Files
optimclaw/src/channels/web/ws.rs
T
bac2d75713 feat: Secure prompt-based skills system (Phases 1-4) (#51)
* feat: Add secure prompt-based skills system (Phase 1 MVP)

Implement a skills system that extends the agent with prompt-level
instructions from local directories. Skills declare activation criteria,
tool permissions, and trust tiers that determine authority attenuation.

Core security model: the minimum trust level of any active skill
determines a tool ceiling -- tools above the ceiling are removed from
the LLM's tool list entirely at the API level, preventing prompt-based
manipulation.

New modules:
- skills/mod.rs: Core types (SkillTrust, SkillManifest, LoadedSkill)
- skills/scanner.rs: Content scanner for manipulation detection
- skills/registry.rs: Filesystem discovery and manifest parsing
- skills/selector.rs: Deterministic two-phase prefilter (no LLM)
- skills/attenuation.rs: Trust-based tool filtering

Integration:
- Agent loop selects skills per-turn and applies tool attenuation
- Reasoning engine injects skill context with structural isolation
- Config supports SKILLS_ENABLED, SKILLS_DIR, SKILLS_MAX_ACTIVE,
  SKILLS_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS environment variables
- Disabled by default (SKILLS_ENABLED=false)

41 new tests covering all modules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address all adversarial review findings for skills system

Security fixes:
- Escape skill name/version in XML attributes to prevent trust spoofing
- Escape prompt content to prevent </skill> tag breakout
- Require integrity hash for Verified/Community tier skills
- Validate skill names against [a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63}
- Add 64 KiB file size limit on prompt.md

Bug fixes:
- Use actual SkillsConfig from AgentDeps instead of SkillsConfig::default()
- Add skills_config field to AgentDeps, wired through from main.rs

Performance:
- Pre-compile regex patterns at load time (cached on LoadedSkill)
- Selector uses pre-compiled patterns instead of recompiling per message
- Switch all std::fs to tokio::fs for non-blocking async I/O

Hardening:
- Cap keyword score at 30 points to prevent keyword stuffing attacks
- Enforce max 20 keywords and 5 patterns per skill
- Normalize line endings (CRLF/CR to LF) before hashing
- Also includes cargo fmt formatting fixes for adjacent code

Tests: 54 skills tests pass (up from 41), zero new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address medium/low severity findings from adversarial review

Fixes all 18 medium/low severity findings identified by the security review:

- mod.rs: Add MAX_TAGS_PER_SKILL cap (10) in enforce_limits(); use
  RegexBuilder with 64 KiB size_limit to prevent ReDoS; replace
  case-enumerated escape_skill_content with regex matching all case
  variants plus whitespace/null byte injection between </ and skill;
  document allowed_patterns as unenforced until Phase 2; document
  Marketplace URL validation as Phase 3 concern

- registry.rs: Add MAX_MANIFEST_FILE_SIZE (16 KiB) check before reading;
  add symlink detection via symlink_metadata to reject symlinks in
  discover_local; add MAX_DISCOVERED_SKILLS (100) cap; validate
  prompt_hash format (sha256: + 64 hex chars); warn on name collision
  before overwriting; accept SkillSource parameter in load_skill instead
  of always using Local; add InvalidHashFormat, ManifestTooLarge,
  SymlinkDetected error variants

- selector.rs: Add MAX_TAG_SCORE (15) cap parallel to keyword cap; warn
  when declared max_context_tokens diverges >2x from actual prompt size

- scanner.rs: Add mixed-script homoglyph detection (Cyrillic, Greek,
  Armenian unicode ranges); document token-boundary bypass and semantic
  paraphrasing as known limitations

- attenuation.rs: Document READ_ONLY_TOOLS maintenance requirements

- agent_loop.rs: Surface scan warnings via structured tracing; add
  structured audit events for skill activation and tool attenuation

61 tests pass, 0 new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address 12 findings from second adversarial security review

HIGH:
- Escape opening <skill tags in prompt content (prevents fake skill block injection)
- Scan manifest metadata fields (description, author, tags, reasons) not just prompt
- Block trust downgrade on name collision (existing Local can't be replaced by Community)

MEDIUM:
- Eliminate TOCTOU gap: read files then check size instead of metadata-then-read
- Reject file-level symlinks in load_skill (prompt.md, skill.toml)
- Truncate and filter manifest.skill.tags (prevent unlimited tag scoring)
- Cap regex pattern score at 40 (prevent 5x20=100 dominating keyword+tag)
- Add doc comment about skill_list tool exposing metadata (sanitization required)
- Move Community disclaimer inside <skill> tags (not outside structural boundary)
- Filter keywords/tags shorter than 3 chars (prevent broad matching)

LOW:
- Enforce minimum token_cost of 1 (max_context_tokens=0 can't bypass budget)
- Remove redundant try_exists checks in discover_local (let load_skill handle errors)

70 skills tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add HTTP endpoint scoping for skills (Phase 1)

Skills that declare an [http] section in skill.toml now have their HTTP
requests constrained to declared endpoints at runtime. This addresses
the gap where allowed_patterns was parsed but never enforced -- once the
http tool was visible via attenuation, the LLM could reach any URL.

Enforcement reuses EndpointPattern/AllowlistValidator from the WASM
capability system. Semantics: if no active skill declares [http], all
requests pass through (backward compat). If any skill declares [http],
URLs must match at least one skill's allowlist (union). Community skills'
[http] declarations are silently ignored (defense in depth).

Shell commands using curl/wget are also validated against scopes.

Scanner gains detection for known exfiltration domains (webhook.site,
ngrok.io, etc.), overly broad wildcards, and credential/host mismatches.

Closes #38

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* style: Apply cargo fmt to http_scoping.rs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* style: Apply cargo fmt across codebase

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add parameter-level permission enforcement for skills (Phase 2)

Activates enforcement of `allowed_patterns` in skill.toml permissions.
Previously these patterns were parsed but not enforced -- a Verified skill
declaring `permissions.shell` with `allowed_patterns = [{command = "cargo *"}]`
could still run any shell command. Now the enforcer validates tool parameters
against declared glob patterns before execution.

Key changes:
- New `enforcer.rs` module with `SkillPermissionEnforcer`, `glob_to_regex()`,
  and `validate_tool_call()` with union semantics across active skills
- Typed pattern enums (`ShellPattern`, `FilePathPattern`, `MemoryTargetPattern`)
  replace the previous `Vec<serde_json::Value>` in `ToolPermissionDeclaration`
- Scanner gains `scan_permission_patterns()` detecting dangerous patterns
  (rm, sudo, curl, bare wildcards, command chaining, sensitive paths, identity files)
- Registry blocks non-Local skills with critical permission pattern warnings
- Agent loop threads enforcer into `execute_chat_tool` alongside HTTP scoping

Trust interaction: Community patterns ignored, Verified enforced, Local without
patterns unrestricted, Local with patterns enforced as guidance. Union semantics
across skills -- tool call allowed if ANY skill's patterns permit it.

34 new tests. All 818 library tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add worker permission enforcement and LLM behavioral analysis (Phase 3+4)

Phase 3 - Worker-side permission enforcement:
- Add SerializedToolPermission/SerializedPattern DTOs for HTTP boundary crossing
- Extend JobDescription, ContainerHandle, and orchestrator API to carry permissions
- CreateJobTool snapshots and forwards skill permissions to spawned workers
- Worker runtime builds SkillPermissionEnforcer and checks before tool execution
- Load-time token budget enforcement rejects prompts exceeding 2x declared budget
- Deduplicate enforcer construction: from_active_skills() delegates to from_serialized()

Phase 4 - LLM behavioral analysis:
- BehavioralAnalyzer with cached, LLM-based semantic content analysis
- Structured output parsing (FINDING|CATEGORY|SEVERITY|DESCRIPTION or CLEAN)
- Content-hash caching with bounded size (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES=256)
- Graceful degradation when LLM unavailable
- Integrated into load_skill() for non-Local skills; critical findings block loading

Review fixes:
- Real cache tests with CountingLlm mock (test_cache_hit, test_cache_miss, test_cache_bounded)
- UTF-8-safe truncate() in worker runtime
- Few-shot examples in behavioral analysis prompt
- Documented max_context_tokens=0 opt-out and create_job() permission gap

848 tests passing, no new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address review feedback from serrrfirat on skills-phase2

- Fix truncate_cmd UTF-8 panic: use char-boundary-aware slicing
- Remove redundant effective_tools branching in reasoning.rs
- Document cache eviction as known limitation (arbitrary, not LRU)
- Add safety comment on SkillTrust enum ordering (security-critical)
- Simplify active_skills selection (prefilter_skills handles empty input)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address remaining skills review feedback

* refactor: replace skills system with OpenClaw SKILL.md format + 2-state trust

Replace the 5-gate, 3-tier trust hierarchy (scanner, behavioral analyzer,
parameter-level enforcer, HTTP endpoint scoping) with a simplified 3-layer
security model: gating -> attenuation -> Docker confinement.

Key changes:
- SKILL.md format (YAML frontmatter + markdown prompt) replaces skill.toml + prompt.md
- 2-state trust (Installed/Trusted) replaces 3-tier (Community/Verified/Local)
- New parser.rs for SKILL.md parsing with serde_yaml
- New gating.rs for requirements checking (bins/env/config)
- Simplified registry with 2-location discovery (workspace + user dirs)
- Removed scanner, behavioral_analyzer, enforcer, http_scoping (~4,100 lines)
- Removed skill_permissions propagation through job/orchestrator/worker pipeline
- Added serde_yaml dependency for YAML frontmatter parsing

Net: -5,298 lines, 59 skills tests pass, 907 total tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add in-app skill management tools and ClawHub catalog integration

Add 4 chat-callable tools (skill_list, skill_search, skill_install,
skill_remove) plus matching web gateway endpoints for managing skills
at runtime. The catalog fetches from ClawHub's public registry API
at runtime rather than bundling entries at compile time.

Key changes:
- SkillRegistry gains mutation methods (install_skill, remove_skill,
  reload, find_by_name) with Arc<RwLock> for concurrent access
- New catalog module queries ClawHub /api/v1/search with in-memory
  caching (5-min TTL, configurable via CLAWHUB_REGISTRY env var)
- skill_list and skill_search added to READ_ONLY_TOOLS for safe use
  under Installed trust ceiling
- Web gateway gets /api/skills, /api/skills/search, /api/skills/install,
  and /api/skills/{name} DELETE endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR #51 review feedback from ilblackdragon

Security:
- Add SSRF protection to fetch_skill_content: require HTTPS, reject
  private/loopback/link-local IPs and internal hostnames, disable
  redirects. Gateway install handler now reuses the same validation.
- URL-encode slug in skill_download_url to prevent query injection.
- Require X-Confirm-Action header on gateway skill install/remove
  endpoints (equivalent to chat tool requires_approval gate).

Correctness:
- Eliminate all block_in_place/block_on usage in skill tools and
  gateway handlers. Split install into prepare_install_to_disk (static
  async, no lock) + commit_install (sync, brief write lock). Same
  pattern for remove: validate_remove + delete_skill_files + commit_remove.
- Write normalized content to disk in install_skill (was writing
  original un-normalized content, causing hash mismatch on re-read).
- Fix token estimation from 0.75 to 0.25 tokens/byte (~4 chars per
  token) in registry.rs, selector.rs, and standalone loader.

Dependencies:
- Replace deprecated serde_yaml 0.9 with serde_yml 0.0.12.
- Remove unused toml dependency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-02-18 00:28:38 +00:00

495 lines
17 KiB
Rust

//! WebSocket handler for bidirectional client communication.
//!
//! Provides the same event stream as SSE but also accepts incoming messages
//! (chat, approvals) over a single persistent connection.
//!
//! ```text
//! Client ──── WS frame: {"type":"message","content":"hello"} ──► Agent Loop
//! ◄─── WS frame: {"type":"event","event_type":"response","data":{...}} ── Broadcast
//! ──── WS frame: {"type":"ping"} ──────────────────────────────────────►
//! ◄─── WS frame: {"type":"pong"} ──────────────────────────────────────
//! ```
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use axum::extract::ws::{Message, WebSocket};
use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::agent::submission::Submission;
use crate::channels::IncomingMessage;
use crate::channels::web::server::GatewayState;
use crate::channels::web::types::{WsClientMessage, WsServerMessage};
/// Tracks active WebSocket connections.
pub struct WsConnectionTracker {
count: AtomicU64,
}
impl WsConnectionTracker {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
count: AtomicU64::new(0),
}
}
pub fn connection_count(&self) -> u64 {
self.count.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
}
fn increment(&self) {
self.count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
fn decrement(&self) {
self.count.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
impl Default for WsConnectionTracker {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
/// Handle an upgraded WebSocket connection.
///
/// Spawns two tasks:
/// - **sender**: forwards broadcast events to the WebSocket client
/// - **receiver**: reads client frames and routes them to the agent
///
/// When either task ends (client disconnect or broadcast closed), both are
/// cleaned up.
pub async fn handle_ws_connection(socket: WebSocket, state: Arc<GatewayState>) {
let (mut ws_sink, mut ws_stream) = socket.split();
// Track connection
if let Some(ref tracker) = state.ws_tracker {
tracker.increment();
}
let tracker_for_drop = state.ws_tracker.clone();
// Subscribe to broadcast events (same source as SSE).
// Reject if we've hit the connection limit.
let Some(raw_stream) = state.sse.subscribe_raw() else {
tracing::warn!("WebSocket rejected: too many connections");
// Decrement the WS tracker we already incremented above.
if let Some(ref tracker) = tracker_for_drop {
tracker.decrement();
}
return;
};
let mut event_stream = Box::pin(raw_stream);
// Channel for the sender task to receive messages from both
// the broadcast stream and any direct sends (like Pong)
let (direct_tx, mut direct_rx) = mpsc::channel::<WsServerMessage>(64);
// Sender task: forward broadcast events + direct messages to WS client
let sender_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let msg = tokio::select! {
event = event_stream.next() => {
match event {
Some(sse_event) => WsServerMessage::from_sse_event(&sse_event),
None => break, // Broadcast channel closed
}
}
direct = direct_rx.recv() => {
match direct {
Some(msg) => msg,
None => break, // Direct channel closed
}
}
};
let json = match serde_json::to_string(&msg) {
Ok(j) => j,
Err(_) => continue,
};
if ws_sink.send(Message::Text(json.into())).await.is_err() {
break; // Client disconnected
}
}
});
// Receiver task: read client frames and route to agent
let user_id = state.user_id.clone();
while let Some(Ok(frame)) = ws_stream.next().await {
match frame {
Message::Text(text) => {
let parsed: Result<WsClientMessage, _> = serde_json::from_str(&text);
match parsed {
Ok(client_msg) => {
handle_client_message(client_msg, &state, &user_id, &direct_tx).await;
}
Err(e) => {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: format!("Invalid message: {}", e),
})
.await;
}
}
}
Message::Close(_) => break,
// Ignore binary, ping/pong (axum handles protocol-level pings)
_ => {}
}
}
// Clean up: abort sender, decrement counter
sender_handle.abort();
if let Some(ref tracker) = tracker_for_drop {
tracker.decrement();
}
}
/// Route a parsed client message to the appropriate handler.
async fn handle_client_message(
msg: WsClientMessage,
state: &GatewayState,
user_id: &str,
direct_tx: &mpsc::Sender<WsServerMessage>,
) {
match msg {
WsClientMessage::Message { content, thread_id } => {
let mut incoming = IncomingMessage::new("gateway", user_id, &content);
if let Some(ref tid) = thread_id {
incoming = incoming.with_thread(tid);
}
let tx_guard = state.msg_tx.read().await;
if let Some(ref tx) = *tx_guard {
if tx.send(incoming).await.is_err() {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: "Channel closed".to_string(),
})
.await;
}
} else {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: "Channel not started".to_string(),
})
.await;
}
}
WsClientMessage::Approval {
request_id,
action,
thread_id,
} => {
let (approved, always) = match action.as_str() {
"approve" => (true, false),
"always" => (true, true),
"deny" => (false, false),
other => {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: format!("Unknown approval action: {}", other),
})
.await;
return;
}
};
let request_uuid = match Uuid::parse_str(&request_id) {
Ok(id) => id,
Err(_) => {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: "Invalid request_id (expected UUID)".to_string(),
})
.await;
return;
}
};
let approval = Submission::ExecApproval {
request_id: request_uuid,
approved,
always,
};
let content = match serde_json::to_string(&approval) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: format!("Failed to serialize approval: {}", e),
})
.await;
return;
}
};
let mut msg = IncomingMessage::new("gateway", user_id, content);
if let Some(ref tid) = thread_id {
msg = msg.with_thread(tid);
}
let tx_guard = state.msg_tx.read().await;
if let Some(ref tx) = *tx_guard {
let _ = tx.send(msg).await;
}
}
WsClientMessage::AuthToken {
extension_name,
token,
} => {
if let Some(ref ext_mgr) = state.extension_manager {
match ext_mgr.auth(&extension_name, Some(&token)).await {
Ok(result) if result.status == "authenticated" => {
let msg = match ext_mgr.activate(&extension_name).await {
Ok(r) => format!(
"{} authenticated ({} tools loaded)",
extension_name,
r.tools_loaded.len()
),
Err(e) => format!(
"{} authenticated but activation failed: {}",
extension_name, e
),
};
crate::channels::web::server::clear_auth_mode(state).await;
state
.sse
.broadcast(crate::channels::web::types::SseEvent::AuthCompleted {
extension_name,
success: true,
message: msg,
});
}
Ok(result) => {
state
.sse
.broadcast(crate::channels::web::types::SseEvent::AuthRequired {
extension_name,
instructions: result.instructions,
auth_url: result.auth_url,
setup_url: result.setup_url,
});
}
Err(e) => {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: format!("Auth failed: {}", e),
})
.await;
}
}
} else {
let _ = direct_tx
.send(WsServerMessage::Error {
message: "Extension manager not available".to_string(),
})
.await;
}
}
WsClientMessage::AuthCancel { .. } => {
crate::channels::web::server::clear_auth_mode(state).await;
}
WsClientMessage::Ping => {
let _ = direct_tx.send(WsServerMessage::Pong).await;
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_ws_connection_tracker() {
let tracker = WsConnectionTracker::new();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 0);
tracker.increment();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 1);
tracker.increment();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 2);
tracker.decrement();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 1);
tracker.decrement();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_ws_connection_tracker_default() {
let tracker = WsConnectionTracker::default();
assert_eq!(tracker.connection_count(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_message_ping() {
// Ping should produce a Pong on the direct channel
let (direct_tx, mut direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
let state = make_test_state(None).await;
handle_client_message(WsClientMessage::Ping, &state, "user1", &direct_tx).await;
let response = direct_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(response, WsServerMessage::Pong));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_message_sends_to_agent() {
// A Message should be forwarded to the agent's msg_tx
let (agent_tx, mut agent_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
let state = make_test_state(Some(agent_tx)).await;
let (direct_tx, _direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
handle_client_message(
WsClientMessage::Message {
content: "hello agent".to_string(),
thread_id: Some("t1".to_string()),
},
&state,
"user1",
&direct_tx,
)
.await;
let incoming = agent_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(incoming.content, "hello agent");
assert_eq!(incoming.thread_id.as_deref(), Some("t1"));
assert_eq!(incoming.channel, "gateway");
assert_eq!(incoming.user_id, "user1");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_message_no_channel() {
// When msg_tx is None, should send an error back
let state = make_test_state(None).await;
let (direct_tx, mut direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
handle_client_message(
WsClientMessage::Message {
content: "hello".to_string(),
thread_id: None,
},
&state,
"user1",
&direct_tx,
)
.await;
let response = direct_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
match response {
WsServerMessage::Error { message } => {
assert!(message.contains("not started"));
}
_ => panic!("Expected Error variant"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_approval_approve() {
let (agent_tx, mut agent_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
let state = make_test_state(Some(agent_tx)).await;
let (direct_tx, _direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
let request_id = Uuid::new_v4();
handle_client_message(
WsClientMessage::Approval {
request_id: request_id.to_string(),
action: "approve".to_string(),
thread_id: Some("thread-42".to_string()),
},
&state,
"user1",
&direct_tx,
)
.await;
let incoming = agent_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
// The content should be a serialized ExecApproval
assert!(incoming.content.contains("ExecApproval"));
// Thread should be forwarded onto the IncomingMessage.
assert_eq!(incoming.thread_id.as_deref(), Some("thread-42"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_approval_invalid_action() {
let state = make_test_state(None).await;
let (direct_tx, mut direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
handle_client_message(
WsClientMessage::Approval {
request_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
action: "maybe".to_string(),
thread_id: None,
},
&state,
"user1",
&direct_tx,
)
.await;
let response = direct_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
match response {
WsServerMessage::Error { message } => {
assert!(message.contains("Unknown approval action"));
}
_ => panic!("Expected Error variant"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_handle_client_approval_invalid_uuid() {
let state = make_test_state(None).await;
let (direct_tx, mut direct_rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
handle_client_message(
WsClientMessage::Approval {
request_id: "not-a-uuid".to_string(),
action: "approve".to_string(),
thread_id: None,
},
&state,
"user1",
&direct_tx,
)
.await;
let response = direct_rx.recv().await.unwrap();
match response {
WsServerMessage::Error { message } => {
assert!(message.contains("Invalid request_id"));
}
_ => panic!("Expected Error variant"),
}
}
/// Helper to create a GatewayState for testing.
async fn make_test_state(msg_tx: Option<mpsc::Sender<IncomingMessage>>) -> GatewayState {
use crate::channels::web::sse::SseManager;
GatewayState {
msg_tx: tokio::sync::RwLock::new(msg_tx),
sse: SseManager::new(),
workspace: None,
session_manager: None,
log_broadcaster: None,
extension_manager: None,
tool_registry: None,
store: None,
job_manager: None,
prompt_queue: None,
user_id: "test".to_string(),
shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::RwLock::new(None),
ws_tracker: Some(Arc::new(WsConnectionTracker::new())),
llm_provider: None,
skill_registry: None,
skill_catalog: None,
chat_rate_limiter: crate::channels::web::server::RateLimiter::new(30, 60),
}
}
}