Files
optimclaw/benchmarks/src/runner.rs
T
bac2d75713 feat: Secure prompt-based skills system (Phases 1-4) (#51)
* feat: Add secure prompt-based skills system (Phase 1 MVP)

Implement a skills system that extends the agent with prompt-level
instructions from local directories. Skills declare activation criteria,
tool permissions, and trust tiers that determine authority attenuation.

Core security model: the minimum trust level of any active skill
determines a tool ceiling -- tools above the ceiling are removed from
the LLM's tool list entirely at the API level, preventing prompt-based
manipulation.

New modules:
- skills/mod.rs: Core types (SkillTrust, SkillManifest, LoadedSkill)
- skills/scanner.rs: Content scanner for manipulation detection
- skills/registry.rs: Filesystem discovery and manifest parsing
- skills/selector.rs: Deterministic two-phase prefilter (no LLM)
- skills/attenuation.rs: Trust-based tool filtering

Integration:
- Agent loop selects skills per-turn and applies tool attenuation
- Reasoning engine injects skill context with structural isolation
- Config supports SKILLS_ENABLED, SKILLS_DIR, SKILLS_MAX_ACTIVE,
  SKILLS_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS environment variables
- Disabled by default (SKILLS_ENABLED=false)

41 new tests covering all modules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address all adversarial review findings for skills system

Security fixes:
- Escape skill name/version in XML attributes to prevent trust spoofing
- Escape prompt content to prevent </skill> tag breakout
- Require integrity hash for Verified/Community tier skills
- Validate skill names against [a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63}
- Add 64 KiB file size limit on prompt.md

Bug fixes:
- Use actual SkillsConfig from AgentDeps instead of SkillsConfig::default()
- Add skills_config field to AgentDeps, wired through from main.rs

Performance:
- Pre-compile regex patterns at load time (cached on LoadedSkill)
- Selector uses pre-compiled patterns instead of recompiling per message
- Switch all std::fs to tokio::fs for non-blocking async I/O

Hardening:
- Cap keyword score at 30 points to prevent keyword stuffing attacks
- Enforce max 20 keywords and 5 patterns per skill
- Normalize line endings (CRLF/CR to LF) before hashing
- Also includes cargo fmt formatting fixes for adjacent code

Tests: 54 skills tests pass (up from 41), zero new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address medium/low severity findings from adversarial review

Fixes all 18 medium/low severity findings identified by the security review:

- mod.rs: Add MAX_TAGS_PER_SKILL cap (10) in enforce_limits(); use
  RegexBuilder with 64 KiB size_limit to prevent ReDoS; replace
  case-enumerated escape_skill_content with regex matching all case
  variants plus whitespace/null byte injection between </ and skill;
  document allowed_patterns as unenforced until Phase 2; document
  Marketplace URL validation as Phase 3 concern

- registry.rs: Add MAX_MANIFEST_FILE_SIZE (16 KiB) check before reading;
  add symlink detection via symlink_metadata to reject symlinks in
  discover_local; add MAX_DISCOVERED_SKILLS (100) cap; validate
  prompt_hash format (sha256: + 64 hex chars); warn on name collision
  before overwriting; accept SkillSource parameter in load_skill instead
  of always using Local; add InvalidHashFormat, ManifestTooLarge,
  SymlinkDetected error variants

- selector.rs: Add MAX_TAG_SCORE (15) cap parallel to keyword cap; warn
  when declared max_context_tokens diverges >2x from actual prompt size

- scanner.rs: Add mixed-script homoglyph detection (Cyrillic, Greek,
  Armenian unicode ranges); document token-boundary bypass and semantic
  paraphrasing as known limitations

- attenuation.rs: Document READ_ONLY_TOOLS maintenance requirements

- agent_loop.rs: Surface scan warnings via structured tracing; add
  structured audit events for skill activation and tool attenuation

61 tests pass, 0 new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address 12 findings from second adversarial security review

HIGH:
- Escape opening <skill tags in prompt content (prevents fake skill block injection)
- Scan manifest metadata fields (description, author, tags, reasons) not just prompt
- Block trust downgrade on name collision (existing Local can't be replaced by Community)

MEDIUM:
- Eliminate TOCTOU gap: read files then check size instead of metadata-then-read
- Reject file-level symlinks in load_skill (prompt.md, skill.toml)
- Truncate and filter manifest.skill.tags (prevent unlimited tag scoring)
- Cap regex pattern score at 40 (prevent 5x20=100 dominating keyword+tag)
- Add doc comment about skill_list tool exposing metadata (sanitization required)
- Move Community disclaimer inside <skill> tags (not outside structural boundary)
- Filter keywords/tags shorter than 3 chars (prevent broad matching)

LOW:
- Enforce minimum token_cost of 1 (max_context_tokens=0 can't bypass budget)
- Remove redundant try_exists checks in discover_local (let load_skill handle errors)

70 skills tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add HTTP endpoint scoping for skills (Phase 1)

Skills that declare an [http] section in skill.toml now have their HTTP
requests constrained to declared endpoints at runtime. This addresses
the gap where allowed_patterns was parsed but never enforced -- once the
http tool was visible via attenuation, the LLM could reach any URL.

Enforcement reuses EndpointPattern/AllowlistValidator from the WASM
capability system. Semantics: if no active skill declares [http], all
requests pass through (backward compat). If any skill declares [http],
URLs must match at least one skill's allowlist (union). Community skills'
[http] declarations are silently ignored (defense in depth).

Shell commands using curl/wget are also validated against scopes.

Scanner gains detection for known exfiltration domains (webhook.site,
ngrok.io, etc.), overly broad wildcards, and credential/host mismatches.

Closes #38

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* style: Apply cargo fmt to http_scoping.rs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* style: Apply cargo fmt across codebase

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add parameter-level permission enforcement for skills (Phase 2)

Activates enforcement of `allowed_patterns` in skill.toml permissions.
Previously these patterns were parsed but not enforced -- a Verified skill
declaring `permissions.shell` with `allowed_patterns = [{command = "cargo *"}]`
could still run any shell command. Now the enforcer validates tool parameters
against declared glob patterns before execution.

Key changes:
- New `enforcer.rs` module with `SkillPermissionEnforcer`, `glob_to_regex()`,
  and `validate_tool_call()` with union semantics across active skills
- Typed pattern enums (`ShellPattern`, `FilePathPattern`, `MemoryTargetPattern`)
  replace the previous `Vec<serde_json::Value>` in `ToolPermissionDeclaration`
- Scanner gains `scan_permission_patterns()` detecting dangerous patterns
  (rm, sudo, curl, bare wildcards, command chaining, sensitive paths, identity files)
- Registry blocks non-Local skills with critical permission pattern warnings
- Agent loop threads enforcer into `execute_chat_tool` alongside HTTP scoping

Trust interaction: Community patterns ignored, Verified enforced, Local without
patterns unrestricted, Local with patterns enforced as guidance. Union semantics
across skills -- tool call allowed if ANY skill's patterns permit it.

34 new tests. All 818 library tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: Add worker permission enforcement and LLM behavioral analysis (Phase 3+4)

Phase 3 - Worker-side permission enforcement:
- Add SerializedToolPermission/SerializedPattern DTOs for HTTP boundary crossing
- Extend JobDescription, ContainerHandle, and orchestrator API to carry permissions
- CreateJobTool snapshots and forwards skill permissions to spawned workers
- Worker runtime builds SkillPermissionEnforcer and checks before tool execution
- Load-time token budget enforcement rejects prompts exceeding 2x declared budget
- Deduplicate enforcer construction: from_active_skills() delegates to from_serialized()

Phase 4 - LLM behavioral analysis:
- BehavioralAnalyzer with cached, LLM-based semantic content analysis
- Structured output parsing (FINDING|CATEGORY|SEVERITY|DESCRIPTION or CLEAN)
- Content-hash caching with bounded size (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES=256)
- Graceful degradation when LLM unavailable
- Integrated into load_skill() for non-Local skills; critical findings block loading

Review fixes:
- Real cache tests with CountingLlm mock (test_cache_hit, test_cache_miss, test_cache_bounded)
- UTF-8-safe truncate() in worker runtime
- Few-shot examples in behavioral analysis prompt
- Documented max_context_tokens=0 opt-out and create_job() permission gap

848 tests passing, no new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: Address review feedback from serrrfirat on skills-phase2

- Fix truncate_cmd UTF-8 panic: use char-boundary-aware slicing
- Remove redundant effective_tools branching in reasoning.rs
- Document cache eviction as known limitation (arbitrary, not LRU)
- Add safety comment on SkillTrust enum ordering (security-critical)
- Simplify active_skills selection (prefilter_skills handles empty input)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address remaining skills review feedback

* refactor: replace skills system with OpenClaw SKILL.md format + 2-state trust

Replace the 5-gate, 3-tier trust hierarchy (scanner, behavioral analyzer,
parameter-level enforcer, HTTP endpoint scoping) with a simplified 3-layer
security model: gating -> attenuation -> Docker confinement.

Key changes:
- SKILL.md format (YAML frontmatter + markdown prompt) replaces skill.toml + prompt.md
- 2-state trust (Installed/Trusted) replaces 3-tier (Community/Verified/Local)
- New parser.rs for SKILL.md parsing with serde_yaml
- New gating.rs for requirements checking (bins/env/config)
- Simplified registry with 2-location discovery (workspace + user dirs)
- Removed scanner, behavioral_analyzer, enforcer, http_scoping (~4,100 lines)
- Removed skill_permissions propagation through job/orchestrator/worker pipeline
- Added serde_yaml dependency for YAML frontmatter parsing

Net: -5,298 lines, 59 skills tests pass, 907 total tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* feat: add in-app skill management tools and ClawHub catalog integration

Add 4 chat-callable tools (skill_list, skill_search, skill_install,
skill_remove) plus matching web gateway endpoints for managing skills
at runtime. The catalog fetches from ClawHub's public registry API
at runtime rather than bundling entries at compile time.

Key changes:
- SkillRegistry gains mutation methods (install_skill, remove_skill,
  reload, find_by_name) with Arc<RwLock> for concurrent access
- New catalog module queries ClawHub /api/v1/search with in-memory
  caching (5-min TTL, configurable via CLAWHUB_REGISTRY env var)
- skill_list and skill_search added to READ_ONLY_TOOLS for safe use
  under Installed trust ceiling
- Web gateway gets /api/skills, /api/skills/search, /api/skills/install,
  and /api/skills/{name} DELETE endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR #51 review feedback from ilblackdragon

Security:
- Add SSRF protection to fetch_skill_content: require HTTPS, reject
  private/loopback/link-local IPs and internal hostnames, disable
  redirects. Gateway install handler now reuses the same validation.
- URL-encode slug in skill_download_url to prevent query injection.
- Require X-Confirm-Action header on gateway skill install/remove
  endpoints (equivalent to chat tool requires_approval gate).

Correctness:
- Eliminate all block_in_place/block_on usage in skill tools and
  gateway handlers. Split install into prepare_install_to_disk (static
  async, no lock) + commit_install (sync, brief write lock). Same
  pattern for remove: validate_remove + delete_skill_files + commit_remove.
- Write normalized content to disk in install_skill (was writing
  original un-normalized content, causing hash mismatch on re-read).
- Fix token estimation from 0.75 to 0.25 tokens/byte (~4 chars per
  token) in registry.rs, selector.rs, and standalone loader.

Dependencies:
- Replace deprecated serde_yaml 0.9 with serde_yml 0.0.12.
- Remove unused toml dependency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-02-18 00:28:38 +00:00

551 lines
19 KiB
Rust

use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Instant;
use chrono::Utc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use uuid::Uuid;
use ironclaw::agent::{Agent, AgentDeps};
use ironclaw::channels::{ChannelManager, IncomingMessage};
use ironclaw::config::AgentConfig;
use ironclaw::llm::LlmProvider;
use ironclaw::safety::SafetyLayer;
use ironclaw::tools::ToolRegistry;
use crate::channel::BenchChannel;
use crate::config::{BenchConfig, MatrixEntry};
use crate::error::BenchError;
use crate::instrumented_llm::InstrumentedLlm;
use crate::results::{
RunResult, TaskResult, Trace, append_task_result, completed_task_ids, run_dir, run_json_path,
tasks_jsonl_path, write_run_result, write_task_results,
};
use crate::suite::{BenchSuite, BenchTask, ConversationTurn, TaskSubmission, TurnRole};
/// Parameters for running a single task in isolation.
struct TaskRunParams<'a> {
task: &'a BenchTask,
suite_id: &'a str,
config_label: &'a str,
llm: Arc<dyn LlmProvider>,
safety: Arc<SafetyLayer>,
timeout: std::time::Duration,
additional_tools: &'a [Arc<dyn ironclaw::tools::Tool>],
}
/// Orchestrates benchmark execution: loads tasks, runs agent per task,
/// scores results, writes JSONL output.
pub struct BenchRunner {
suite: Arc<dyn BenchSuite>,
config: BenchConfig,
llm: Arc<dyn LlmProvider>,
safety: Arc<SafetyLayer>,
}
impl BenchRunner {
pub fn new(
suite: Box<dyn BenchSuite>,
config: BenchConfig,
llm: Arc<dyn LlmProvider>,
safety: Arc<SafetyLayer>,
) -> Self {
Self {
suite: Arc::from(suite),
config,
llm,
safety,
}
}
/// Run the benchmark for one matrix entry.
///
/// Returns the run_id for result retrieval.
pub async fn run(
&self,
matrix: &MatrixEntry,
sample: Option<usize>,
task_filter: Option<&[String]>,
tag_filter: Option<&[String]>,
resume_run_id: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Uuid, BenchError> {
let run_id = resume_run_id.unwrap_or_else(Uuid::new_v4);
let results_base = &self.config.results_dir;
let dir = run_dir(results_base, run_id);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir)?;
let jsonl_path = tasks_jsonl_path(results_base, run_id);
let json_path = run_json_path(results_base, run_id);
// Load completed task IDs for resume support
let completed: HashSet<String> = if resume_run_id.is_some() {
completed_task_ids(&jsonl_path)?
} else {
HashSet::new()
};
if !completed.is_empty() {
tracing::info!(
"Resuming run {}: {} tasks already completed",
run_id,
completed.len()
);
}
// Load all tasks once (used for both execution and scoring)
let all_tasks = self.suite.load_tasks().await?;
let task_index: HashMap<String, BenchTask> = all_tasks
.iter()
.map(|t| (t.id.clone(), t.clone()))
.collect();
// Filter tasks for execution
let mut tasks = all_tasks;
if let Some(ids) = task_filter {
let id_set: HashSet<&str> = ids.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
tasks.retain(|t| id_set.contains(t.id.as_str()));
}
if let Some(tags) = tag_filter {
let tag_set: HashSet<&str> = tags.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
tasks.retain(|t| t.tags.iter().any(|tag| tag_set.contains(tag.as_str())));
}
// Filter out already-completed tasks
tasks.retain(|t| !completed.contains(&t.id));
// Sample if requested
if let Some(n) = sample {
tasks.truncate(n);
}
let total_tasks = tasks.len() + completed.len();
let model_label = matrix.model.as_deref().unwrap_or(self.llm.model_name());
let commit_hash = git_short_hash();
tracing::info!(
"[{} @ {}] Running {} tasks for suite '{}' (run: {})",
model_label,
commit_hash,
tasks.len(),
self.suite.id(),
run_id
);
let started_at = Utc::now();
let all_results: Arc<Mutex<Vec<TaskResult>>> =
Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::with_capacity(tasks.len())));
if self.config.parallelism <= 1 {
// Sequential execution
let additional_tools = self.suite.additional_tools();
for (i, task) in tasks.iter().enumerate() {
tracing::info!(
"[{}/{}] Running task: {}",
i + 1 + completed.len(),
total_tasks,
task.id
);
if let Err(e) = self.suite.setup_task(task).await {
tracing::warn!("setup_task failed for {}: {}", task.id, e);
let result = make_error_result(
task,
self.suite.id(),
&matrix.label,
Utc::now(),
&format!("setup_task failed: {e}"),
);
append_task_result(&jsonl_path, &result)?;
all_results.lock().await.push(result);
continue;
}
let params = TaskRunParams {
task,
suite_id: self.suite.id(),
config_label: &matrix.label,
llm: Arc::clone(&self.llm),
safety: Arc::clone(&self.safety),
timeout: task.timeout.unwrap_or(self.config.task_timeout),
additional_tools: &additional_tools,
};
let result = run_task_isolated(params).await;
if let Err(e) = self.suite.teardown_task(task).await {
tracing::warn!("teardown_task failed for {}: {}", task.id, e);
}
append_task_result(&jsonl_path, &result)?;
all_results.lock().await.push(result);
}
} else {
// Parallel execution with bounded concurrency
let semaphore = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(self.config.parallelism));
let shared_tools: Arc<[Arc<dyn ironclaw::tools::Tool>]> =
Arc::from(self.suite.additional_tools());
let mut handles = Vec::new();
for (i, task) in tasks.into_iter().enumerate() {
let sem = Arc::clone(&semaphore);
let suite = Arc::clone(&self.suite);
let config_label = matrix.label.clone();
let llm = Arc::clone(&self.llm);
let safety = Arc::clone(&self.safety);
let timeout = task.timeout.unwrap_or(self.config.task_timeout);
let results_ref = Arc::clone(&all_results);
let completed_count = completed.len();
let total = total_tasks;
let additional_tools = Arc::clone(&shared_tools);
handles.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
let _permit = match sem.acquire().await {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(_) => {
tracing::error!("Semaphore closed for task {}", task.id);
return;
}
};
tracing::info!(
"[{}/{}] Running task: {}",
i + 1 + completed_count,
total,
task.id
);
if let Err(e) = suite.setup_task(&task).await {
tracing::warn!("setup_task failed for {}: {}", task.id, e);
let result = make_error_result(
&task,
suite.id(),
&config_label,
Utc::now(),
&format!("setup_task failed: {e}"),
);
results_ref.lock().await.push(result);
return;
}
let suite_id = suite.id().to_string();
let params = TaskRunParams {
task: &task,
suite_id: &suite_id,
config_label: &config_label,
llm,
safety,
timeout,
additional_tools: &additional_tools,
};
let result = run_task_isolated(params).await;
if let Err(e) = suite.teardown_task(&task).await {
tracing::warn!("teardown_task failed for {}: {}", task.id, e);
}
results_ref.lock().await.push(result);
}));
}
for handle in handles {
if let Err(e) = handle.await {
tracing::error!("Task panicked: {}", e);
}
}
// Write all results to JSONL after parallel execution completes.
// This avoids the race condition of concurrent file appends.
let results = all_results.lock().await;
for result in results.iter() {
append_task_result(&jsonl_path, result)?;
}
}
// Score all results using the cached task index
let results = all_results.lock().await;
let mut scored: Vec<TaskResult> = Vec::with_capacity(results.len());
for result in results.iter() {
if let Some(task) = task_index.get(&result.task_id) {
let submission = TaskSubmission {
response: result.response.clone(),
conversation: vec![],
tool_calls: result
.trace
.tool_calls
.iter()
.map(|tc| tc.name.clone())
.collect(),
error: result.error.clone(),
};
match self.suite.score(task, &submission).await {
Ok(score) => {
let mut scored_result = result.clone();
scored_result.score = score;
scored.push(scored_result);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Scoring failed for {}: {}", result.task_id, e);
scored.push(result.clone());
}
}
} else {
scored.push(result.clone());
}
}
// Combine with any previously completed results for the aggregate
let mut all_for_aggregate = crate::results::read_task_results(&jsonl_path)?;
// De-duplicate (prefer the newer scored versions)
let scored_ids: HashSet<String> = scored.iter().map(|r| r.task_id.clone()).collect();
all_for_aggregate.retain(|r| !scored_ids.contains(&r.task_id));
all_for_aggregate.extend(scored);
// Rewrite JSONL with scored results so `results` command shows final scores
write_task_results(&jsonl_path, &all_for_aggregate)?;
let model_name = matrix.model.as_deref().unwrap_or(self.llm.model_name());
let run_result = RunResult::from_tasks(
run_id,
self.suite.id(),
&matrix.label,
model_name,
&commit_hash,
total_tasks,
&all_for_aggregate,
started_at,
);
write_run_result(&json_path, &run_result)?;
tracing::info!(
"[{} @ {}] Run {} complete: {:.1}% pass rate, {:.3} avg score, ${:.4} cost",
model_name,
commit_hash,
run_id,
run_result.pass_rate * 100.0,
run_result.avg_score,
run_result.total_cost_usd,
);
Ok(run_id)
}
}
/// Run a single benchmark task in complete isolation.
///
/// Creates a fresh Agent + BenchChannel + InstrumentedLlm for the task,
/// injects the prompt, waits for the response, and returns the result.
///
/// # Current limitations
///
/// - **Single-turn only**: After the first assistant response, `/quit` is sent.
/// Multi-turn suites (e.g., Tau-bench's `next_user_message()`) are not yet wired.
/// - **Resources not injected**: `BenchTask.resources` (e.g., GAIA file attachments)
/// are not included in the prompt or made available via the workspace.
/// - **Conversation not captured**: `TaskSubmission.conversation` is always empty,
/// which prevents multi-turn scoring hooks from working.
async fn run_task_isolated(params: TaskRunParams<'_>) -> TaskResult {
let TaskRunParams {
task,
suite_id,
config_label,
llm,
safety,
timeout,
additional_tools,
} = params;
let started_at = Utc::now();
let start = Instant::now();
// Wrap LLM with instrumentation
let instrumented = Arc::new(InstrumentedLlm::new(llm));
// Create bench channel
let (bench_channel, msg_tx) = BenchChannel::new();
let capture = bench_channel.capture();
// Build tool registry
let tools = Arc::new(ToolRegistry::new());
tools.register_builtin_tools();
// Register additional suite-specific tools
for tool in additional_tools {
tools.register(Arc::clone(tool)).await;
}
// Build agent config (minimal, headless)
let agent_config = AgentConfig {
name: format!("bench-{}", task.id),
max_parallel_jobs: 1,
job_timeout: timeout,
stuck_threshold: timeout,
repair_check_interval: timeout + std::time::Duration::from_secs(999),
max_repair_attempts: 0,
use_planning: false,
session_idle_timeout: timeout,
allow_local_tools: true,
max_cost_per_day_cents: None,
max_actions_per_hour: None,
};
let cost_guard = Arc::new(ironclaw::agent::cost_guard::CostGuard::new(
ironclaw::agent::cost_guard::CostGuardConfig::default(),
));
let deps = AgentDeps {
store: None,
llm: instrumented.clone() as Arc<dyn LlmProvider>,
cheap_llm: None,
safety,
tools,
workspace: None,
extension_manager: None,
skill_registry: None,
skills_config: ironclaw::config::SkillsConfig::default(),
hooks: Arc::new(ironclaw::hooks::HookRegistry::new()),
cost_guard,
};
let mut channels = ChannelManager::new();
channels.add(Box::new(bench_channel));
let agent = Agent::new(agent_config, deps, channels, None, None, None, None);
// Build the full prompt with context
let full_prompt = if let Some(ref ctx) = task.context {
format!("{}\n\nContext:\n{}", task.prompt, ctx)
} else {
task.prompt.clone()
};
// Inject the task prompt
let incoming = IncomingMessage::new("bench", "bench-user", &full_prompt);
if msg_tx.send(incoming).await.is_err() {
return make_error_result(
task,
suite_id,
config_label,
started_at,
"failed to send prompt",
);
}
// Record prompt in conversation
{
let mut cap = capture.lock().await;
cap.conversation.push(ConversationTurn {
role: TurnRole::User,
content: full_prompt,
});
}
// Run agent with timeout.
// After the first response, send /quit to end the session.
let quit_tx = msg_tx.clone();
let capture_for_quit = Arc::clone(&capture);
let quit_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
// Poll for first response
loop {
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
let cap = capture_for_quit.lock().await;
if !cap.responses.is_empty() {
break;
}
}
// Give a small grace period for any final status events
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
let quit = IncomingMessage::new("bench", "bench-user", "/quit");
let _ = quit_tx.send(quit).await;
});
let agent_result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, agent.run()).await;
quit_handle.abort();
let wall_time = start.elapsed();
let hit_timeout = agent_result.is_err();
if let Ok(Err(e)) = &agent_result {
tracing::warn!("Agent error for task {}: {}", task.id, e);
}
// Extract results from capture
let cap = capture.lock().await;
let response = cap.responses.last().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
let trace = Trace {
wall_time_ms: wall_time.as_millis() as u64,
llm_calls: instrumented.call_count(),
input_tokens: instrumented.total_input_tokens(),
output_tokens: instrumented.total_output_tokens(),
estimated_cost_usd: instrumented.estimated_cost(),
tool_calls: cap.tool_calls.clone(),
turns: cap.responses.len() as u32,
hit_iteration_limit: false,
hit_timeout,
};
let error = if hit_timeout {
Some(format!("timeout after {}s", timeout.as_secs()))
} else if let Ok(Err(e)) = &agent_result {
Some(e.to_string())
} else {
None
};
TaskResult {
task_id: task.id.clone(),
suite_id: suite_id.to_string(),
score: crate::suite::BenchScore {
value: 0.0,
label: "pending".to_string(),
details: None,
},
trace,
response,
started_at,
finished_at: Utc::now(),
config_label: config_label.to_string(),
error,
}
}
fn make_error_result(
task: &BenchTask,
suite_id: &str,
config_label: &str,
started_at: chrono::DateTime<Utc>,
reason: &str,
) -> TaskResult {
TaskResult {
task_id: task.id.clone(),
suite_id: suite_id.to_string(),
score: crate::suite::BenchScore::fail(reason),
trace: Trace {
wall_time_ms: 0,
llm_calls: 0,
input_tokens: 0,
output_tokens: 0,
estimated_cost_usd: 0.0,
tool_calls: vec![],
turns: 0,
hit_iteration_limit: false,
hit_timeout: false,
},
response: String::new(),
started_at,
finished_at: Utc::now(),
config_label: config_label.to_string(),
error: Some(reason.to_string()),
}
}
/// Get the short git commit hash of HEAD, or "unknown" if not in a repo.
fn git_short_hash() -> String {
std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"])
.output()
.ok()
.and_then(|o| {
if o.status.success() {
Some(String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string())
} else {
None
}
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string())
}