ZakiandClaude 3ad91338f7 security: address review findings -- domain check, nesting depth, SSE redaction ...

Three security fixes from code review:

1. CRITICAL: Block Container-domain tools from executing on the
   orchestrator host. The ToolExecutor now checks tool.domain() and
   rejects Container tools with PtcError::DomainBlocked, preventing
   sandbox escape / RCE.

2. MEDIUM: Floor client-provided nesting_depth at 1 instead of trusting
   the worker's value. A malicious worker can no longer send
   nesting_depth=0 to bypass MAX_NESTING_DEPTH.

3. MEDIUM: Redact tool parameters in SSE JobToolUse events to prevent
   leaking sensitive data (API keys, passwords) to web UI observers.

4. Python SDK: Always send timeout_secs to server and use server_timeout+5
   for client-side HTTP timeout to prevent premature client timeouts.

Regression test: test_container_domain_blocked verifies Container-domain
tools are rejected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

2026-03-21 08:12:54 +00:00

..

ironclaw_tools.py

security: address review findings -- domain check, nesting depth, SSE redaction

2026-03-21 08:12:54 +00:00

test_ironclaw_tools.py

feat(ptc): programmatic tool calling -- executor, SDK, and E2E tests

2026-03-21 08:11:31 +00:00