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* fix(security): replace regex HTML sanitizer with DOMPurify to prevent XSS The previous sanitizeRenderedHtml() used regex patterns to strip dangerous HTML tags and event handler attributes before assigning to innerHTML. Regex- based HTML sanitization is notoriously bypassable via: - SVG/MathML elements not in the blocklist (<svg onload=...>) - Newline-split event handlers (<img src=x on\nload=alert(1)>) - Mutation XSS (browser parsing quirks that reconstruct dangerous DOM) - Encoded attribute values and alternative quote styles - Nested/recursive tag patterns that defeat linear regex This is exploitable through prompt injection: if an LLM tool output contains crafted HTML, it flows through marked.parse() -> sanitizeRenderedHtml() -> innerHTML, allowing script execution in the user's browser session. Replace the regex sanitizer with DOMPurify 3.2.3, the industry-standard DOM-based HTML sanitizer. DOMPurify parses HTML into a real DOM tree and walks it node-by-node, which eliminates all known bypass vectors. It is used by Mozilla, Google, and most major web applications. CDN: cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.2.3/purify.min.js SRI: sha384-osZDKVu4ipZP703HmPOhWdyBajcFyjX2Psjk//TG1Rc0AdwEtuToaylrmcK3LdAl Audited all 60+ innerHTML assignments in app.js: - 5 use renderMarkdown() -> now protected by DOMPurify - Remainder use escapeHtml(), static literals, or empty strings Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(security): guard sanitizeRenderedHtml against DOMPurify CDN unavailability [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>