* fix: comprehensive security hardening across all layers
Critical:
- Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with explicit tool allowlist
via settings.json (Claude Code bridge)
- Constant-time token comparison (subtle crate) in web auth and
orchestrator auth to prevent timing attacks
High:
- Revoke tokens and clean up handles on container creation failure
- Drop SETUID/SETGID capabilities from containers (keep only CHOWN)
- Disable redirect following in HTTP tool and WASM wrapper (SSRF)
- Reject URL userinfo (@) in WASM allowlist parser (host confusion)
- Fix binary body bypassing leak detection (from_utf8 -> from_utf8_lossy)
- Protect identity files from LLM overwrites (prompt injection defense)
- Prevent tool shadowing: built-in tools cannot be replaced dynamically
- User-scoped job APIs: list/detail/cancel/restart/prompt/events/files
- CORS restricted to localhost origins, WebSocket origin validation
- Sandbox shell fail-closed: no silent fallback to unsandboxed execution
- Scrub secrets from log broadcaster before SSE broadcast
- XSS sanitization on rendered markdown in web UI
- WASM epoch ticker thread so timeout deadlines actually fire
Medium:
- Cap state transition history at 200 entries
- SSE/WebSocket connection limit (100 max)
- Request body size limit (1MB)
- Response body size limit enforcement in WASM HTTP
- UTF-8 safe string truncation (routine engine, shell tool)
- Fix PolicyAction::Sanitize to actually run the sanitizer
- TOCTOU fix in scheduler and context manager (hold write lock)
- Project file serving moved behind auth
- Path traversal guard on project_id
- Session file permissions set to 0600 on unix
- AtomicUsize for routine running_count (panic-safe)
- Completion detection hardened against false positives and tool injection
- Tool output no longer drives job completion (only LLM response)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix: address security review findings across all layers
- Fix path traversal sandbox bypass via lexical normalization (file.rs)
- Fix SSRF via DNS rebinding with pre-request hostname resolution (http.rs)
- Add token budget enforcement on LLM calls (reasoning.rs, state.rs)
- Fix cross-user chat history leak with ownership verification (store.rs, server.rs)
- Add sliding-window rate limiter on gateway chat endpoint (server.rs)
- Harden extension install: HTTPS-only, 50MB cap, WASM magic validation (manager.rs)
- Add destructive command blocklist that overrides shell auto-approval (shell.rs)
- Add 5MB response body size cap to HTTP tool (http.rs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* refactor: deduplicate shared helpers and remove dead code
Extract floor_char_boundary and llm_signals_completion into src/util.rs,
unifying diverging phrase lists from agent/worker.rs and worker/runtime.rs.
Remove dead RespondResult::usage(), duplicate PROTECTED_IDENTITY_FILES
constant, double LeakDetector scanning in WebLogLayer, and invalid
0.0.0.0 origin from WebSocket allow list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix: address PR review findings and CI test failures
- Fix record_failed_approve: .truncate(true) wiped the attempts file
before reading, so failed pairing attempts never accumulated and
rate limiting never triggered.
- Guard wizard WASM test: skip gracefully when channel build artifacts
are absent (CI doesn't compile wasm32-wasip2 targets).
- Fix DNS rebinding check: use port 0 instead of hardcoded 443, since
the port is irrelevant for hostname resolution.
- Remove hardcoded CORS port 3001: the dynamic addr.port() entries
already cover the actual server port.
- Require WebSocket Origin header: reject connections that omit it
entirely, since browsers always send Origin for WS upgrades and a
missing header indicates a non-browser client bypassing the check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix: address second round of PR review findings
- store.rs: reintroduce file locking around read-modify-write in
record_failed_approve (concurrent callers could clobber each other).
- sse.rs: replace load+check+fetch_add with atomic fetch_update in both
subscribe_raw() and subscribe() to prevent overshooting max_connections.
- ws.rs: decrement WS tracker before early return when subscribe_raw()
returns None (connection limit reached), fixing a counter leak.
- server.rs: parse WS Origin host exactly instead of prefix matching,
preventing bypass via crafted origins like http://localhost.evil.com.
- workspace_integration.rs: skip tests gracefully when Postgres is
unreachable instead of panicking (fixes 10 CI failures).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
* fix: add Origin header to WS integration tests
The Origin header requirement added in a3b0190 broke the WS gateway
integration tests. Test clients now send Origin: http://127.0.0.1:{port}
to match the server's localhost validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
Extends the WASM sandbox with HTTP API capabilities, secrets management,
tool aliasing, and leak detection. Key security principle: WASM never
sees credentials, injection happens at host boundary.
New modules:
- secrets: AES-256-GCM encrypted storage with HKDF key derivation
- leak_detector: Aho-Corasick + regex pattern matching for secret exfiltration
- capabilities: Extended capability system (HTTP, ToolInvoke, Secrets)
- allowlist: HTTP endpoint validation with glob patterns
- credential_injector: Host-boundary credential injection
- rate_limiter: Sliding window per-tool rate limiting
- storage: WASM binary storage with BLAKE3 integrity verification
Leak detection happens at two points:
1. Before HTTP request (prevents exfiltration via URL/headers/body)
2. After response (prevents exposure in outputs returned to WASM)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
