* test: add unit tests across 20 modules for coverage push
Add 300+ unit tests covering config, context, evaluation, extensions,
LLM, secrets, tools/builder, and tools/mcp modules. All tests are
pure unit tests (no mocks) exercising serde roundtrips, edge cases,
error paths, and business logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix(tests): replace hardcoded /tmp paths with tempfile::tempdir
The e2e_metrics_test::test_metrics_collected_from_tool_trace test was
failing because setup_test_dir() created /tmp/ironclaw_metrics_test but
the fixture referenced /tmp/ironclaw_e2e_test/hello.txt (path mismatch).
Added LlmTrace::replace_paths() to substitute fixture paths at runtime,
then converted all 12 test files from hardcoded /tmp/ironclaw_* paths to
tempfile::tempdir(). Tests are now isolated, parallel-safe, and leave no
debris on disk.
Regression test: test_metrics_collected_from_tool_trace now passes
consistently regardless of prior /tmp state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix(security): use OsRng for all security-critical key and token generation
Replace rand::thread_rng() with rand::rngs::OsRng in all security-critical
code paths that generate cryptographic key material, bearer tokens, PKCE
verifiers, CSRF state parameters, and webhook secrets. thread_rng() uses a
userspace CSPRNG (ChaCha) seeded from OS entropy, which is fine for
non-security contexts but adds an unnecessary intermediate layer for
key material where direct OS entropy (OsRng) is the correct choice.
Files changed:
- src/secrets/keychain.rs: master encryption key generation
- src/secrets/crypto.rs: per-secret HKDF salt generation
- src/orchestrator/auth.rs: per-job bearer token generation
- src/channels/web/mod.rs: gateway auth token fallback
- src/cli/oauth_defaults.rs: OAuth PKCE verifier and CSRF state
- src/tools/mcp/auth.rs: MCP OAuth PKCE verifier
- src/extensions/manager.rs: auto-generated extension secrets
- src/setup/channels.rs: webhook secret generation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix(security): address PR review feedback for OsRng migration
- Remove shadowing inner `use rand::rngs::OsRng` in `generate_salt()`;
use module-level `aes_gcm::aead::OsRng` import instead (same type,
avoids divergence risk if rand_core versions drift)
- Fix missed callsites in `pairing/store.rs`: `random_code()` and
`generate_unique_code()` now use `OsRng` for pairing auth codes
- Add regression tests for `generate_salt()`: correct length,
non-zero output, uniqueness across calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
Extends the WASM sandbox with HTTP API capabilities, secrets management,
tool aliasing, and leak detection. Key security principle: WASM never
sees credentials, injection happens at host boundary.
New modules:
- secrets: AES-256-GCM encrypted storage with HKDF key derivation
- leak_detector: Aho-Corasick + regex pattern matching for secret exfiltration
- capabilities: Extended capability system (HTTP, ToolInvoke, Secrets)
- allowlist: HTTP endpoint validation with glob patterns
- credential_injector: Host-boundary credential injection
- rate_limiter: Sliding window per-tool rate limiting
- storage: WASM binary storage with BLAKE3 integrity verification
Leak detection happens at two points:
1. Before HTTP request (prevents exfiltration via URL/headers/body)
2. After response (prevents exposure in outputs returned to WASM)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
