Files
optimclaw/src/tools/builtin/http.rs
T
09e1c97a27 fix(approval): make "always" auto-approve work for credentialed HTTP requests (#1257)
The HTTP tool returned `ApprovalRequirement::Always` for requests with
credentials, but `Always` is hardcoded to ignore the session auto-approve
set. This meant users who clicked "always" were re-prompted on every
subsequent HTTP call — the UI offered "always" but the backend ignored it.

Two fixes:
1. HTTP credentialed requests now return `UnlessAutoApproved` instead of
   `Always`, so the session auto-approve set is respected.
2. `StatusUpdate::ApprovalNeeded` now carries `allow_always: bool`. All
   channel UIs (Telegram, Slack, Signal, REPL, Web) conditionally hide
   the "always" option when a tool truly requires per-invocation approval
   (`ApprovalRequirement::Always`, e.g. destructive shell commands).

Also boxes `PendingApproval` in `AgenticLoopResult::NeedApproval` to fix
a pre-existing clippy `large_enum_variant` warning.

Regression tests included (test_credentialed_requests_respect_auto_approve,
test_allow_always_matches_approval_requirement) but CI heuristic cannot
detect them in cross-fork PR diffs.

[skip-regression-check]

Co-authored-by: Tyler <[email protected]>
2026-03-19 11:45:32 -07:00

1487 lines
54 KiB
Rust

//! HTTP request tool.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use reqwest::Client;
use crate::context::JobContext;
use crate::safety::LeakDetector;
use crate::secrets::SecretsStore;
use crate::tools::tool::{ApprovalRequirement, Tool, ToolError, ToolOutput, require_str};
use crate::tools::wasm::{InjectedCredentials, SharedCredentialRegistry, inject_credential};
#[cfg(feature = "html-to-markdown")]
use crate::tools::builtin::convert_html_to_markdown;
/// Maximum response body size for text responses (5 MB).
///
/// 5 MB is large enough for typical JSON API responses and moderate HTML pages,
/// but small enough to prevent OOM from malicious or runaway servers. The WASM
/// HTTP wrapper uses the same limit for consistency.
const MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Maximum response body size when saving to disk via `save_to` (50 MB).
///
/// Larger limit for file downloads since the body is written to disk, not held
/// in memory for LLM context. Matches the WASM attachment size cap.
const MAX_SAVE_TO_SIZE: usize = 50 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Default request timeout when the caller does not provide one.
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
/// Maximum allowed request timeout to bound resource usage from LLM-controlled inputs.
const MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 300;
/// Maximum number of redirects to follow for simple GET requests.
const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 3;
/// Descriptive User-Agent so public APIs don't reject bare requests.
const USER_AGENT: &str = concat!(
"IronClaw-Agent/",
env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
" (https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw)"
);
/// Tool for making HTTP requests.
///
/// Each request builds a per-request [`Client`] with DNS pinning to prevent
/// TOCTOU DNS rebinding attacks. The hostname is resolved once, validated
/// against the SSRF blocklist, and then pinned via
/// [`reqwest::ClientBuilder::resolve_to_addrs`] so that reqwest connects
/// directly to the pre-validated IPs without a second DNS lookup.
pub struct HttpTool {
credential_registry: Option<Arc<SharedCredentialRegistry>>,
secrets_store: Option<Arc<dyn SecretsStore + Send + Sync>>,
}
impl HttpTool {
/// Create a new HTTP tool.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
credential_registry: None,
secrets_store: None,
}
}
/// Attach a credential registry and secrets store for auto-injection.
pub fn with_credentials(
mut self,
registry: Arc<SharedCredentialRegistry>,
secrets_store: Arc<dyn SecretsStore + Send + Sync>,
) -> Self {
self.credential_registry = Some(registry);
self.secrets_store = Some(secrets_store);
self
}
}
/// Validate and resolve a `save_to` path, ensuring it stays under `/tmp/`.
///
/// Uses `path_utils::validate_path` with `/tmp` as the base directory to catch
/// traversal attacks like `/tmp/../../etc/passwd` and symlink escapes.
/// Creates parent directories only after validation succeeds.
fn validate_save_to_path(save_to: &str) -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, ToolError> {
// Quick prefix check before doing any fs work
if !save_to.starts_with("/tmp/") {
return Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"save_to path must be under /tmp/".to_string(),
));
}
// Validate path BEFORE creating directories to prevent traversal-based
// directory creation outside /tmp (e.g. `/tmp/../../etc/passwd`).
let tmp_base = std::path::Path::new("/tmp");
let validated = crate::tools::builtin::path_utils::validate_path(save_to, Some(tmp_base))?;
// Only create parent directories for the validated (safe) path
if let Some(parent) = validated.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("failed to create directory: {}", e))
})?;
}
Ok(validated)
}
/// Parse and validate a URL without DNS resolution.
///
/// Checks scheme (HTTPS only), rejects localhost and private/link-local IP
/// literals. Does **not** resolve hostnames -- use [`validate_and_resolve_url`]
/// for the full DNS-pinning flow that eliminates the TOCTOU rebinding window.
pub(crate) fn validate_url(url: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Url, ToolError> {
let parsed = reqwest::Url::parse(url)
.map_err(|e| ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("invalid URL: {}", e)))?;
if parsed.scheme() != "https" {
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(
"only https URLs are allowed".to_string(),
));
}
let host = parsed
.host_str()
.ok_or_else(|| ToolError::InvalidParameters("URL missing host".to_string()))?;
let host_lower = host.to_lowercase();
if host_lower == "localhost" || host_lower.ends_with(".localhost") {
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(
"localhost is not allowed".to_string(),
));
}
// Check literal IP addresses
if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<IpAddr>()
&& is_disallowed_ip(&ip)
{
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(
"private or local IPs are not allowed".to_string(),
));
}
Ok(parsed)
}
/// Resolve DNS for a validated URL and check every resolved address against
/// the SSRF blocklist.
///
/// Returns the resolved [`SocketAddr`]s so that callers can pin the hostname
/// via [`reqwest::ClientBuilder::resolve_to_addrs`], preventing a DNS rebinding
/// attack where a second, independent resolution (inside reqwest) returns a
/// different -- potentially private -- IP after our validation pass.
pub(crate) async fn validate_and_resolve_url(
url: &reqwest::Url,
) -> Result<Vec<SocketAddr>, ToolError> {
let host = url
.host_str()
.ok_or_else(|| ToolError::InvalidParameters("URL missing host".to_string()))?;
let port = url.port_or_known_default().unwrap_or(443);
let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = tokio::net::lookup_host(format!("{}:{}", host, port))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExternalService(format!("DNS resolution failed for '{}': {}", host, e))
})?
.collect();
if addrs.is_empty() {
return Err(ToolError::ExternalService(format!(
"DNS resolution for '{}' returned no addresses",
host
)));
}
for addr in &addrs {
if is_disallowed_ip(&addr.ip()) {
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(format!(
"hostname '{}' resolves to disallowed IP {}",
host,
addr.ip()
)));
}
}
Ok(addrs)
}
/// Build a reqwest [`Client`] that pins the given hostname to the
/// pre-validated resolved addresses, preventing any second DNS lookup.
pub(crate) fn build_pinned_client(
host: &str,
resolved_addrs: &[SocketAddr],
timeout: Duration,
redirect_policy: reqwest::redirect::Policy,
) -> Result<Client, ToolError> {
let builder = Client::builder()
.timeout(timeout)
.redirect(redirect_policy)
.user_agent(USER_AGENT)
.resolve_to_addrs(host, resolved_addrs);
builder
.build()
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExternalService(format!("failed to build HTTP client: {}", e)))
}
/// Check whether an IPv4 address falls in a disallowed range (private,
/// loopback, link-local, multicast, unspecified, or cloud metadata).
fn is_disallowed_ipv4(v4: &Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_multicast()
|| v4.is_unspecified()
|| *v4 == Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 169, 254)
|| (v4.octets()[0] == 100 && (v4.octets()[1] & 0xC0) == 64)
}
fn is_disallowed_ip(ip: &IpAddr) -> bool {
match ip {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_disallowed_ipv4(v4),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
// Catch IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g. ::ffff:169.254.169.254)
// that would bypass IPv4-only checks.
if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped()
&& is_disallowed_ipv4(&v4)
{
return true;
}
v6.is_loopback()
|| v6.is_unique_local()
|| v6.is_unicast_link_local()
|| v6.is_multicast()
|| v6.is_unspecified()
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "html-to-markdown")]
/// Heuristic: treat as HTML if the `Content-Type` header contains `text/html`.
fn is_html_response(headers: &HashMap<String, String>) -> bool {
headers
.iter()
.find(|(k, _)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-type"))
.map(|(_, v)| v.to_lowercase().contains("text/html"))
.unwrap_or(false)
}
fn parse_headers_param(
headers: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, ToolError> {
fn parse_header_object(
map: &serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, ToolError> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(map.len());
for (k, v) in map {
let value = v.as_str().ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("header '{}' must have a string value", k))
})?;
out.push((k.clone(), value.to_string()));
}
Ok(out)
}
fn parse_header_array(items: &[serde_json::Value]) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, ToolError> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(items.len());
for (idx, item) in items.iter().enumerate() {
let obj = item.as_object().ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"headers[{}] must be an object with 'name' and 'value'",
idx
))
})?;
let name = obj.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("headers[{}].name must be a string", idx))
})?;
let value = obj.get("value").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("headers[{}].value must be a string", idx))
})?;
out.push((name.to_string(), value.to_string()));
}
Ok(out)
}
match headers {
None => Ok(Vec::new()),
Some(serde_json::Value::String(raw)) => {
let trimmed = raw.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let parsed = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(trimmed).map_err(|e| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"headers string must contain valid JSON object/array: {}",
e
))
})?;
match parsed {
serde_json::Value::Object(map) => parse_header_object(&map),
serde_json::Value::Array(items) => parse_header_array(&items),
_ => Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"headers string must decode to a JSON object or array".to_string(),
)),
}
}
Some(serde_json::Value::Object(map)) => parse_header_object(map),
Some(serde_json::Value::Array(items)) => parse_header_array(items),
Some(_) => Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"'headers' must be an object or an array of {name, value}".to_string(),
)),
}
}
fn parse_timeout_secs_param(timeout: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Result<Option<u64>, ToolError> {
let parsed = match timeout {
None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => Ok(None),
Some(serde_json::Value::Number(n)) => n.as_u64().map(Some).ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters("timeout_secs must be a non-negative integer".to_string())
}),
Some(serde_json::Value::String(raw)) => {
let trimmed = raw.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
let secs = trimmed.parse::<u64>().map_err(|_| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"timeout_secs string must contain a non-negative integer".to_string(),
)
})?;
Ok(Some(secs))
}
Some(_) => Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"timeout_secs must be an integer".to_string(),
)),
}?;
if let Some(secs) = parsed
&& secs > MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS
{
return Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"timeout_secs must be <= {}",
MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS
)));
}
Ok(parsed)
}
fn parse_save_to_param(save_to: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Result<Option<String>, ToolError> {
match save_to {
None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => Ok(None),
Some(serde_json::Value::String(path)) => {
let trimmed = path.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
Ok(None)
} else {
Ok(Some(trimmed.to_string()))
}
}
Some(_) => Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(
"save_to must be a string".to_string(),
)),
}
}
/// Extract host from URL in params (for approval checks).
fn extract_host_from_params(params: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {
params
.get("url")
.and_then(|u| u.as_str())
.and_then(|u| reqwest::Url::parse(u).ok())
.and_then(|u| u.host_str().map(|h| h.to_string()))
}
impl Default for HttpTool {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for HttpTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"http"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Make HTTP requests to external APIs. Supports GET, POST, PUT, DELETE methods. \
Use save_to to download binary files (images, PDFs, etc.) to a local path, \
e.g. {\"method\":\"GET\",\"url\":\"https://picsum.photos/800/600\",\"save_to\":\"/tmp/photo.jpg\"}."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"method": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"],
"description": "HTTP method (default: GET)"
},
"url": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The URL to request"
},
"headers": {
"type": "array",
"description": "Optional headers as a list of {name, value} objects",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"name": { "type": "string" },
"value": { "type": "string" }
},
"required": ["name", "value"],
"additionalProperties": false
}
},
"body": {
"description": "Request body (for POST/PUT/PATCH). Can be a JSON object, array, string, or other value."
},
"timeout_secs": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Request timeout in seconds (default: 30)"
},
"save_to": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Save response body as raw bytes to this file path instead of returning it. Use for binary downloads (images, PDFs, etc.). The path must be under /tmp/."
}
},
"required": ["url"]
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let method = params["method"].as_str().unwrap_or("GET");
let method_upper = method.to_uppercase();
let url = require_str(&params, "url")?;
let mut parsed_url = validate_url(url)?;
// Resolve DNS once, validate against SSRF blocklist, then pin the
// resolved addresses into the reqwest client so it cannot re-resolve
// to a different (potentially private) IP.
let resolved_addrs = validate_and_resolve_url(&parsed_url).await?;
let host = parsed_url
.host_str()
.ok_or_else(|| ToolError::InvalidParameters("URL missing host".into()))?
.to_string();
let client = build_pinned_client(
&host,
&resolved_addrs,
Duration::from_secs(30),
reqwest::redirect::Policy::none(),
)?;
// Parse headers
let mut headers_vec = parse_headers_param(params.get("headers"))?;
let timeout_secs = parse_timeout_secs_param(params.get("timeout_secs"))?;
let save_to = parse_save_to_param(params.get("save_to"))?;
let effective_timeout = Duration::from_secs(timeout_secs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS));
// Build request
let mut request = match method.to_uppercase().as_str() {
"GET" => client.get(parsed_url.clone()),
"POST" => client.post(parsed_url.clone()),
"PUT" => client.put(parsed_url.clone()),
"DELETE" => client.delete(parsed_url.clone()),
"PATCH" => client.patch(parsed_url.clone()),
_ => {
return Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"unsupported method: {}",
method
)));
}
};
request = request.timeout(effective_timeout);
// Add headers
for (key, value) in &headers_vec {
request = request.header(key.as_str(), value.as_str());
}
// Add body if present
let body_bytes = if let Some(body) = params.get("body") {
if let Some(body_str) = body.as_str() {
if body_str.is_empty() {
None
} else if let Ok(json_body) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body_str) {
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&json_body).map_err(|e| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("invalid body JSON: {}", e))
})?;
request = request.json(&json_body);
Some(bytes)
} else {
let bytes = body_str.as_bytes().to_vec();
request = request.body(body_str.to_string());
Some(bytes)
}
} else {
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(body).map_err(|e| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("invalid body JSON: {}", e))
})?;
request = request.json(body);
Some(bytes)
}
} else {
None
};
// Credential injection from shared registry
if let (Some(registry), Some(store)) = (
self.credential_registry.as_ref(),
self.secrets_store.as_ref(),
) {
let cred_host = parsed_url.host_str().unwrap_or("");
let matched: Vec<crate::secrets::CredentialMapping> = registry.find_for_host(cred_host);
for mapping in &matched {
match store
.get_decrypted(&ctx.user_id, &mapping.secret_name)
.await
{
Ok(secret) => {
let mut injected = InjectedCredentials::empty();
inject_credential(&mut injected, &mapping.location, &secret);
for (name, value) in &injected.headers {
request = request.header(name.as_str(), value.as_str());
headers_vec.push((name.clone(), value.clone()));
}
for (name, value) in &injected.query_params {
parsed_url.query_pairs_mut().append_pair(name, value);
request = request.query(&[(name.as_str(), value.as_str())]);
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
secret = %mapping.secret_name,
error = %e,
"Failed to inject credential for HTTP tool"
);
}
}
}
}
// Leak detection on outbound request (url/headers/body)
let detector = LeakDetector::new();
detector
.scan_http_request(parsed_url.as_str(), &headers_vec, body_bytes.as_deref())
.map_err(|e| ToolError::NotAuthorized(format!("{}", e)))?;
// Build the interceptor request descriptor for recording/replay
let intercept_req = crate::llm::recording::HttpExchangeRequest {
method: method_upper,
url: parsed_url.to_string(),
headers: headers_vec.clone(),
body: body_bytes
.as_ref()
.map(|b| String::from_utf8_lossy(b).into_owned()),
};
// Check HTTP interceptor (replay mode returns pre-recorded response)
if let Some(ref interceptor) = ctx.http_interceptor
&& let Some(recorded) = interceptor.before_request(&intercept_req).await
{
let headers: HashMap<String, String> = recorded.headers.iter().cloned().collect();
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&recorded.body)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| serde_json::Value::String(recorded.body.clone()));
let result = serde_json::json!({
"status": recorded.status,
"headers": headers,
"body": body
});
return Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()).with_raw(recorded.body));
}
// Determine if this is a simple GET (eligible for redirect following).
let is_simple_get =
method.eq_ignore_ascii_case("GET") && headers_vec.is_empty() && body_bytes.is_none();
// Execute request, optionally following redirects for simple GETs.
// Each redirect hop gets its own DNS resolution + SSRF validation +
// pinned client to prevent rebinding attacks across hops.
let response = if is_simple_get {
let mut redirects_remaining = MAX_REDIRECTS;
loop {
// Build a per-hop pinned client for the current URL.
let hop_addrs = validate_and_resolve_url(&parsed_url).await?;
let hop_host = parsed_url
.host_str()
.ok_or_else(|| ToolError::InvalidParameters("URL missing host".into()))?
.to_string();
let hop_client = build_pinned_client(
&hop_host,
&hop_addrs,
effective_timeout,
reqwest::redirect::Policy::none(),
)?;
let resp = hop_client
.get(parsed_url.clone())
.header(
reqwest::header::ACCEPT,
"text/markdown, text/html;q=0.9, application/json;q=0.9, */*;q=0.8",
)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| {
if e.is_timeout() {
ToolError::Timeout(effective_timeout)
} else {
ToolError::ExternalService(e.to_string())
}
})?;
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
if (300..400).contains(&status) {
if redirects_remaining == 0 {
return Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"too many redirects (max {})",
MAX_REDIRECTS
)));
}
let location = resp
.headers()
.get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| {
ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"redirect (HTTP {}) has no Location header",
status
))
})?;
let next_url_str =
if location.starts_with("http://") || location.starts_with("https://") {
location.to_string()
} else {
parsed_url
.join(location)
.map(|u| u.to_string())
.map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"could not resolve relative redirect '{}': {}",
location, e
))
})?
};
// SSRF re-validation on every hop (URL structure checks).
// DNS resolution + IP validation happens at the top of the
// next loop iteration via validate_and_resolve_url.
parsed_url = validate_url(&next_url_str)?;
let hop_detector = LeakDetector::new();
hop_detector
.scan_http_request(parsed_url.as_str(), &[], None)
.map_err(|e| ToolError::NotAuthorized(e.to_string()))?;
redirects_remaining -= 1;
tracing::debug!(
to = %parsed_url,
hops_left = redirects_remaining,
"http tool following redirect"
);
continue;
}
break resp;
}
} else {
let resp = request.send().await.map_err(|e| {
if e.is_timeout() {
ToolError::Timeout(effective_timeout)
} else {
ToolError::ExternalService(e.to_string())
}
})?;
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
// Block redirects for non-simple requests (potential SSRF)
if (300..400).contains(&status) {
return Err(ToolError::NotAuthorized(format!(
"request returned redirect (HTTP {}), which is blocked to prevent SSRF",
status
)));
}
resp
};
let status = response.status().as_u16();
let headers: HashMap<String, String> = response
.headers()
.iter()
.filter_map(|(k, v)| v.to_str().ok().map(|v| (k.to_string(), v.to_string())))
.collect();
// Use a larger size limit when saving to disk (file downloads)
let saving_to_disk = save_to.is_some();
let max_size = if saving_to_disk {
MAX_SAVE_TO_SIZE
} else {
MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE
};
// Pre-check Content-Length header to reject obviously oversized responses
// before downloading anything, preventing OOM from malicious servers.
if let Some(content_length) = response.headers().get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_LENGTH)
&& let Ok(s) = content_length.to_str()
&& let Ok(len) = s.parse::<usize>()
&& len > max_size
{
tracing::warn!(
url = %parsed_url,
content_length = len,
max = max_size,
"Rejected HTTP response: Content-Length exceeds limit"
);
return Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"Response Content-Length ({} bytes) exceeds maximum allowed size ({} bytes)",
len, max_size
)));
}
// Stream the response body with a hard size cap. Even if Content-Length was
// absent or lied about the size, we stop reading once we exceed the limit.
let mut body = Vec::new();
let mut stream = response.bytes_stream();
while let Some(chunk) = StreamExt::next(&mut stream).await {
let chunk = chunk.map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExternalService(format!("failed to read response body: {}", e))
})?;
if body.len() + chunk.len() > max_size {
return Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"Response body exceeds maximum allowed size ({} bytes)",
max_size
)));
}
body.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
}
let body_bytes = bytes::Bytes::from(body);
// If save_to is specified, write raw bytes to file and return metadata.
if let Some(save_to) = save_to {
let saved_to = save_to.clone();
let bytes_clone = body_bytes.clone();
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
let canonical = validate_save_to_path(&save_to)?;
std::fs::write(&canonical, &bytes_clone).map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("failed to write file: {}", e))
})?;
Ok::<_, ToolError>(canonical)
})
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("spawn_blocking failed: {}", e)))?
.map_err(|e: ToolError| e)?;
let result = serde_json::json!({
"status": status,
"saved_to": saved_to,
"size_bytes": body_bytes.len(),
"headers": headers,
});
return Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()));
}
let body_text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body_bytes).into_owned();
// Record the HTTP exchange if interceptor is present (recording mode)
if let Some(ref interceptor) = ctx.http_interceptor {
let resp_headers: Vec<(String, String)> = headers
.iter()
.map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), v.clone()))
.collect();
interceptor
.after_response(
&intercept_req,
&crate::llm::recording::HttpExchangeResponse {
status,
headers: resp_headers,
body: body_text.clone(),
},
)
.await;
}
#[cfg(feature = "html-to-markdown")]
let body_text = if is_html_response(&headers) {
match convert_html_to_markdown(&body_text, parsed_url.as_str()) {
Ok(md) => md,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(url = %parsed_url, error = %e, "HTML-to-markdown conversion failed, returning raw HTML");
body_text
}
}
} else {
body_text
};
// Try to parse as JSON, fall back to string
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&body_text)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| serde_json::Value::String(body_text.clone()));
let result = serde_json::json!({
"status": status,
"headers": headers,
"body": body
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()).with_raw(body_text))
}
fn estimated_duration(&self, _params: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<Duration> {
Some(Duration::from_secs(5)) // Average HTTP request time
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
true // External data always needs sanitization
}
fn requires_approval(&self, params: &serde_json::Value) -> ApprovalRequirement {
let has_credentials = crate::safety::params_contain_manual_credentials(params)
|| (self.credential_registry.as_ref().is_some_and(|registry| {
extract_host_from_params(params)
.is_some_and(|host| registry.has_credentials_for_host(&host))
}));
if has_credentials {
return ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved;
}
// GET requests (or missing method, since GET is the default) are low-risk
let method = params["method"].as_str().unwrap_or("GET");
if method.eq_ignore_ascii_case("GET") {
return ApprovalRequirement::Never;
}
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
}
fn rate_limit_config(&self) -> Option<crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig> {
Some(crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig::new(30, 500))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::testing::credentials::{TEST_OPENAI_API_KEY, test_secrets_store};
#[test]
fn test_http_tool_schema_headers_is_array() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let schema = tool.parameters_schema();
assert_eq!(schema["properties"]["headers"]["type"], "array");
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_rejects_http() {
let err = validate_url("http://example.com").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("https"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_rejects_localhost() {
let err = validate_url("https://localhost:8080").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("localhost"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_accepts_https_public() {
let url = validate_url("https://example.com").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host_str(), Some("example.com"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_rejects_private_ip_literal() {
let err = validate_url("https://192.168.1.1/api").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("private"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_rejects_loopback_ip() {
let err = validate_url("https://127.0.0.1/api").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("private"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_url_rejects_link_local() {
let err = validate_url("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("private"));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_disallowed_ip_covers_ranges() {
// Private ranges
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 1))));
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 16, 0, 1))));
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 0, 1))));
// Loopback
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST)));
// Cloud metadata
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
169, 254, 169, 254
))));
// Carrier-grade NAT
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(100, 64, 0, 1))));
// Public
assert!(!is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8))));
}
#[test]
fn test_is_disallowed_ip_catches_ipv4_mapped_ipv6() {
use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
// ::ffff:127.0.0.1 (IPv4-mapped loopback)
let mapped_loopback = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0x7f00, 0x0001));
assert!(
is_disallowed_ip(&mapped_loopback),
"IPv4-mapped ::ffff:127.0.0.1 should be disallowed"
);
// ::ffff:169.254.169.254 (IPv4-mapped cloud metadata)
let mapped_metadata = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xa9fe, 0xa9fe));
assert!(
is_disallowed_ip(&mapped_metadata),
"IPv4-mapped ::ffff:169.254.169.254 should be disallowed"
);
// ::ffff:10.0.0.1 (IPv4-mapped private)
let mapped_private = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0x0a00, 0x0001));
assert!(
is_disallowed_ip(&mapped_private),
"IPv4-mapped ::ffff:10.0.0.1 should be disallowed"
);
// ::ffff:8.8.8.8 (IPv4-mapped public -- should be allowed)
let mapped_public = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0x0808, 0x0808));
assert!(
!is_disallowed_ip(&mapped_public),
"IPv4-mapped ::ffff:8.8.8.8 should be allowed"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_max_response_size_is_reasonable() {
// MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE should be 5 MB to prevent OOM while allowing typical API responses.
assert_eq!(MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE, 5 * 1024 * 1024);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_headers_param_accepts_object_legacy_shape() {
let headers = serde_json::json!({"Authorization": "Bearer token"});
let parsed = parse_headers_param(Some(&headers)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
parsed,
vec![("Authorization".to_string(), "Bearer token".to_string())]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_headers_param_accepts_array_shape() {
let headers = serde_json::json!([
{"name": "Authorization", "value": "Bearer token"},
{"name": "X-Test", "value": "1"}
]);
let parsed = parse_headers_param(Some(&headers)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
parsed,
vec![
("Authorization".to_string(), "Bearer token".to_string()),
("X-Test".to_string(), "1".to_string())
]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_headers_param_accepts_stringified_array() {
let headers =
serde_json::json!("[{\"name\":\"Authorization\",\"value\":\"Bearer token\"}]");
let parsed = parse_headers_param(Some(&headers)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
parsed,
vec![("Authorization".to_string(), "Bearer token".to_string())]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_headers_param_rejects_double_string_encoding() {
let headers = serde_json::json!("\"hello\"");
let err = parse_headers_param(Some(&headers)).unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string()
.contains("headers string must decode to a JSON object or array"),
"unexpected error: {}",
err
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_timeout_secs_param_accepts_string_integer() {
let timeout = serde_json::json!("30");
assert_eq!(parse_timeout_secs_param(Some(&timeout)).unwrap(), Some(30));
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_timeout_secs_param_treats_empty_string_as_none() {
let timeout = serde_json::json!("");
assert_eq!(parse_timeout_secs_param(Some(&timeout)).unwrap(), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_timeout_secs_param_rejects_value_above_cap() {
let timeout = serde_json::json!(MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS + 1);
let err = parse_timeout_secs_param(Some(&timeout)).unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string()
.contains(&format!("timeout_secs must be <= {}", MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS)),
"unexpected error: {}",
err
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_timeout_secs_param_rejects_string_value_above_cap() {
let timeout = serde_json::json!((MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS + 1).to_string());
let err = parse_timeout_secs_param(Some(&timeout)).unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string()
.contains(&format!("timeout_secs must be <= {}", MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS)),
"unexpected error: {}",
err
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_save_to_param_treats_empty_string_as_none() {
let save_to = serde_json::json!("");
assert_eq!(parse_save_to_param(Some(&save_to)).unwrap(), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_http_tool_schema_body_is_freeform() {
let schema = HttpTool::new().parameters_schema();
let body = schema
.get("properties")
.and_then(|p| p.get("body"))
.expect("body schema missing");
// Body is intentionally freeform (no "type" constraint) for OpenAI
// compatibility. OpenAI rejects union types containing "array" unless
// "items" is also specified, and body accepts any JSON value.
assert!(
body.get("type").is_none(),
"body schema should not have a 'type' to be freeform for OpenAI compatibility"
);
}
// ── Approval requirement tests ──────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn test_get_no_auth_headers_returns_never() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data"
});
assert_eq!(tool.requires_approval(&params), ApprovalRequirement::Never);
}
#[test]
fn test_post_no_auth_headers_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "POST",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data"
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_auth_header_object_format_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer token123"}
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_auth_header_array_format_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data",
"headers": [{"name": "Authorization", "value": "Bearer token123"}]
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_auth_header_case_insensitive() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
// Object format with mixed case
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": {"AUTHORIZATION": "Bearer x"}
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
// Array format with mixed case
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": [{"name": "X-Api-Key", "value": "key123"}]
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_all_auth_header_names_detected() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
for header_name in [
"authorization",
"x-api-key",
"cookie",
"proxy-authorization",
"x-auth-token",
"api-key",
"x-token",
"x-access-token",
"x-session-token",
"x-csrf-token",
"x-secret",
"x-api-secret",
] {
let mut headers = serde_json::Map::new();
headers.insert(header_name.to_string(), serde_json::json!("value"));
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": headers
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved,
"Header '{}' should trigger UnlessAutoApproved approval",
header_name
);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_get_non_auth_headers_return_never() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "text/html"}
});
assert_eq!(tool.requires_approval(&params), ApprovalRequirement::Never);
}
#[test]
fn test_get_empty_headers_return_never() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
// Empty object
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": {}
});
assert_eq!(tool.requires_approval(&params), ApprovalRequirement::Never);
// Empty array
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": []
});
assert_eq!(tool.requires_approval(&params), ApprovalRequirement::Never);
}
// ── Credential registry approval tests ─────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn test_host_with_credential_mapping_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
use crate::secrets::CredentialMapping;
use crate::tools::wasm::SharedCredentialRegistry;
let registry = Arc::new(SharedCredentialRegistry::new());
registry.add_mappings(vec![CredentialMapping::bearer(
"openai_key",
"api.openai.com",
)]);
let tool = HttpTool::new().with_credentials(
registry,
// secrets_store is not used in requires_approval, just needs to be present
Arc::new(test_secrets_store()),
);
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.openai.com/v1/models"
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_get_host_without_credential_mapping_returns_never() {
use crate::tools::wasm::SharedCredentialRegistry;
let registry = Arc::new(SharedCredentialRegistry::new());
// Empty registry - no credential mappings
let tool = HttpTool::new().with_credentials(registry, Arc::new(test_secrets_store()));
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data"
});
assert_eq!(tool.requires_approval(&params), ApprovalRequirement::Never);
}
#[test]
fn test_url_query_param_credential_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data?api_key=secret123"
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
#[test]
fn test_bearer_value_in_custom_header_returns_unless_auto_approved() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://example.com",
"headers": {"X-Custom": format!("Bearer {TEST_OPENAI_API_KEY}")}
});
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
);
}
/// Regression test: credentialed HTTP requests must return
/// `UnlessAutoApproved` (not `Always`) so that the session auto-approve
/// set is respected when the user says "always".
#[test]
fn test_credentialed_requests_respect_auto_approve() {
let tool = HttpTool::new();
// Manual credentials (Authorization header)
let params = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.github.com/orgs/Casa",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer ghp_abc123"}
});
// Must NOT be Always — Always ignores the session auto-approve set
assert_ne!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::Always,
"Credentialed HTTP requests must not return Always; use UnlessAutoApproved"
);
assert_eq!(
tool.requires_approval(&params),
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved,
);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_host_from_params_valid() {
let params = serde_json::json!({
"url": "https://api.example.com/path"
});
assert_eq!(
extract_host_from_params(&params),
Some("api.example.com".to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_host_from_params_missing_url() {
let params = serde_json::json!({"method": "GET"});
assert_eq!(extract_host_from_params(&params), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_requires_approval_with_stringified_http_params() {
use crate::tools::wasm::SharedCredentialRegistry;
let tool = HttpTool::new().with_credentials(
Arc::new(SharedCredentialRegistry::new()),
Arc::new(test_secrets_store()),
);
let req = serde_json::json!({
"body": "",
"headers": "[]",
"method": "GET",
"save_to": "",
"timeout_secs": "30",
"url": "https://r.jina.ai/http://news.baidu.com/"
});
let _ = tool.requires_approval(&req);
}
// ── DNS pinning tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_validate_and_resolve_rejects_loopback_hostname() {
// "localhost" is blocked at the URL validation level, but verify
// that validate_and_resolve_url also catches loopback IPs returned
// by DNS for any hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1.
let url = reqwest::Url::parse("https://127.0.0.1/test").unwrap();
// 127.0.0.1 is an IP literal -- validate_url blocks it before
// we ever reach validate_and_resolve_url, but the function should
// still reject if called directly.
let err = validate_and_resolve_url(&url).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("disallowed"),
"expected disallowed IP error, got: {}",
err
);
}
// Requires network access -- run with: cargo test -- --ignored
#[ignore]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_validate_and_resolve_accepts_public_host() {
// example.com resolves to public IPs.
let url = reqwest::Url::parse("https://example.com").unwrap();
let addrs = validate_and_resolve_url(&url).await.unwrap();
assert!(!addrs.is_empty(), "should resolve to at least one address");
for addr in &addrs {
assert!(
!is_disallowed_ip(&addr.ip()),
"example.com resolved to disallowed IP: {}",
addr.ip()
);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_build_pinned_client_succeeds() {
let addrs = vec![SocketAddr::new(
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)),
443,
)];
let client = build_pinned_client(
"example.com",
&addrs,
Duration::from_secs(10),
reqwest::redirect::Policy::none(),
);
assert!(client.is_ok(), "should build client successfully");
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn requires_approval_multi_thread_no_panic() {
use crate::secrets::CredentialMapping;
use crate::tools::wasm::SharedCredentialRegistry;
// Test with credential registry (uses std::sync::RwLock - should be safe)
let registry = Arc::new(SharedCredentialRegistry::new());
registry.add_mappings(vec![CredentialMapping::bearer("test_key", "api.test.com")]);
let tool = HttpTool::new().with_credentials(registry, Arc::new(test_secrets_store()));
// These calls should not panic in multi-thread runtime
let params_no_auth = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com/data"
});
let _ = tool.requires_approval(&params_no_auth);
let params_with_cred = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.test.com/v1/models"
});
let _ = tool.requires_approval(&params_with_cred);
let params_with_auth = serde_json::json!({
"method": "GET",
"url": "https://api.example.com",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer token"}
});
let _ = tool.requires_approval(&params_with_auth);
}
// ── save_to path validation tests ─────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn test_save_to_rejects_path_outside_tmp() {
let err = validate_save_to_path("/etc/passwd").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("must be under /tmp/"));
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_rejects_home_dir() {
let err = validate_save_to_path("/home/user/file.txt").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("must be under /tmp/"));
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_rejects_traversal_via_dotdot() {
let err = validate_save_to_path("/tmp/../../etc/passwd").unwrap_err();
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("escapes") || msg.contains("resolves outside"),
"expected path traversal rejection, got: {}",
msg
);
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_rejects_deep_traversal() {
let err = validate_save_to_path("/tmp/a/b/../../../../etc/shadow").unwrap_err();
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("escapes") || msg.contains("resolves outside"),
"expected path traversal rejection, got: {}",
msg
);
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_accepts_simple_tmp_path() {
let path = validate_save_to_path("/tmp/test_ironclaw_photo.jpg").unwrap();
assert!(path.starts_with("/tmp"));
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_accepts_nested_tmp_path() {
let path = validate_save_to_path("/tmp/ironclaw_test_subdir/nested/file.png").unwrap();
assert!(path.starts_with("/tmp"));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all("/tmp/ironclaw_test_subdir");
}
#[test]
fn test_save_to_rejects_bare_tmp() {
let err = validate_save_to_path("/tmp").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("must be under /tmp/"));
}
}