sk-agent-* for all relay API calls (chat-api token verification) - Remove register_callback() — PUT /callbacks endpoint removed - Remove event_callback_url from initiate_oauth() — parameter removed - Make signing_secret a required field in RelayConfig (new env var: CHANNEL_RELAY_SIGNING_SECRET) - Update integration tests for Bearer auth and removed endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: use server-side approval tokens, remove caller-supplied routing - Approval flow now calls POST /approvals to register server-side record, then embeds only the opaque approval_token in button value - Remove instance_id parameter from proxy_provider() — channel-relay no longer accepts it (uses verified identity) - Remove instance_id and user_id from initiate_oauth() — channel-relay derives them from the Bearer token - Add create_approval() to RelayClient Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: pass webhook_url during OAuth so callback_url is set on connection The channel-relay OAuth flow now accepts webhook_url to set the callback_url during connection creation. IronClaw computes its webhook URL from callback_base + webhook_path and passes it during initiate_oauth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: remove webhook_url from OAuth initiation Channel-relay now derives the callback URL from chat-api's instance_url. IronClaw no longer supplies webhook_url during OAuth — the relay is the authority on where events get delivered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * chore: cargo fmt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: remove all URL params from OAuth initiation IronClaw no longer supplies any URLs to channel-relay. The relay derives all URLs from the trusted instance_url in chat-api. initiate_oauth() takes no parameters. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: restore CSRF nonce for OAuth callback validation Re-add nonce generation and secret storage in auth_channel_relay. The nonce is passed to channel-relay as state_nonce param (not a URL). Channel-relay embeds it in the signed state and appends it to the redirect URL so IronClaw's callback handler can validate and activate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: per-instance callback signing secrets relay_signing_secret() now prefers OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN (per-instance) over the shared CHANNEL_RELAY_SIGNING_SECRET. A compromised instance can no longer forge callbacks to other instances on the same relay. CHANNEL_RELAY_SIGNING_SECRET is now optional in RelayConfig. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: clean per-instance callback secrets, no shared secrets, no fallbacks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: pass team_id to get_signing_secret for workspace-scoped lookup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * security: remove sender_id from create_approval — relay derives it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: remove stale relay sender_id validation * fix: harden relay webhook activation lifecycle --------- Co-authored-by: Pierre <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
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Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/LLM_PROVIDERS.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
