Files
optimclaw/src/tools/builtin/file.rs
T
ibhagwanandGitHub bf35b59222 feat(signal) attachment upload + message tool (#375)
* feat(channels/signal): add attachment upload support

- Add attachments field to OutgoingResponse for carrying file paths
- Add with_attachments() builder method to OutgoingResponse
- Update build_rpc_params() to include attachments array in JSON-RPC
- Update respond() and broadcast() to handle attachments:
  - Text + attachments: sends text first, then each attachment
  - Attachments only: sends each attachment with path as message
  - Text only: original behavior (no change)
- Add tests for build_rpc_params with attachments
- Add tests for OutgoingResponse attachment builder

This enables the Signal channel to send files via signal-cli daemon's
JSON-RPC send method, matching the nullclaw implementation.

Risk: Low - uses existing JSON-RPC infrastructure
Tests: 85 signal tests pass, 1543 lib tests pass

* feat(tools): add message tool for cross-channel messaging

Add a new 'message' tool that allows the agent to send messages to
any connected channel (signal, telegram, slack, etc.) with optional
file attachments.

Features:
- Send messages to specific channel + target combinations
- Support for attachments (file paths)
- E.164 validation delegated to channel (signal expects +number,
  telegram accepts username/chat_id, slack uses #channels)
- Helpful error messages showing available channels on failure

Tool schema:
- content: message text (required)
- channel: target channel name (optional, defaults to current channel)
- target: recipient (E.164, group ID, chat ID) (optional, defaults to
  current user/group chat)
- attachments: optional file paths to send

This complements the recently added attachment upload support for the
Signal channel by giving the agent a proper way to specify attachments
when sending messages.

Tests: 4 new tests for message tool schema
Risk: Low - new tool with no breaking changes
Tests: All 1547 lib tests pass, clippy clean

* feat(llm): add conversation context to system prompt for Signal

Add conversation_context HashMap to Reasoning struct to pass channel-specific
metadata (sender phone, sender UUID, group ID) to the LLM. This helps the
agent know who/group it's talking to, preventing it from hallucinating
phone numbers or sending to wrong recipients.

Changes:
- Add conversation_context field and with_conversation_data() builder method
- Add build_conversation_section() to include current conversation info in system prompt
- Update dispatcher to extract Signal metadata (sender, sender_uuid, group) and pass to Reasoning
- Add signal_sender_uuid to Signal channel metadata for privacy mode users

* feat(tools): add secure attachment path validation with sandbox enforcement

Implement robust path validation for message tool attachments to prevent
directory traversal attacks and unauthorized file access. Attachments are
now sandboxed to ~/.ironclaw/ by default.

Key changes:
- Create shared path_utils module with validate_path() and is_path_safe_basic()
- Extract normalize_lexical() from file.rs for reuse
- MessageTool now enforces sandbox at ~/.ironclaw/ for all attachments
- Path validation includes: traversal detection, canonicalization, symlink resolution
- Error messages reveal the allowed sandbox directory for user clarity

Security improvements:
- Blocks path traversal attacks (../, URL-encoded, null bytes)
- Canonicalizes paths to resolve symlinks before validation
- Walks up to nearest existing ancestor for non-existent paths
- Prevents escape from sandbox directory

Backward compatibility:
- File tools continue to work with their configured base_dir
- Message tool defaults to ~/.ironclaw/ sandbox
- Tests updated to create files within sandbox

Tests added:
- path_utils module tests (9 tests for validation logic)
- message tool attachment validation tests
- All 1571 existing tests pass

* fix(channels/signal): use robust path validation with full security coverage

Signal channel's validate_attachment_paths() now uses path_utils::validate_path()
for consistent, secure path validation.

Fixes:
- Replaced weak path.contains('..') check with robust validate_path()
- validate_path() now includes is_path_safe_basic() as first-pass filter to
  block null bytes and URL-encoded traversal sequences (%2e%2e%2f)
- Error message now shows allowed sandbox directory (~/.ironclaw/)

Security coverage:
- Path traversal: ../, foo/../bar, ../../etc/passwd ✓
- URL-encoded traversal: %2e%2e%2fetc/passwd ✓
- Null byte injection: file\0.txt ✓
- Paths outside sandbox: /tmp/evil.txt ✓
- Symlink escape attempts (via canonicalization) ✓

Tests added:
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_path_outside_sandbox
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_url_encoded_traversal
- validate_attachment_paths_rejects_null_byte
- Fixed broken assertion in rejects_double_dot test

* fix(llm): add Signal channel to build_channel_section to include message tool hint

The catch-all '_' arm was returning early before the message_tool_hint
section was constructed, which meant Signal users never got the
'## Proactive Messaging' section with examples for:
- Using attachments parameter
- Targeting different users/groups
- Cross-channel messaging

Now Signal will include the full message_tool_hint section with usage examples.

* fix(tools): use async locks in register_message_tools to prevent silent failures

The method was using register_sync which calls try_write() on self.tools.
If the lock was held, try_write() would return Err and silently skip
adding the tool to the registry, while self.message_tool already held
a reference. This creates an inconsistent state.

Fix: use async write locks directly instead of register_sync to ensure
the tool is always registered or the method fails explicitly.

* refactor(dispatcher): use Channel trait for conversation context

Replace hardcoded 'if message.channel == signal' block with generic
conversation_context() method on the Channel trait. This allows any
channel to provide context (sender, group, etc.) without hardcoding
channel names.

Changes:
- Add conversation_context() method to Channel trait (default: empty)
- Implement for SignalChannel: extracts sender, sender_uuid, group
- Add get_channel() to ChannelManager (returns Arc<dyn Channel>)
- Change ChannelManager storage from Box to Arc for shared access
- Update dispatcher to use new trait method
- Add tests for conversation_context extraction

Other channels (Telegram, Slack, Discord) can now implement this
method to provide conversation context without code changes in dispatcher.

* fix(tests): split message_tool_with_attachments into sandbox and channel tests

The original test was passing for the wrong reason - it expected an error
because the channel doesn't exist, but actually failed earlier during sandbox
validation because /tmp paths are outside ~/.ironclaw/.

Split into two tests:
- message_tool_with_attachments_outside_sandbox: verifies sandbox rejection
  with explicit error message check
- message_tool_with_attachments_inside_sandbox_no_channel: uses files within
  sandbox (like message_tool_passes_attachment_to_broadcast does) and verifies
  the channel-related error message

* security(message tool): add rate limiting, approval requirements, and audit logging

The message tool can send to ANY connected channel/target making it a significant
abuse vector if the LLM is compromised or prompt-injected. This commit adds:

1. Rate limiting: 10 messages/minute, 100/hour per user
2. Approval requirement: Always requires approval for cross-channel messages
   (when channel differs from the default conversation channel)
3. Audit logging: Every successful message send is logged with channel,
   target, and attachment count

The approval logic:
- If channel param is provided and differs from default -> Always require approval
- If no default channel is set and explicit channel provided -> Always require approval
- Otherwise (using default channel) -> UnlessAutoApproved

* fix(message tool): return explicit error for malformed attachments array

Previously, malformed attachments like {"attachments": [123, true]} would be
silently ignored via .ok().unwrap_or_default(), leaving users confused
when attachments weren't sent.

Now returns explicit error: "Invalid attachments format: ..."

* fix(message tool): verify attachment files exist before sending

Previously, non-existent paths would pass sandbox validation and surface
as confusing Signal RPC errors. Now returns clear "Attachment file not found" error.

* fix(test): create sandbox directory if it doesn't exist for CI

The test validate_attachment_paths_accepts_normal_paths uses
tempfile::tempdir_in() which requires the parent directory to exist.
In CI, ~/.ironclaw doesn't exist, causing test failure.
2026-02-26 18:06:21 +04:00

873 lines
26 KiB
Rust

//! File operation tools for reading, writing, and navigating the filesystem.
//!
//! These tools provide controlled access to the filesystem with:
//! - Path validation and sandboxing
//! - Size limits on read/write operations
//! - Support for common development tasks
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tokio::fs;
use crate::context::JobContext;
use crate::tools::builtin::path_utils::validate_path;
use crate::tools::tool::{
ApprovalRequirement, Tool, ToolDomain, ToolError, ToolOutput, require_str,
};
use crate::workspace::paths as ws_paths;
/// Well-known workspace filenames that must go through memory_write, not write_file.
///
/// If the LLM tries to write one of these via the filesystem tool we reject
/// immediately and point it at the correct tool.
const WORKSPACE_FILES: &[&str] = &[
ws_paths::HEARTBEAT,
ws_paths::MEMORY,
ws_paths::IDENTITY,
ws_paths::SOUL,
ws_paths::AGENTS,
ws_paths::USER,
ws_paths::README,
];
/// Check whether `path` resolves to a workspace file that should be written
/// through `memory_write` instead of `write_file`.
fn is_workspace_path(path: &str) -> bool {
let filename = std::path::Path::new(path)
.file_name()
.and_then(|f| f.to_str())
.unwrap_or(path);
WORKSPACE_FILES.contains(&filename)
|| path.starts_with("daily/")
|| path.starts_with("context/")
}
/// Maximum file size for reading (1MB).
const MAX_READ_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
/// Maximum file size for writing (5MB).
const MAX_WRITE_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Maximum directory listing entries.
const MAX_DIR_ENTRIES: usize = 500;
/// Read file contents tool.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct ReadFileTool {
base_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
}
impl ReadFileTool {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
pub fn with_base_dir(mut self, dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
self.base_dir = Some(dir);
self
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for ReadFileTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"read_file"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Read a file from the LOCAL FILESYSTEM. NOT for workspace memory paths \
(use memory_read for those). Returns file content as text. \
For large files, you can specify offset and limit to read a portion."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Path to the file to read"
},
"offset": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Line number to start reading from (1-indexed, optional)"
},
"limit": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Maximum number of lines to read (optional)"
}
},
"required": ["path"]
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
_ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let path_str = require_str(&params, "path")?;
let offset = params.get("offset").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0) as usize;
let limit = params.get("limit").and_then(|v| v.as_u64());
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let path = validate_path(path_str, self.base_dir.as_deref())?;
// Check file size
let metadata = fs::metadata(&path)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Cannot access file: {}", e)))?;
if metadata.len() > MAX_READ_SIZE {
return Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"File too large ({} bytes). Maximum is {} bytes. Use offset/limit for partial reads.",
metadata.len(),
MAX_READ_SIZE
)));
}
// Read file
let content = fs::read_to_string(&path)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to read file: {}", e)))?;
// Apply offset and limit
let lines: Vec<&str> = content.lines().collect();
let total_lines = lines.len();
let start_line = if offset > 0 {
offset.saturating_sub(1)
} else {
0
};
let end_line = if let Some(lim) = limit {
(start_line + lim as usize).min(total_lines)
} else {
total_lines
};
let selected_lines: Vec<String> = lines[start_line..end_line]
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, line)| format!("{:>6}{}", start_line + i + 1, line))
.collect();
let result = serde_json::json!({
"content": selected_lines.join("\n"),
"total_lines": total_lines,
"lines_shown": end_line - start_line,
"path": path.display().to_string()
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()))
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
true // File content could contain anything
}
fn requires_approval(&self, _params: &serde_json::Value) -> ApprovalRequirement {
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
}
fn domain(&self) -> ToolDomain {
ToolDomain::Container
}
}
/// Write file contents tool.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct WriteFileTool {
base_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
}
impl WriteFileTool {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
pub fn with_base_dir(mut self, dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
self.base_dir = Some(dir);
self
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for WriteFileTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"write_file"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Write content to a file on the LOCAL FILESYSTEM. NOT for workspace memory \
(use memory_write for that). Creates the file if it doesn't exist, overwrites if it does. \
Parent directories are created automatically. Use apply_patch for targeted edits."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Path to the file to write"
},
"content": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Content to write to the file"
}
},
"required": ["path", "content"]
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
_ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let path_str = require_str(&params, "path")?;
// Reject workspace paths: these live in the database, not on disk.
if is_workspace_path(path_str) {
return Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"'{}' is a workspace memory file. Use the memory_write tool instead of write_file. \
For HEARTBEAT.md use target='heartbeat', for MEMORY.md use target='memory'.",
path_str
)));
}
let content = require_str(&params, "content")?;
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
// Check content size
if content.len() > MAX_WRITE_SIZE {
return Err(ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!(
"Content too large ({} bytes). Maximum is {} bytes.",
content.len(),
MAX_WRITE_SIZE
)));
}
let path = validate_path(path_str, self.base_dir.as_deref())?;
// Create parent directories
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent).await.map_err(|e| {
ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to create directories: {}", e))
})?;
}
// Write file
fs::write(&path, content)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to write file: {}", e)))?;
let result = serde_json::json!({
"path": path.display().to_string(),
"bytes_written": content.len(),
"success": true
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()))
}
fn requires_approval(&self, _params: &serde_json::Value) -> ApprovalRequirement {
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
false // We're writing, not reading external data
}
fn domain(&self) -> ToolDomain {
ToolDomain::Container
}
fn rate_limit_config(&self) -> Option<crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig> {
Some(crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig::new(20, 200))
}
}
/// List directory contents tool.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct ListDirTool {
base_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
}
impl ListDirTool {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
pub fn with_base_dir(mut self, dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
self.base_dir = Some(dir);
self
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for ListDirTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"list_dir"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"List contents of a directory on the LOCAL FILESYSTEM. NOT for workspace memory \
(use memory_tree for that). Shows files and subdirectories with their sizes."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Path to the directory to list (defaults to current directory)"
},
"recursive": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "If true, list contents recursively (default false)"
},
"max_depth": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Maximum depth for recursive listing (default 3)"
}
},
"required": []
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
_ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let path_str = params.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(".");
let recursive = params
.get("recursive")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.unwrap_or(false);
let max_depth = params
.get("max_depth")
.and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
.unwrap_or(3) as usize;
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let path = validate_path(path_str, self.base_dir.as_deref())?;
let mut entries = Vec::new();
list_dir_inner(&path, &path, recursive, max_depth, 0, &mut entries).await?;
// Sort entries
entries.sort_by(|a, b| {
let a_is_dir = a.ends_with('/');
let b_is_dir = b.ends_with('/');
match (a_is_dir, b_is_dir) {
(true, false) => std::cmp::Ordering::Less,
(false, true) => std::cmp::Ordering::Greater,
_ => a.cmp(b),
}
});
let truncated = entries.len() > MAX_DIR_ENTRIES;
if truncated {
entries.truncate(MAX_DIR_ENTRIES);
}
let result = serde_json::json!({
"path": path.display().to_string(),
"entries": entries,
"count": entries.len(),
"truncated": truncated
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()))
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
false // Directory listings are safe
}
fn requires_approval(&self, _params: &serde_json::Value) -> ApprovalRequirement {
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
}
fn domain(&self) -> ToolDomain {
ToolDomain::Container
}
}
/// Recursively list directory contents.
async fn list_dir_inner(
base: &Path,
path: &Path,
recursive: bool,
max_depth: usize,
current_depth: usize,
entries: &mut Vec<String>,
) -> Result<(), ToolError> {
if entries.len() >= MAX_DIR_ENTRIES {
return Ok(());
}
let mut dir = fs::read_dir(path)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to read directory: {}", e)))?;
while let Some(entry) = dir
.next_entry()
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to read entry: {}", e)))?
{
if entries.len() >= MAX_DIR_ENTRIES {
break;
}
let entry_path = entry.path();
let relative = entry_path
.strip_prefix(base)
.unwrap_or(&entry_path)
.to_string_lossy();
let metadata = entry.metadata().await.ok();
let is_dir = metadata.as_ref().is_some_and(|m| m.is_dir());
let display = if is_dir {
format!("{}/", relative)
} else {
let size = metadata.as_ref().map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
format!("{} ({})", relative, format_size(size))
};
entries.push(display);
if recursive && is_dir && current_depth < max_depth {
// Skip common non-essential directories
let name = entry.file_name();
let name_str = name.to_string_lossy();
if !matches!(
name_str.as_ref(),
"node_modules" | "target" | ".git" | "__pycache__" | "venv" | ".venv"
) {
Box::pin(list_dir_inner(
base,
&entry_path,
recursive,
max_depth,
current_depth + 1,
entries,
))
.await?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Format file size in human-readable form.
fn format_size(bytes: u64) -> String {
const KB: u64 = 1024;
const MB: u64 = KB * 1024;
const GB: u64 = MB * 1024;
if bytes >= GB {
format!("{:.1}GB", bytes as f64 / GB as f64)
} else if bytes >= MB {
format!("{:.1}MB", bytes as f64 / MB as f64)
} else if bytes >= KB {
format!("{:.1}KB", bytes as f64 / KB as f64)
} else {
format!("{}B", bytes)
}
}
/// Apply patch tool for targeted file edits.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct ApplyPatchTool {
base_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
}
impl ApplyPatchTool {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
pub fn with_base_dir(mut self, dir: PathBuf) -> Self {
self.base_dir = Some(dir);
self
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for ApplyPatchTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"apply_patch"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Apply targeted edits to a file using search/replace. Finds the exact 'old_string' \
and replaces it with 'new_string'. Use for surgical code changes without rewriting entire files. \
The old_string must match exactly (including whitespace and indentation)."
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Path to the file to edit"
},
"old_string": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The exact string to find and replace"
},
"new_string": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The string to replace it with"
},
"replace_all": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "If true, replace all occurrences (default false, replaces first only)"
}
},
"required": ["path", "old_string", "new_string"]
})
}
async fn execute(
&self,
params: serde_json::Value,
_ctx: &JobContext,
) -> Result<ToolOutput, ToolError> {
let path_str = require_str(&params, "path")?;
let old_string = require_str(&params, "old_string")?;
let new_string = require_str(&params, "new_string")?;
let replace_all = params
.get("replace_all")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.unwrap_or(false);
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let path = validate_path(path_str, self.base_dir.as_deref())?;
// Read current content
let content = fs::read_to_string(&path)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to read file: {}", e)))?;
// Check if old_string exists
if !content.contains(old_string) {
return Err(ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
"Could not find the specified text in {}. Make sure old_string matches exactly.",
path.display()
)));
}
// Apply replacement
let new_content = if replace_all {
content.replace(old_string, new_string)
} else {
content.replacen(old_string, new_string, 1)
};
// Count replacements
let replacements = if replace_all {
content.matches(old_string).count()
} else {
1
};
// Write back
fs::write(&path, &new_content)
.await
.map_err(|e| ToolError::ExecutionFailed(format!("Failed to write file: {}", e)))?;
let result = serde_json::json!({
"path": path.display().to_string(),
"replacements": replacements,
"success": true
});
Ok(ToolOutput::success(result, start.elapsed()))
}
fn requires_approval(&self, _params: &serde_json::Value) -> ApprovalRequirement {
ApprovalRequirement::UnlessAutoApproved
}
fn requires_sanitization(&self) -> bool {
false // We're writing, not reading external data
}
fn domain(&self) -> ToolDomain {
ToolDomain::Container
}
fn rate_limit_config(&self) -> Option<crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig> {
Some(crate::tools::tool::ToolRateLimitConfig::new(20, 200))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::tools::builtin::path_utils::normalize_lexical;
use tempfile::TempDir;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_read_file() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let file_path = dir.path().join("test.txt");
std::fs::write(&file_path, "line 1\nline 2\nline 3\n").unwrap();
let tool = ReadFileTool::new().with_base_dir(dir.path().to_path_buf());
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({"path": file_path.to_str().unwrap()}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap();
let content = result.result.get("content").unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
assert!(content.contains("line 1"));
assert!(content.contains("line 2"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_write_file() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let file_path = dir.path().join("new_file.txt");
let tool = WriteFileTool::new().with_base_dir(dir.path().to_path_buf());
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({
"path": file_path.to_str().unwrap(),
"content": "hello world"
}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(result.result.get("success").unwrap().as_bool().unwrap());
assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&file_path).unwrap(), "hello world");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_apply_patch() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let file_path = dir.path().join("code.rs");
std::fs::write(&file_path, "fn main() {\n println!(\"old\");\n}\n").unwrap();
let tool = ApplyPatchTool::new().with_base_dir(dir.path().to_path_buf());
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({
"path": file_path.to_str().unwrap(),
"old_string": "println!(\"old\")",
"new_string": "println!(\"new\")"
}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(result.result.get("success").unwrap().as_bool().unwrap());
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&file_path).unwrap();
assert!(content.contains("println!(\"new\")"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_write_file_rejects_workspace_paths() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let tool = WriteFileTool::new().with_base_dir(dir.path().to_path_buf());
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let workspace_files = &[
"HEARTBEAT.md",
"MEMORY.md",
"IDENTITY.md",
"SOUL.md",
"AGENTS.md",
"USER.md",
"README.md",
];
for filename in workspace_files {
let path = dir.path().join(filename);
let err = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({
"path": path.to_str().unwrap(),
"content": "test"
}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap_err();
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("memory_write"),
"Rejection for {} should mention memory_write, got: {}",
filename,
msg
);
}
// daily/ and context/ prefixes should also be rejected
for prefix_path in &["daily/2024-01-15.md", "context/vision.md"] {
let err = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({
"path": prefix_path,
"content": "test"
}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("memory_write"),
"Rejection for {} should mention memory_write",
prefix_path
);
}
// Regular files should still work
let regular_path = dir.path().join("normal.txt");
let result = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({
"path": regular_path.to_str().unwrap(),
"content": "fine"
}),
&ctx,
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_list_dir() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.path().join("file1.txt"), "content").unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir(dir.path().join("subdir")).unwrap();
let tool = ListDirTool::new();
let ctx = JobContext::default();
let result = tool
.execute(
serde_json::json!({"path": dir.path().to_str().unwrap()}),
&ctx,
)
.await
.unwrap();
let entries = result.result.get("entries").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
assert!(entries.len() >= 2);
}
#[test]
fn test_normalize_lexical() {
// Basic .. resolution
assert_eq!(
normalize_lexical(Path::new("/a/b/../c")),
PathBuf::from("/a/c")
);
// Multiple .. components
assert_eq!(
normalize_lexical(Path::new("/a/b/c/../../d")),
PathBuf::from("/a/d")
);
// . components stripped
assert_eq!(
normalize_lexical(Path::new("/a/./b/./c")),
PathBuf::from("/a/b/c")
);
// Cannot escape root
assert_eq!(
normalize_lexical(Path::new("/a/../../..")),
PathBuf::from("/")
);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_rejects_traversal_nonexistent_parent() {
// The critical test: writing to ../../outside/newdir/file with base_dir
// set should be rejected even when the parent directory does not exist
// (i.e. canonicalize() cannot resolve it).
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let evil_path = format!(
"{}/../../outside/newdir/file.txt",
dir.path().to_str().unwrap()
);
let result = validate_path(&evil_path, Some(dir.path()));
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"Should reject traversal via non-existent parent, got: {:?}",
result
);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_rejects_relative_traversal() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let result = validate_path("../../etc/passwd", Some(dir.path()));
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"Should reject relative traversal, got: {:?}",
result
);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_allows_valid_nested_write() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let result = validate_path("subdir/newfile.txt", Some(dir.path()));
assert!(
result.is_ok(),
"Should allow nested writes within sandbox: {:?}",
result
);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_allows_dot_dot_within_sandbox() {
// a/b/../c resolves to a/c which is still inside the sandbox
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("a/b")).unwrap();
let result = validate_path("a/b/../c.txt", Some(dir.path()));
assert!(
result.is_ok(),
"Should allow .. that stays within sandbox: {:?}",
result
);
}
}