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* feat(shell): add Low/Medium/High risk levels for graduated approval (#172) - Add `RiskLevel` enum (Low/Medium/High, Ord-comparable) to `tool.rs` and re-export from `tools/mod.rs` - Add `risk_level_for(¶ms) -> RiskLevel` to the `Tool` trait (default: Low); override on `ShellTool` via `classify_command_risk` - Add `classify_command_risk(command: &str) -> RiskLevel` to `shell.rs`: High for NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE patterns, Low for read-only prefixes, Medium for reversible mutations, Medium as the unknown-command default - Add `extract_command_param` helper to de-duplicate JSON extraction - Add `sudo ` to `NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE_PATTERNS` (now classified High) - Wire `risk_level_for` into `requires_approval`: Low → Never, Medium → UnlessAutoApproved, High → Always (uses upstream's new API) - Log risk level at INFO on every tool call in `worker.rs` - Replace `requires_explicit_approval` (simple bool) with the richer `classify_command_risk`; update dispatcher.rs test - Add tests: `test_classify_command_risk_high/low/medium/pipeline`, `test_risk_level_for_via_tool_trait`, updated approval tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: apply cargo fmt to shell.rs and dispatcher.rs Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): fix pipeline risk aggregation and word-boundary matching Address reviewer feedback: - `classify_command_risk` now iterates ALL pipeline segments and takes the maximum risk, so `echo hello | cargo build` → Medium instead of the previous (wrong) Low - Replace `starts_with` with `matches_command_pattern`: single-word patterns use exact first-token comparison so `lsblk` no longer matches `ls`, `makeself` no longer matches `make`, etc.; multi-word patterns (e.g. `git status`) still use starts_with + space boundary - Drop `--help` / `-h` from LOW_RISK_PATTERNS (can never be first token) - Add `test_classify_command_risk_word_boundary` and extend pipeline test with mixed Low+Medium and unknown-command cases Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): move sed/awk/find from Low to Medium risk `sed -i`, `awk -i inplace`, and `find -delete`/`find -exec rm` can all modify or delete files. Classifying these as Low (auto-approve) was unsafe. Moving to Medium requires UnlessAutoApproved approval, which prompts the user unless they have explicitly enabled auto-approve mode. Fixes review feedback from zmanian on PR #368. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): update test to use classify_command_risk after requires_explicit_approval removal The rebase brought in upstream commits that removed requires_explicit_approval. Update the mixed-case destructive command test to assert RiskLevel::High via classify_command_risk instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): use word-boundary matching for High-risk patterns to prevent false positives The NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE_PATTERNS check used `contains()` on the full command string, causing false positives: `makeshutdownscript` matched `shutdown`, `nftables-config` matched `nft`, and `passwdqc-check` matched `passwd`. Fix: move the High-risk check inside the per-segment loop and use `matches_command_pattern` (the same word-boundary logic used for Low/Medium), so classification is consistent across all three risk levels. Also remove the trailing spaces from `"nft "` and `"sudo "` in NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE_PATTERNS since `matches_command_pattern` handles word-boundary detection without them. Adds three regression tests for the false-positive cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): address zmanian review — redirect safety + explicit git push pattern Two issues from zmanian's CHANGES_REQUESTED review on PR #368: 1. **Security (Low → UnlessAutoApproved)**: `Low` was mapped to `ApprovalRequirement::Never`, bypassing approval entirely for commands like `cat /etc/shadow > /tmp/out` since the pipeline splitter does not split on shell redirections (`>`, `>>`). Changing to `UnlessAutoApproved` preserves the graduated risk metadata for audit while keeping approval policy conservative until redirect-aware parsing is in place. 2. **Minor (explicit git push pattern)**: `git push origin feature-branch` fell through to the unknown-command Medium default rather than matching an explicit pattern. Adding `"git push"` to MEDIUM_RISK_PATTERNS makes the classification intentional. Force-push variants (`git push --force`, `git push -f`) remain in NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE_PATTERNS (High). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * test(shell): add regression tests for redirect bypass and git push pattern fixes Two regression tests for the fixes in the previous commit: 1. `test_low_risk_with_redirect_not_never` — verifies that Low-risk commands containing shell redirections (`echo x > /etc/passwd`, `cat /etc/shadow > /tmp/out`, etc.) return `UnlessAutoApproved`, not `Never`. Before the fix, `Low` mapped to `Never` which would have allowed these writes to bypass approval entirely. 2. `test_git_push_explicit_medium_pattern` — verifies that `git push origin branch` is classified `Medium` via the explicit `MEDIUM_RISK_PATTERNS` entry (not the unknown-command fallthrough). Force variants (`--force`, `-f`) remain `High`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * test(shell): add integration regression tests for redirect bypass and git push Covers the two fixes from the previous commits at the integration-test level (tests/ directory) to ensure the CI regression-test gate is satisfied: 1. `low_risk_command_with_redirect_is_unless_auto_approved` -- verifies that Low-risk commands containing shell redirections return UnlessAutoApproved, not Never (the pre-fix behaviour that allowed redirect-based bypass). 2. `git_push_is_unless_auto_approved` -- verifies git push is Medium risk (UnlessAutoApproved) via the explicit pattern, not unknown-command fallthrough. 3. `git_push_force_requires_always_approval` -- verifies force-push variants remain High risk (Always approval required). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * refactor(test): move inline assertions to tests/ to satisfy no-panics CI check The project's no-panics CI check (code_style.yml) scans src/**/*.rs for assert_eq!/assert_ne!/.unwrap() in added lines. Moving classify_command_risk tests to tests/shell_risk_regression.rs and adding // safety: comments on the two remaining assertions in dispatcher.rs eliminates all false positives. - Remove test_classify_command_risk_* and related functions from shell.rs - Remove test_low_risk_with_redirect_not_never and test_git_push_* from shell.rs (covered by integration tests in tests/) - Expand tests/shell_risk_regression.rs with full coverage via public API - Add // safety: test code comments on dispatcher.rs assert lines Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(shell): address review findings — force-with-lease, test runners, Display - Add `git push --force-with-lease` to NEVER_AUTO_APPROVE_PATTERNS — the word-boundary matching in matches_command_pattern would not match it against the existing `git push --force` pattern (next char is `-`, not space), causing it to fall through to Medium instead of High. - Move `cargo test`, `npm test`, `npm run test`, `yarn test` from LOW_RISK_PATTERNS to MEDIUM_RISK_PATTERNS — test runners execute arbitrary code and can have side effects (file creation, network calls, process spawning). - Add `Display` impl for `RiskLevel` (lowercase: low/medium/high) and switch worker logging from `?risk` (Debug) to `%risk` (Display) for cleaner audit logs. - Fix integration test helper to call `register_dev_tools()` since ShellTool is registered there, not in `register_builtin_tools()`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: [email protected] <[email protected]>
40 lines
1.2 KiB
Rust
40 lines
1.2 KiB
Rust
//! Extensible tool system.
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//!
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//! Tools are the agent's interface to the outside world. They can:
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//! - Call external APIs
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//! - Interact with the marketplace
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//! - Execute sandboxed code (via WASM sandbox)
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//! - Delegate tasks to other services
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//! - Build new software and tools
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mod autonomy;
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pub mod builder;
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pub mod builtin;
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mod coercion;
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pub mod execute;
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pub mod mcp;
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pub mod rate_limiter;
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pub mod redaction;
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pub mod schema_validator;
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pub mod wasm;
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mod registry;
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mod tool;
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pub use autonomy::{
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AUTONOMOUS_TOOL_DENYLIST, autonomous_allowed_tool_names, autonomous_unavailable_error,
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autonomous_unavailable_message, is_autonomous_tool_denylisted,
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};
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pub use builder::{
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BuildPhase, BuildRequirement, BuildResult, BuildSoftwareTool, BuilderConfig, Language,
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LlmSoftwareBuilder, SoftwareBuilder, SoftwareType, Template, TemplateEngine, TemplateType,
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TestCase, TestHarness, TestResult, TestSuite, ValidationError, ValidationResult, WasmValidator,
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};
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pub(crate) use coercion::prepare_tool_params;
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pub use rate_limiter::RateLimiter;
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pub use registry::ToolRegistry;
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pub use tool::{
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ApprovalContext, ApprovalRequirement, RiskLevel, Tool, ToolDomain, ToolError, ToolOutput,
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ToolRateLimitConfig, redact_params, validate_tool_schema,
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};
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