Files
optimclaw/src/orchestrator/auth.rs
T
33ef0a6ea5 fix: security hardening across all layers (#35)
* fix: comprehensive security hardening across all layers

Critical:
- Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with explicit tool allowlist
  via settings.json (Claude Code bridge)
- Constant-time token comparison (subtle crate) in web auth and
  orchestrator auth to prevent timing attacks

High:
- Revoke tokens and clean up handles on container creation failure
- Drop SETUID/SETGID capabilities from containers (keep only CHOWN)
- Disable redirect following in HTTP tool and WASM wrapper (SSRF)
- Reject URL userinfo (@) in WASM allowlist parser (host confusion)
- Fix binary body bypassing leak detection (from_utf8 -> from_utf8_lossy)
- Protect identity files from LLM overwrites (prompt injection defense)
- Prevent tool shadowing: built-in tools cannot be replaced dynamically
- User-scoped job APIs: list/detail/cancel/restart/prompt/events/files
- CORS restricted to localhost origins, WebSocket origin validation
- Sandbox shell fail-closed: no silent fallback to unsandboxed execution
- Scrub secrets from log broadcaster before SSE broadcast
- XSS sanitization on rendered markdown in web UI
- WASM epoch ticker thread so timeout deadlines actually fire

Medium:
- Cap state transition history at 200 entries
- SSE/WebSocket connection limit (100 max)
- Request body size limit (1MB)
- Response body size limit enforcement in WASM HTTP
- UTF-8 safe string truncation (routine engine, shell tool)
- Fix PolicyAction::Sanitize to actually run the sanitizer
- TOCTOU fix in scheduler and context manager (hold write lock)
- Project file serving moved behind auth
- Path traversal guard on project_id
- Session file permissions set to 0600 on unix
- AtomicUsize for routine running_count (panic-safe)
- Completion detection hardened against false positives and tool injection
- Tool output no longer drives job completion (only LLM response)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address security review findings across all layers

- Fix path traversal sandbox bypass via lexical normalization (file.rs)
- Fix SSRF via DNS rebinding with pre-request hostname resolution (http.rs)
- Add token budget enforcement on LLM calls (reasoning.rs, state.rs)
- Fix cross-user chat history leak with ownership verification (store.rs, server.rs)
- Add sliding-window rate limiter on gateway chat endpoint (server.rs)
- Harden extension install: HTTPS-only, 50MB cap, WASM magic validation (manager.rs)
- Add destructive command blocklist that overrides shell auto-approval (shell.rs)
- Add 5MB response body size cap to HTTP tool (http.rs)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* refactor: deduplicate shared helpers and remove dead code

Extract floor_char_boundary and llm_signals_completion into src/util.rs,
unifying diverging phrase lists from agent/worker.rs and worker/runtime.rs.
Remove dead RespondResult::usage(), duplicate PROTECTED_IDENTITY_FILES
constant, double LeakDetector scanning in WebLogLayer, and invalid
0.0.0.0 origin from WebSocket allow list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address PR review findings and CI test failures

- Fix record_failed_approve: .truncate(true) wiped the attempts file
  before reading, so failed pairing attempts never accumulated and
  rate limiting never triggered.
- Guard wizard WASM test: skip gracefully when channel build artifacts
  are absent (CI doesn't compile wasm32-wasip2 targets).
- Fix DNS rebinding check: use port 0 instead of hardcoded 443, since
  the port is irrelevant for hostname resolution.
- Remove hardcoded CORS port 3001: the dynamic addr.port() entries
  already cover the actual server port.
- Require WebSocket Origin header: reject connections that omit it
  entirely, since browsers always send Origin for WS upgrades and a
  missing header indicates a non-browser client bypassing the check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address second round of PR review findings

- store.rs: reintroduce file locking around read-modify-write in
  record_failed_approve (concurrent callers could clobber each other).
- sse.rs: replace load+check+fetch_add with atomic fetch_update in both
  subscribe_raw() and subscribe() to prevent overshooting max_connections.
- ws.rs: decrement WS tracker before early return when subscribe_raw()
  returns None (connection limit reached), fixing a counter leak.
- server.rs: parse WS Origin host exactly instead of prefix matching,
  preventing bypass via crafted origins like http://localhost.evil.com.
- workspace_integration.rs: skip tests gracefully when Postgres is
  unreachable instead of panicking (fixes 10 CI failures).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: add Origin header to WS integration tests

The Origin header requirement added in a3b0190 broke the WS gateway
integration tests. Test clients now send Origin: http://127.0.0.1:{port}
to match the server's localhost validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-02-13 05:25:20 +00:00

164 lines
4.7 KiB
Rust

//! Per-job bearer token authentication for worker-to-orchestrator communication.
//!
//! Security properties:
//! - Tokens are cryptographically random (32 bytes, hex-encoded)
//! - Tokens are scoped to a specific job_id
//! - Tokens are ephemeral (in-memory only, never persisted)
//! - A token for Job A cannot access endpoints for Job B
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::extract::{Request, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::middleware::Next;
use axum::response::Response;
use rand::Rng;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// In-memory store for per-job authentication tokens.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct TokenStore {
/// Maps job_id -> bearer token. Never logged or persisted.
tokens: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<Uuid, String>>>,
}
impl TokenStore {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
tokens: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
}
}
/// Generate and store a new token for a job.
pub async fn create_token(&self, job_id: Uuid) -> String {
let token = generate_token();
self.tokens.write().await.insert(job_id, token.clone());
token
}
/// Validate a token for a specific job (constant-time comparison).
pub async fn validate(&self, job_id: Uuid, token: &str) -> bool {
self.tokens
.read()
.await
.get(&job_id)
.map(|stored| stored.as_bytes().ct_eq(token.as_bytes()).into())
.unwrap_or(false)
}
/// Remove a token (on container cleanup).
pub async fn revoke(&self, job_id: Uuid) {
self.tokens.write().await.remove(&job_id);
}
/// Get the number of active tokens (for diagnostics).
pub async fn active_count(&self) -> usize {
self.tokens.read().await.len()
}
}
impl Default for TokenStore {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
/// Generate a cryptographically random token (32 bytes, hex-encoded = 64 chars).
fn generate_token() -> String {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
rand::thread_rng().fill(&mut bytes);
hex_encode(&bytes)
}
fn hex_encode(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
}
/// Axum middleware that validates worker bearer tokens.
///
/// Extracts the job_id from the path (`/worker/{job_id}/...`) and validates
/// the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header against the token store.
///
/// Wire up with `axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(token_store, worker_auth_middleware)`.
pub async fn worker_auth_middleware(
State(token_store): State<TokenStore>,
request: Request,
next: Next,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let path = request.uri().path().to_string();
let job_id = extract_job_id_from_path(&path).ok_or(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
let token = request
.headers()
.get("authorization")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
if !token_store.validate(job_id, token).await {
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
Ok(next.run(request).await)
}
/// Extract job UUID from a path like `/worker/{uuid}/...`
fn extract_job_id_from_path(path: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
let parts: Vec<&str> = path.trim_start_matches('/').split('/').collect();
if parts.len() >= 2 && parts[0] == "worker" {
Uuid::parse_str(parts[1]).ok()
} else {
None
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_token_create_and_validate() {
let store = TokenStore::new();
let job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let token = store.create_token(job_id).await;
assert_eq!(token.len(), 64); // 32 bytes hex = 64 chars
assert!(store.validate(job_id, &token).await);
assert!(!store.validate(job_id, "wrong-token").await);
assert!(!store.validate(Uuid::new_v4(), &token).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_token_revoke() {
let store = TokenStore::new();
let job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let token = store.create_token(job_id).await;
assert!(store.validate(job_id, &token).await);
store.revoke(job_id).await;
assert!(!store.validate(job_id, &token).await);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_job_id() {
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let path = format!("/worker/{}/llm/complete", id);
assert_eq!(extract_job_id_from_path(&path), Some(id));
assert_eq!(extract_job_id_from_path("/other/path"), None);
assert_eq!(extract_job_id_from_path("/worker/not-a-uuid/foo"), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_token_is_random() {
let t1 = generate_token();
let t2 = generate_token();
assert_ne!(t1, t2);
}
}