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67d5a473333eee5ca2c053225cf3ca293d3bf494
11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 [email protected]andClaude Opus 4.6
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4d643f47c7 |
refactor: remove glob re-exports, fix clippy warnings, clean up duplicates
- Remove `pub use ironclaw_safety::*` from src/safety/mod.rs and migrate all 20+ call sites to import directly from `ironclaw_safety` - Remove `pub use ironclaw_skills::*` from src/skills/mod.rs and migrate all 15+ call sites to import directly from `ironclaw_skills` - Fix 4 clippy warnings: 2 shadow imports, 2 collapsible if-let chains - Add missing SkillActivated arm to WASM channel StatusUpdate match - Remove duplicate AuthRequired/AuthCompleted arms in repl.rs - Update CLAUDE.md extracted crates guidance and prompt template rule - Fix bench imports (safety_check, safety_pipeline) 46 files changed, zero warnings, 3836 tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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5a62ceaa99 |
refactor: extract safety module into ironclaw_safety crate (#1024)
* refactor: extract safety module into ironclaw_safety crate Move prompt injection defense, input validation, secret leak detection, and safety policy enforcement into a standalone crate under crates/. The safety module was a leaf dependency with no async, no database, and no other ironclaw traits — only pure computation with pattern matching. SafetyConfig (2 fields) moves into the crate; env-var resolution stays in ironclaw's config module as a free function. src/safety/mod.rs becomes a thin re-export so all existing `crate::safety::*` imports keep working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * docs: update CLAUDE.md for ironclaw_safety crate extraction Add guidance to migrate imports from crate::safety to ironclaw_safety when touching files. Update project structure to reflect crates/ dir. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * refactor: move safety fuzz targets into ironclaw_safety crate Split fuzz infrastructure: - crates/ironclaw_safety/fuzz/ — 5 safety-only targets (sanitizer, validator, leak_detector, credential_detect, config_env) depending only on ironclaw_safety for faster builds - fuzz/ — keeps fuzz_tool_params which needs ironclaw::tools Add seed corpus files (51 total) covering each pattern family: sanitizer injection patterns, validator edge cases, leak detector secret formats, credential detect HTTP param shapes. Add new fuzz_credential_detect target exercising params_contain_manual_credentials with arbitrary JSON. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR review — single-pass XML escaping and versioned path dep Rewrite escape_xml_attr from chained .replace() to single-pass char iteration (O(n) instead of O(4n) with intermediate allocations). Add version = "0.1.0" to ironclaw_safety path dep to satisfy cargo-deny wildcards = "deny". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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0e04123188 |
fix: stop XML-escaping tool output content (#598) (#874)
* fix(ci): secrets can't be used in step if conditions [skip-regression-check] (#787) GitHub Actions step-level `if:` doesn't have access to `secrets` context. Replace `if: secrets.X != ''` with `continue-on-error: true` and let the Set token step handle the fallback. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(ci): clean up staging pipeline — remove hacks, skip redundant checks [skip-regression-check] (#794) - Remove continue-on-error from staging-ci.yml app token steps (secrets are configured) - Skip test.yml and code_style.yml on PRs targeting staging (staging-ci.yml already runs tests before promoting, promotion PR gets full CI on main) - Allow ironclaw-ci[bot] in Claude Code review for bot-created promotion PRs Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(ci): run fmt + clippy on staging PRs, skip Windows clippy [skip-regression-check] (#802) - Remove branches:[main] filter from code_style.yml so it runs on all PRs - Gate clippy-windows with `if: github.base_ref == 'main'` (skip on staging PRs) - Update rollup job to allow skipped clippy-windows - Simplify claude-review.yml to only trigger on labeled event (avoids duplicate runs) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: persist user_id in save_job and expose job_id on routine runs (#709) * feat: persist worker events to DB and fix activity tab rendering In-process Worker (used by Scheduler::dispatch_job) now persists events via save_job_event at key execution points: plan creation, LLM responses, tool_use, tool_result, and job completion/failure/stuck. Event data shapes match the container worker format so the gateway activity tab renders them correctly. Frontend: tool_result errors now show a red X icon with danger styling instead of a silent empty output. The result event falls back to the error field when message is absent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: wire RoutineEngine into gateway for direct manual trigger firing Replace the message-channel hack in routines_trigger_handler with a direct call to RoutineEngine::fire_manual(), ensuring FullJob routines dispatch correctly when triggered from the web UI. Inject the engine into GatewayState from Agent::run after construction. Also persists user_id in save_job for both PG and libSQL backends, removes the source='sandbox' filter so all jobs are visible, and exposes job_id on RoutineRunInfo for the frontend job link. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: remove stale gateway_state argument from Agent::new test call sites The gateway_state parameter was removed from Agent::new during rebase (replaced by post-construction set_routine_engine_slot), but three test call sites still passed the extra None argument. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR review — restore sandbox source filter, remove blank lines - Revert removal of `source = 'sandbox'` filter in all SandboxStore queries (8 sites across PG and libSQL). Sandbox-specific APIs should stay scoped to sandbox jobs; unified job listing for the Jobs tab should use a separate query path. - Remove extra blank lines in agent_loop.rs and worker.rs that caused formatting CI failure. [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address review — regenerate Cargo.lock, add user_id regression test - Regenerate Cargo.lock from main's lockfile to eliminate dependency version downgrades (anyhow, syn, etc.) that were churn from rebase. - Add regression test verifying user_id round-trips through save_job and get_job in the libSQL backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: remove trailing blank line in libsql jobs.rs [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * test: add Postgres-side regression test for user_id persistence in save_job Mirrors the existing libSQL test (test_save_job_persists_user_id) for the Postgres backend. Gated behind #[cfg(feature = "postgres")] + #[ignore] since it requires a running PostgreSQL instance (integration tier). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat(llm): per-provider unsupported parameter filtering (#749, #728) (#809) Add declarative `unsupported_params` field to provider definitions in providers.json. Parameters listed are stripped from requests before sending, preventing 400 errors from providers that reject them (e.g. gpt-5 family and kimi-k2.5 rejecting custom temperature values). - Add `unsupported_params` to ProviderDefinition and RegistryProviderConfig - Propagate from registry through config resolution - Generic strip helpers handle temperature, max_tokens, stop_sequences - Apply filtering in RigAdapter and AnthropicOAuthProvider - Mark openai and tinfoil providers as unsupporting temperature - Update openai default model to gpt-5-mini Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: stop XML-escaping tool output content in wrap_for_llm (#598) Remove content escaping that corrupted JSON in tool output. The <tool_output> structural boundary is preserved but content now passes through raw, fixing downstream parse failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Henry Park <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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470de5bd2d |
feat: merge http/web_fetch tools, add tool output stash for large responses (#578)
* feat: merge http/web_fetch tools, add tool output stash for large responses Merge `web_fetch` into `http` tool with smart approval: plain GETs (no headers, no body) run without approval and follow redirects with SSRF re-validation per hop; all other requests require approval as before. Add `tool_output_stash` on JobContext so full tool outputs are preserved before safety-layer truncation. The `json` tool gains a `source_tool_call_id` parameter to reference stashed outputs, enabling reliable parsing of large API responses that exceed the 100KB context limit. Other improvements: - Descriptive User-Agent header using CARGO_PKG_VERSION - Truncation now keeps partial data + hint about source_tool_call_id - System prompt reinforces tool_calls over narration - json tool query/stringify handle pre-parsed (non-string) data [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * chore: delete dead web_fetch.rs (merged into http tool) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: fix rustfmt formatting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * style: rename shadowed data binding for clarity in json tool Address PR review: rename owned `data` to `data_value` before re-binding as `let data = &data_value` to make ownership explicit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix(ci): mark network-dependent trace tests as #[ignore] The weather_sf and baseball_stats tests hit live external APIs (wttr.in, ESPN) which are unreliable in CI. Mark them #[ignore] so they don't block the pipeline. Run locally with `--ignored` to include them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: replay recorded HTTP exchanges in trace tests instead of hitting live APIs Wire ReplayingHttpInterceptor into TestRig when the trace fixture contains http_exchanges. This replays recorded responses instead of making live network calls, making tests deterministic and CI-stable. Add captured HTTP responses to weather_sf.json (wttr.in) and baseball_stats.json (ESPN API) fixtures. Revert #[ignore] on both tests — they now run offline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: recover inline bracket-format tool calls from LLM text responses When flatten_tool_messages converts tool calls to text like `[Called tool `http` with arguments: {...}]` for NEAR AI compatibility, the LLM sometimes echoes this format back in its text responses instead of using proper tool_calls. Add recovery for this bracket format in recover_tool_calls_from_content and strip it in clean_response so users don't see raw tool call syntax. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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1f2e8c3b72 |
fix: scan inbound messages for leaked secrets (#433)
* fix: scan inbound messages for leaked secrets before LLM processing (#393) Add scan_inbound_for_secrets() to SafetyLayer that reuses the existing leak detector on user input. Wire it into thread_ops.rs after the policy check so messages containing API keys or tokens are rejected early, preventing the LLM from echoing them back and triggering outbound leak-detection error loops. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: unify inbound secret scan warning messages Both the detected-secret and error branches now show the same actionable message guiding users to remove secrets and use the config system instead. Addresses Gemini review feedback on PR #433. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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48b5323ec9 |
feat: group chat privacy, channel-aware prompts, and safety hardening (#285)
Prevent personal memory (MEMORY.md) from leaking into group chat contexts by adding system_prompt_for_context(is_group_chat) to the workspace. Add channel-specific formatting hints (Discord, Telegram, Slack, WhatsApp), runtime metadata injection, group chat behavioral guidance with NO_REPLY silent token, safety rules in the system prompt, tool call style guidance, wrap_external_content() for untrusted data, and improved workspace seed files with richer identity/soul/agent templates and heartbeat checklist. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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2cdd1acb1e |
refactor: consolidate tool approval into single param-aware method (#274)
* refactor: consolidate tool approval into single param-aware method Replace the two confusing approval methods (requires_approval() and requires_approval_for()) with a single requires_approval(&self, params) returning a 3-variant ApprovalRequirement enum (Never, UnlessAutoApproved, Always). This enables param-aware approval decisions: HTTP calls without auth headers now skip approval entirely, while authenticated requests always require it. Shell tool merges its destructive-command detection into the same method. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * feat: add credential injection to built-in HTTP tool Wire the WASM credential injection system into the built-in HTTP tool so credentials are auto-injected at the boundary (zero-exposure model). - Add SharedCredentialRegistry: thread-safe, append-only registry of credential mappings populated by WASM tools at registration time - Add credential_detect module with broad auth detection for headers (12 exact + 5 substring matches), header values (7 auth scheme prefixes), and URL query params (17 exact + 5 substring matches) - HttpTool now accepts optional credential registry + secrets store, auto-injects matching credentials in execute(), and uses broader auth detection in requires_approval() - ToolRegistry passes credential registry to HttpTool at startup and populates it when WASM tools register - Remove old hardcoded AUTH_HEADER_NAMES / has_auth_headers in favor of the new params_contain_manual_credentials() Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR #274 review comments (query param injection, lock poisoning, visibility) - Fix injected query params not being sent on outbound HTTP requests by also calling .query() on the RequestBuilder alongside parsed_url mutation - Recover from poisoned RwLock in SharedCredentialRegistry instead of silently ignoring failures, with tracing::warn for visibility - Narrow inject_credential and host_matches_pattern to pub(crate) to avoid committing to them as stable public API Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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33ef0a6ea5 |
fix: security hardening across all layers (#35)
* fix: comprehensive security hardening across all layers Critical: - Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with explicit tool allowlist via settings.json (Claude Code bridge) - Constant-time token comparison (subtle crate) in web auth and orchestrator auth to prevent timing attacks High: - Revoke tokens and clean up handles on container creation failure - Drop SETUID/SETGID capabilities from containers (keep only CHOWN) - Disable redirect following in HTTP tool and WASM wrapper (SSRF) - Reject URL userinfo (@) in WASM allowlist parser (host confusion) - Fix binary body bypassing leak detection (from_utf8 -> from_utf8_lossy) - Protect identity files from LLM overwrites (prompt injection defense) - Prevent tool shadowing: built-in tools cannot be replaced dynamically - User-scoped job APIs: list/detail/cancel/restart/prompt/events/files - CORS restricted to localhost origins, WebSocket origin validation - Sandbox shell fail-closed: no silent fallback to unsandboxed execution - Scrub secrets from log broadcaster before SSE broadcast - XSS sanitization on rendered markdown in web UI - WASM epoch ticker thread so timeout deadlines actually fire Medium: - Cap state transition history at 200 entries - SSE/WebSocket connection limit (100 max) - Request body size limit (1MB) - Response body size limit enforcement in WASM HTTP - UTF-8 safe string truncation (routine engine, shell tool) - Fix PolicyAction::Sanitize to actually run the sanitizer - TOCTOU fix in scheduler and context manager (hold write lock) - Project file serving moved behind auth - Path traversal guard on project_id - Session file permissions set to 0600 on unix - AtomicUsize for routine running_count (panic-safe) - Completion detection hardened against false positives and tool injection - Tool output no longer drives job completion (only LLM response) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address security review findings across all layers - Fix path traversal sandbox bypass via lexical normalization (file.rs) - Fix SSRF via DNS rebinding with pre-request hostname resolution (http.rs) - Add token budget enforcement on LLM calls (reasoning.rs, state.rs) - Fix cross-user chat history leak with ownership verification (store.rs, server.rs) - Add sliding-window rate limiter on gateway chat endpoint (server.rs) - Harden extension install: HTTPS-only, 50MB cap, WASM magic validation (manager.rs) - Add destructive command blocklist that overrides shell auto-approval (shell.rs) - Add 5MB response body size cap to HTTP tool (http.rs) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * refactor: deduplicate shared helpers and remove dead code Extract floor_char_boundary and llm_signals_completion into src/util.rs, unifying diverging phrase lists from agent/worker.rs and worker/runtime.rs. Remove dead RespondResult::usage(), duplicate PROTECTED_IDENTITY_FILES constant, double LeakDetector scanning in WebLogLayer, and invalid 0.0.0.0 origin from WebSocket allow list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR review findings and CI test failures - Fix record_failed_approve: .truncate(true) wiped the attempts file before reading, so failed pairing attempts never accumulated and rate limiting never triggered. - Guard wizard WASM test: skip gracefully when channel build artifacts are absent (CI doesn't compile wasm32-wasip2 targets). - Fix DNS rebinding check: use port 0 instead of hardcoded 443, since the port is irrelevant for hostname resolution. - Remove hardcoded CORS port 3001: the dynamic addr.port() entries already cover the actual server port. - Require WebSocket Origin header: reject connections that omit it entirely, since browsers always send Origin for WS upgrades and a missing header indicates a non-browser client bypassing the check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address second round of PR review findings - store.rs: reintroduce file locking around read-modify-write in record_failed_approve (concurrent callers could clobber each other). - sse.rs: replace load+check+fetch_add with atomic fetch_update in both subscribe_raw() and subscribe() to prevent overshooting max_connections. - ws.rs: decrement WS tracker before early return when subscribe_raw() returns None (connection limit reached), fixing a counter leak. - server.rs: parse WS Origin host exactly instead of prefix matching, preventing bypass via crafted origins like http://localhost.evil.com. - workspace_integration.rs: skip tests gracefully when Postgres is unreachable instead of panicking (fixes 10 CI failures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: add Origin header to WS integration tests The Origin header requirement added in a3b0190 broke the WS gateway integration tests. Test clients now send Origin: http://127.0.0.1:{port} to match the server's localhost validation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> |
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Illia Polosukhin
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3e6dfb8409 | Addressing vareity of security issues | ||
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Illia PolosukhinandClaude Opus 4.5
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32bfd24154 |
Add WASM sandbox secure API extension
Extends the WASM sandbox with HTTP API capabilities, secrets management, tool aliasing, and leak detection. Key security principle: WASM never sees credentials, injection happens at host boundary. New modules: - secrets: AES-256-GCM encrypted storage with HKDF key derivation - leak_detector: Aho-Corasick + regex pattern matching for secret exfiltration - capabilities: Extended capability system (HTTP, ToolInvoke, Secrets) - allowlist: HTTP endpoint validation with glob patterns - credential_injector: Host-boundary credential injection - rate_limiter: Sliding window per-tool rate limiting - storage: WASM binary storage with BLAKE3 integrity verification Leak detection happens at two points: 1. Before HTTP request (prevents exfiltration via URL/headers/body) 2. After response (prevents exposure in outputs returned to WASM) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]> |
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Illia Polosukhin
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8c38566378 | Initial implementation of the agent framework |