Files
optimclaw/.claude/rules/safety-and-sandbox.md
T
bcbdc273a5 Restructure CLAUDE.md into modular rules + add pr-shepherd command (#750)
* refactor: restructure CLAUDE.md into modular rules and add pr-shepherd command

Trim CLAUDE.md from 710 lines to 92 by moving detailed guidance into
path-scoped `.claude/rules/` files that load on demand. Add a new
`/pr-shepherd` command that consolidates the full PR lifecycle
(review, fix, quality gate, CI fix loop, merge) into one workflow.

Changes:
- CLAUDE.md: keep only essentials (build commands, code style, architecture,
  module specs, config reference, debugging)
- .claude/rules/review-discipline.md: 15+ review rules, scoped to src/**/*.rs
- .claude/rules/database.md: dual-backend rules with SQL dialect translation
  table, scoped to src/db/** and migrations/**
- .claude/rules/safety-and-sandbox.md: safety layer and sandbox rules, scoped
  to src/safety/**, src/sandbox/**, src/secrets/**
- .claude/rules/testing.md: test tiers and patterns, scoped to src/** and tests/**
- .claude/rules/tools.md: tool architecture and implementation pattern, scoped
  to src/tools/** and tools-src/**
- .claude/commands/pr-shepherd.md: 7-phase PR lifecycle command that subsumes
  review-pr, respond-pr, ship, and manual CI fix loops

[skip-regression-check]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address review feedback on CLAUDE.md restructure

- Restore project structure tree in CLAUDE.md (zmanian blocking)
- Create .claude/rules/skills.md with trust model, SKILL.md format,
  selection pipeline, and skill tools (zmanian blocking)
- Restore configuration section with key env vars (zmanian medium)
- Restore "Adding a New Channel" guide (zmanian medium)
- Add heartbeat mention to Workspace & Memory section (zmanian low)
- Fix pr-shepherd: replace `git add -A` with specific file staging (zmanian)
- Fix pr-shepherd: ask user for merge strategy instead of hardcoding --squash (zmanian)
- Fix pr-shepherd: replace `--watch` with polling + 10min timeout (zmanian)
- Fix testing.md: "skipped if DB is unreachable" not "expected to fail" (Copilot)

[skip-regression-check]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address review comments on PR #750

- Narrow `crate::` import rule: `super::` is fine in tests and intra-module refs
- Fix capabilities file naming: `<name>.capabilities.json` sidecar, not bare `capabilities.json`
- Update mechanical verification checklist to match narrowed import rule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* refactor: move Bedrock docs from CLAUDE.md to src/llm/CLAUDE.md

Bedrock provider details (auth, config, feature flag) belong in the
LLM module spec, not the top-level guide. Added file map entry,
provider table row, and dedicated section in src/llm/CLAUDE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* refactor: move env var config block out of CLAUDE.md

Replace 20-line config block with one-liner pointing to .env.example
and src/llm/CLAUDE.md. Config details are only needed during deployment,
not everyday coding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: use gh pr checkout for fork-safe PR checkout in pr-shepherd

Replaces git fetch/checkout with gh pr checkout {number} which
handles both same-repo and fork-based PRs automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: address Copilot review round 5 on PR #750

- Add gh pr list and gh pr checkout to pr-shepherd allowed-tools
- Align crate:: import rule in pr-shepherd with updated CLAUDE.md guidance
- Fix vector type in database.md: BLOB (flexible dims), not F32_BLOB(1536)
- Update MCP limitation: stdio/HTTP/Unix transports exist, no streaming

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-03-09 23:19:25 +00:00

1.3 KiB

paths
paths
src/safety/**
src/sandbox/**
src/secrets/**
src/tools/wasm/**

Safety Layer & Sandbox Rules

Safety Layer

All external tool output passes through SafetyLayer:

  1. Sanitizer - Detects injection patterns, escapes dangerous content
  2. Validator - Checks length, encoding, forbidden patterns
  3. Policy - Rules with severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low) and actions (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  4. Leak Detector - Scans for 15+ secret patterns at two points: tool output before LLM, and LLM responses before user

Tool outputs are wrapped in <tool_output> XML before reaching the LLM.

Shell Environment Scrubbing

The shell tool scrubs sensitive env vars before executing commands. The sanitizer detects command injection patterns (chained commands, subshells, path traversal).

Sandbox Policies

Policy Filesystem Network
ReadOnly Read-only workspace Allowlisted domains
WorkspaceWrite Read-write workspace Allowlisted domains
FullAccess Full filesystem Unrestricted

Zero-Exposure Credential Model

Secrets are stored encrypted on the host and injected into HTTP requests by the proxy at transit time. Container processes never see raw credential values.