02f85a8ad5 feat(mcp): transport abstraction, stdio/UDS transports, and OAuth fixes (#721)
* feat(mcp): transport abstraction, stdio/UDS transports, and OAuth fixes

Extract McpTransport trait from HTTP-coupled McpClient, enabling pluggable
transport backends. Implements stdio and Unix domain socket transports for
local MCP server integration, fixes OAuth discovery per RFC 9728, and adds
SSRF protection.

Transport abstraction (Step 2):
- McpTransport trait with send(), shutdown(), supports_http_features()
- HttpMcpTransport extracted from McpClient with SSE parsing, session tracking
- Shared JSON-RPC framing helpers (write_jsonrpc_line, spawn_jsonrpc_reader)
- McpClient refactored to hold Arc<dyn McpTransport>

Stdio transport (#652, Step 4):
- StdioMcpTransport spawns child process, communicates via stdin/stdout
- McpProcessManager for lifecycle management with exponential backoff restart
- Background stderr drain task for debug logging

Unix domain socket transport (#134, Step 5):
- UnixMcpTransport connects to existing Unix sockets
- Reuses shared JSON-RPC framing from transport.rs

HTML error body sanitization (#263, Step 1):
- sanitize_error_body() detects HTML, strips control chars, truncates to 500

Custom headers (#639, Step 3):
- headers field on McpServerConfig, merged into every HTTP request
- --header CLI arg for `mcp add`

Config and CLI updates (Step 6):
- McpTransportConfig tagged enum (Http/Stdio/Unix) with serde support
- EffectiveTransport for zero-copy config dispatch
- CLI: --transport, --command, --arg, --env, --socket flags for `mcp add`
- `mcp list` shows transport type

OAuth fixes (#299, Step 8):
- Multi-strategy discovery (401-based, RFC 9728, direct)
- RFC 8707 resource parameter in auth and refresh flows
- SSRF protection with IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass detection
- Well-known URI construction per RFC 8414

Closes #652, #134, #639, #263, #299

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): address audit findings from crate review

- Fix SSRF bypass: make validate_url_safe async with DNS resolution to
  block hostnames that resolve to private/link-local IPs
- Fix UTF-8 truncation: use char-based truncation in sanitize_error_body
  to avoid panicking on multi-byte characters
- Fix SSE parser: process only complete lines to handle chunks split
  across boundaries, add 10MB buffer size limit
- Add debug_assert for transport type mismatch in new_with_config
- Propagate custom headers in new_with_transport constructor
- Deduplicate effective_transport() calls in CLI list command
- Gate test-only accessors with #[cfg(test)] to eliminate dead_code warnings
- Document JSON-RPC notification id:0 limitation in protocol.rs
- Document total backoff wait time (31s) in process.rs
- Add regression test for multi-byte UTF-8 truncation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): address PR review findings from Copilot, Gemini, and zmanian

Moderate/High fixes:
- Plumb custom headers through new_authenticated constructor
- Restrict HTTP to localhost only in validate_url_safe (prevent
  plaintext credential leaks over non-localhost HTTP)
- Add mcp_process_manager.shutdown_all() to app shutdown path to
  prevent orphaning stdio child processes
- Validate discovered authorization_url before opening browser
  (prevent malicious MCP server redirecting to phishing page)

Medium fixes:
- Upgrade debug_assert to assert in new_with_config (fires in release)
- Remove pending map entry on Ok(Err(_)) in stdio/unix send() to avoid
  stale entries and unnecessary 30s waits
- Shut down old transport in try_restart() before spawning replacement
- Redact env var values in mcp list --verbose (may contain secrets)
- Drain pending requests on shutdown to wake waiters immediately
- Add IPv6 link-local, site-local, unique-local, and documentation
  ranges to is_dangerous_ip SSRF protection

Low fixes:
- Truncate logged JSON parse error lines to 200 chars (prevent
  sensitive data in logs)
- Remove misleading shutdown comment in unix_transport
- Use tempfile::tempdir() instead of hardcoded /tmp/ path in test
- Adopt main's improved sanitize_error_body (HTML tag stripping,
  200-char truncation with char_indices)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): gate unix_transport with #[cfg(unix)] for Windows compat

- Add #[cfg(unix)] to unix_transport module declaration
- Add #[cfg(unix)]/#[cfg(not(unix))] branches in app.rs for Unix
  socket MCP server setup
- Remove unused sanitize_error_body import in client.rs tests

[skip-regression-check]

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-03-09 02:47:42 +00:00
2026-03-05 17:12:49 -08:00
2026-02-04 22:09:52 -08:00
2026-02-11 08:31:25 +00:00
2026-02-09 03:00:35 +00:00
2026-03-06 11:23:28 -08:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-21 15:14:57 -07:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but works with any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Popular options include OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, Ollama (local), and self-hosted servers like vLLM or LiteLLM.

Select "OpenAI-compatible" in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/LLM_PROVIDERS.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Telegram channel: See docs/TELEGRAM_SETUP.md for setup and DM pairing.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

S
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IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security
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