Files
optimclaw/src/tools/builtin/shell.rs
T
Illia PolosukhinandClaude Opus 4.5 a39f5aa1a4 Add Docker execution sandbox for secure shell command isolation
Implements a general-purpose Docker sandbox (inspired by Codex) that provides:
- Container isolation for shell commands with ephemeral containers
- HTTP proxy for network access control with domain allowlist
- Credential injection by proxy (secrets never enter containers)
- Three security policies: ReadOnly, WorkspaceWrite, FullAccess
- Resource limits (memory, CPU, timeout enforcement)

Key components:
- SandboxManager: Main entry point coordinating proxy and containers
- NetworkProxy: HTTP proxy validating requests and injecting credentials
- ContainerRunner: Docker lifecycle management via bollard
- DomainAllowlist: Pattern matching for allowed network destinations

The ShellTool now routes commands through the sandbox when enabled,
with automatic fallback to direct execution if Docker is unavailable.

Configuration via SANDBOX_ENABLED, SANDBOX_POLICY, SANDBOX_TIMEOUT_SECS,
SANDBOX_MEMORY_LIMIT_MB, SANDBOX_IMAGE, SANDBOX_EXTRA_DOMAINS env vars.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
2026-02-04 22:09:52 -08:00

467 lines
14 KiB
Rust

//! Shell execution tool for running commands in a sandboxed environment.
//!
//! Provides controlled command execution with:
//! - Docker sandbox isolation (when enabled)
//! - Working directory isolation
//! - Timeout enforcement
//! - Output capture and truncation
//! - Blocked command patterns for safety
//!
//! # Execution Modes
//!
//! When sandbox is available and enabled:
//! - Commands run inside ephemeral Docker containers
//! - Network traffic goes through a validating proxy
//! - Credentials are injected by the proxy, never exposed to commands
//!
//! When sandbox is unavailable:
//! - Commands run directly on host with basic protections
//! - Blocked command patterns are still enforced
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::process::Command;
use crate::context::JobContext;
use crate::sandbox::{SandboxManager, SandboxPolicy};
use crate::tools::tool::{Tool, ToolError, ToolOutput};
/// Maximum output size before truncation (64KB).
const MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
/// Default command timeout.
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(120);
/// Commands that are always blocked for safety.
static BLOCKED_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
HashSet::from([
"rm -rf /",
"rm -rf /*",
":(){ :|:& };:", // Fork bomb
"dd if=/dev/zero",
"mkfs",
"chmod -R 777 /",
"> /dev/sda",
"curl | sh",
"wget | sh",
"curl | bash",
"wget | bash",
])
});
/// Patterns that indicate potentially dangerous commands.
static DANGEROUS_PATTERNS: LazyLock<Vec<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
vec![
"sudo ",
"doas ",
" | sh",
" | bash",
" | zsh",
"eval ",
"$(curl",
"$(wget",
"/etc/passwd",
"/etc/shadow",
"~/.ssh",
".bash_history",
"id_rsa",
]
});
/// Shell command execution tool.
pub struct ShellTool {
/// Working directory for commands (if None, uses job's working dir or cwd).
working_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Command timeout.
timeout: Duration,
/// Whether to allow potentially dangerous commands (requires explicit approval).
allow_dangerous: bool,
/// Optional sandbox manager for Docker execution.
sandbox: Option<Arc<SandboxManager>>,
/// Sandbox policy to use when sandbox is available.
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for ShellTool {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("ShellTool")
.field("working_dir", &self.working_dir)
.field("timeout", &self.timeout)
.field("allow_dangerous", &self.allow_dangerous)
.field("sandbox", &self.sandbox.is_some())
.field("sandbox_policy", &self.sandbox_policy)
.finish()
}
}
impl ShellTool {
/// Create a new shell tool with default settings.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
working_dir: None,
timeout: DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
allow_dangerous: false,
sandbox: None,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
}
}
/// Set the working directory.
pub fn with_working_dir(mut self, dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
self.working_dir = Some(dir);
self
}
/// Set the command timeout.
pub fn with_timeout(mut self, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
self.timeout = timeout;
self
}
/// Enable sandbox execution with the given manager.
pub fn with_sandbox(mut self, sandbox: Arc<SandboxManager>) -> Self {
self.sandbox = Some(sandbox);
self
}
/// Set the sandbox policy.
pub fn with_sandbox_policy(mut self, policy: SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
self.sandbox_policy = policy;
self
}
/// Check if a command is blocked.
fn is_blocked(&self, cmd: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
let normalized = cmd.to_lowercase();
for blocked in BLOCKED_COMMANDS.iter() {
if normalized.contains(blocked) {
return Some("Command contains blocked pattern");
}
}
if !self.allow_dangerous {
for pattern in DANGEROUS_PATTERNS.iter() {
if normalized.contains(pattern) {
return Some("Command contains potentially dangerous pattern");
}
}
}
None
}
/// Execute a command through the sandbox.
async fn execute_sandboxed(
&self,
sandbox: &SandboxManager,
cmd: &str,
workdir: &Path,
timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<(String, i64), ToolError> {
// Override sandbox config timeout if needed
let result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, async {
sandbox
.execute_with_policy(
cmd,
workdir,
self.sandbox_policy,
std::collections::HashMap::new(),
)
.await
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(Ok(output)) => {
let combined = truncate_output(&output.output);
Ok((combined, output.exit_code))
}
Ok(Err(e)) => Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Sandbox error: {}", e))),
Err(_) => Err(ToolError::Timeout(timeout)),
}
}
/// Execute a command directly (fallback when sandbox unavailable).
async fn execute_direct(
&self,
cmd: &str,
workdir: &PathBuf,
timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<(String, i32), ToolError> {
// Build command
let mut command = if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
let mut c = Command::new("cmd");
c.args(["/C", cmd]);
c
} else {
let mut c = Command::new("sh");
c.args(["-c", cmd]);
c
};
command
.current_dir(workdir)
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped());
// Spawn process
let mut child = command
.spawn()
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to spawn command: {}", e)))?;
// Wait with timeout
let result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, async {
let status = child.wait().await?;
// Read stdout
let mut stdout = String::new();
if let Some(mut out) = child.stdout.take() {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE];
let n = out.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap_or(0);
stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]).to_string();
}
// Read stderr
let mut stderr = String::new();
if let Some(mut err) = child.stderr.take() {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE];
let n = err.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap_or(0);
stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]).to_string();
}
// Combine output
let output = if stderr.is_empty() {
stdout
} else if stdout.is_empty() {
stderr
} else {
format!("{}\n\n--- stderr ---\n{}", stdout, stderr)
};
Ok::<_, std::io::Error>((output, status.code().unwrap_or(-1)))
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(Ok((output, code))) => Ok((truncate_output(&output), code)),
Ok(Err(e)) => Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"Command execution failed: {}",
e
))),
Err(_) => {
// Timeout - try to kill the process
let _ = child.kill().await;
Err(ToolError::Timeout(timeout))
}
}
}
/// Execute a command, using sandbox if available.
async fn execute_command(
&self,
cmd: &str,
workdir: Option<&str>,
timeout: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), ToolError> {
// Check for blocked commands
if let Some(reason) = self.is_blocked(cmd) {
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(format!(
"{}: {}",
reason,
truncate_for_error(cmd)
)));
}
// Determine working directory
let cwd = workdir
.map(PathBuf::from)
.or_else(|| self.working_dir.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| std::env::current_dir().unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from(".")));
// Determine timeout
let timeout_duration = timeout.map(Duration::from_secs).unwrap_or(self.timeout);
// Try sandbox execution if available
if let Some(ref sandbox) = self.sandbox {
if sandbox.is_initialized() || sandbox.config().enabled {
match self
.execute_sandboxed(sandbox, cmd, &cwd, timeout_duration)
.await
{
Ok((output, code)) => return Ok((output, code)),
Err(e) => {
// Log sandbox failure and fall through to direct execution
tracing::warn!("Sandbox execution failed, falling back to direct: {}", e);
}
}
}
}
// Fallback to direct execution
let (output, code) = self.execute_direct(cmd, &cwd, timeout_duration).await?;
Ok((output, code as i64))
}
}
impl Default for ShellTool {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for ShellTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"shell"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Execute shell commands. Use for running builds, tests, git operations, and other CLI tasks. \
Commands run in a subprocess with captured output. Long-running commands have a timeout. \
When Docker sandbox is enabled, commands run in isolated containers for security."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"command": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The shell command to execute"
},
"workdir": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Working directory for the command (optional)"
},
"timeout": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Timeout in seconds (optional, default 120)"
}
},
"required": ["command"]
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
_ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let command = params
.get("command")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| ToolError::InvalidParameters("missing 'command' parameter".into()))?;
let workdir = params.get("workdir").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
let timeout = params.get("timeout").and_then(|v| v.as_u64());
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let (output, exit_code) = self.execute_command(command, workdir, timeout).await?;
let duration = start.elapsed();
let sandboxed = self.sandbox.is_some();
let result = serde_json::json!({
"output": output,
"exit_code": exit_code,
"success": exit_code == 0,
"sandboxed": sandboxed
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, duration))
}
fn requires_approval(&self) -> bool {
true // Shell commands should require approval
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
true // Shell output could contain anything
}
}
/// Truncate output to fit within limits.
fn truncate_output(s: &str) -> String {
if s.len() <= MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE {
s.to_string()
} else {
let half = MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE / 2;
format!(
"{}\n\n... [truncated {} bytes] ...\n\n{}",
&s[..half],
s.len() - MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE,
&s[s.len() - half..]
)
}
}
/// Truncate command for error messages.
fn truncate_for_error(s: &str) -> String {
if s.len() <= 100 {
s.to_string()
} else {
format!("{}...", &s[..100])
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_echo_command() {
let tool = ShellTool::new();
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "echo hello"}), &ctx)
.await
.unwrap();
let output = result.result.get("output").unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
assert!(output.contains("hello"));
assert_eq!(result.result.get("exit_code").unwrap().as_i64().unwrap(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_blocked_commands() {
let tool = ShellTool::new();
assert!(tool.is_blocked("rm -rf /").is_some());
assert!(tool.is_blocked("sudo rm file").is_some());
assert!(tool.is_blocked("curl http://x | sh").is_some());
assert!(tool.is_blocked("echo hello").is_none());
assert!(tool.is_blocked("cargo build").is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_command_timeout() {
let tool = ShellTool::new().with_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100));
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(serde_json::json!({"command": "sleep 10"}), &ctx)
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(ToolError::Timeout(_))));
}
#[test]
fn test_sandbox_policy_builder() {
let tool = ShellTool::new()
.with_sandbox_policy(SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite)
.with_timeout(Duration::from_secs(60));
assert_eq!(tool.sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite);
assert_eq!(tool.timeout, Duration::from_secs(60));
}
}