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Implements hybrid-custody NEAR key management where the agent holds scoped function-call keys for routine operations while high-value operations require explicit user approval through the existing channel approval flow. Core infrastructure: - Ed25519 key generation/import via ed25519-dalek (not near-crypto) - AES-256-GCM encrypted storage via existing SecretsStore - Hand-rolled borsh-serializable NEAR transaction types - NEP-413 intent signing and MPC chain signature support - Configurable policy engine with transaction analysis pipeline - Daily spend tracking with automatic midnight UTC reset - Encrypted backup/restore with Argon2id KDF - CLI subcommands: generate, import, list, info, remove, export, policy, backup, restore - NEAR ed25519 secret key leak detection (Critical/Block) - WASM sign-payload host function (keys never enter WASM memory) - KeyManager wired into AgentDeps for agent-wide access Security invariants: private keys never reach the LLM or WASM boundary, signing happens in host Rust code with Zeroize on drop, every transaction is analyzed before signing, most-restrictive policy rule wins. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
174 lines
6.0 KiB
Plaintext
174 lines
6.0 KiB
Plaintext
// WASM Tool Sandbox Interface
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//
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// Defines the contract between sandboxed tools and the host runtime.
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// Tools export the `tool` interface; the host provides the `host` interface.
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//
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// Security Model:
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// - WASM tools are untrusted and run in a sandbox
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// - All capabilities are opt-in (default: no access)
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// - Secrets are NEVER exposed to WASM; credentials are injected at host boundary
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// - All outputs are scanned for secret leakage before returning to WASM
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package near:agent;
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/// Host-provided capabilities for sandboxed tools.
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///
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/// These are the only ways a sandboxed tool can interact with the outside world.
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/// The set is intentionally minimal to reduce attack surface.
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interface host {
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/// Log levels for structured logging.
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enum log-level {
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trace,
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debug,
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info,
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warn,
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error,
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}
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/// Emit a log message.
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///
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/// Messages are collected and emitted after execution completes.
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/// Rate-limited to 1000 entries per execution, 4KB per message.
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log: func(level: log-level, message: string);
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/// Get the current timestamp in milliseconds since Unix epoch.
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now-millis: func() -> u64;
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/// Read a file from the workspace (if capability granted).
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///
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/// Path must be relative (no leading /) and cannot contain "..".
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/// Returns None if the file doesn't exist or capability not granted.
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workspace-read: func(path: string) -> option<string>;
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// ==================== HTTP Capability ====================
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/// Response from an HTTP request.
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record http-response {
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/// HTTP status code.
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status: u16,
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/// Response headers as JSON object string.
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headers-json: string,
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/// Response body bytes.
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body: list<u8>,
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}
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/// Make an HTTP request (if capability granted).
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///
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/// Security:
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/// - Only allowed endpoints (host/path patterns) can be accessed
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/// - Credentials are injected by the host; WASM never sees them
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/// - Response is scanned for leaked secrets before returning
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/// - Rate-limited per tool
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///
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/// Returns Err with error message if:
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/// - Endpoint not in allowlist
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/// - Rate limit exceeded
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/// - Request/response size limit exceeded
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/// - Network error
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/// - Timeout
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/// - Secret leak detected in response
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http-request: func(
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method: string,
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url: string,
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headers-json: string,
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body: option<list<u8>>
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) -> result<http-response, string>;
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// ==================== Tool Invocation Capability ====================
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/// Invoke another tool by alias (if capability granted).
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///
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/// Security:
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/// - WASM calls tools by alias, not real name (indirection layer)
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/// - Only aliased tools can be invoked
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/// - Rate-limited per tool
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/// - Output is scanned for leaked secrets before returning
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///
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/// Returns the tool output as JSON string, or Err with error message.
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tool-invoke: func(alias: string, params-json: string) -> result<string, string>;
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// ==================== Secrets Capability ====================
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/// Check if a secret exists (if capability granted).
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///
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/// Security:
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/// - WASM can only check existence, NEVER read values
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/// - Only allowed secret names can be checked
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/// - Actual credentials are injected by host during HTTP requests
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///
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/// Returns true if the secret exists and is accessible to this tool.
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secret-exists: func(name: string) -> bool;
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// ==================== Signing Capability ====================
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/// Result of a payload signing request.
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record sign-result {
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/// Base64-encoded signature bytes (set on success).
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signature: option<string>,
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/// Error message (set on failure).
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error: option<string>,
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/// True if user approval is needed before signing can proceed.
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approval-pending: bool,
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}
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/// Sign a payload using a NEAR key managed by the host (if capability granted).
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///
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/// Security:
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/// - Private keys NEVER enter WASM memory; signing happens in host code only
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/// - Only key labels declared in the tool's signing capability can be used
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/// - Rate-limited per execution
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/// - Subject to the host's transaction policy (may require user approval)
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///
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/// The payload should be base64-encoded bytes to sign.
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/// The context-json is optional metadata about what's being signed (for policy display).
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///
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/// Returns sign-result with either signature or error/approval-pending.
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sign-payload: func(key-label: string, payload: string, context-json: string) -> sign-result;
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}
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/// Tool interface that sandboxed tools must implement.
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interface tool {
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/// Request payload for tool execution.
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record request {
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/// JSON-encoded parameters matching the tool's schema.
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params: string,
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/// Optional JSON-encoded job context for stateful operations.
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context: option<string>,
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}
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/// Response from tool execution.
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record response {
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/// JSON-encoded output on success.
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output: option<string>,
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/// Error message on failure.
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error: option<string>,
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}
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/// Execute the tool with the given request.
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///
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/// This is the main entry point. The tool should:
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/// 1. Parse params as JSON according to its schema
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/// 2. Perform the operation
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/// 3. Return a response with either result or error set
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execute: func(req: request) -> response;
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/// Get the JSON Schema for this tool's parameters.
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///
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/// Must return a valid JSON Schema object describing the expected
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/// structure of the `params` field in requests.
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schema: func() -> string;
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/// Get a human-readable description of what this tool does.
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///
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/// Used by the LLM to understand when to invoke the tool.
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description: func() -> string;
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}
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/// World definition for sandboxed tools.
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///
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/// Tools import host capabilities and export the tool interface.
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world sandboxed-tool {
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import host;
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export tool;
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}
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