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optimclaw/src
28a22f2a59 fix(security): replace regex HTML sanitizer with DOMPurify to prevent XSS (#510)
* fix(security): replace regex HTML sanitizer with DOMPurify to prevent XSS

The previous sanitizeRenderedHtml() used regex patterns to strip dangerous
HTML tags and event handler attributes before assigning to innerHTML. Regex-
based HTML sanitization is notoriously bypassable via:

- SVG/MathML elements not in the blocklist (<svg onload=...>)
- Newline-split event handlers (<img src=x on\nload=alert(1)>)
- Mutation XSS (browser parsing quirks that reconstruct dangerous DOM)
- Encoded attribute values and alternative quote styles
- Nested/recursive tag patterns that defeat linear regex

This is exploitable through prompt injection: if an LLM tool output contains
crafted HTML, it flows through marked.parse() -> sanitizeRenderedHtml() ->
innerHTML, allowing script execution in the user's browser session.

Replace the regex sanitizer with DOMPurify 3.2.3, the industry-standard
DOM-based HTML sanitizer. DOMPurify parses HTML into a real DOM tree and
walks it node-by-node, which eliminates all known bypass vectors. It is
used by Mozilla, Google, and most major web applications.

CDN: cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.2.3/purify.min.js
SRI: sha384-osZDKVu4ipZP703HmPOhWdyBajcFyjX2Psjk//TG1Rc0AdwEtuToaylrmcK3LdAl

Audited all 60+ innerHTML assignments in app.js:
- 5 use renderMarkdown() -> now protected by DOMPurify
- Remainder use escapeHtml(), static literals, or empty strings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix(security): guard sanitizeRenderedHtml against DOMPurify CDN unavailability [skip-regression-check]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-03-11 15:55:35 -07:00
..
2026-03-10 13:55:06 -07:00
2026-03-10 13:55:06 -07:00