Renamed project from "near-agent" to "ironclaw" throughout the codebase.
Updated documentation to emphasize the core philosophy:
- Your data stays yours (local, encrypted, no telemetry)
- Self-expanding capabilities (build tools on the fly)
- Defense in depth (WASM sandbox, prompt injection defense)
- Always on user's side
Key changes:
- Package name: near-agent -> ironclaw
- Config paths: ~/.near-agent/ -> ~/.ironclaw/
- Database name in docs: near_agent -> ironclaw
- CLI binary: near-agent -> ironclaw
- Log filters: RUST_LOG=near_agent -> RUST_LOG=ironclaw
- All user-facing strings (welcome messages, help text, etc.)
Preserved for compatibility:
- HKDF salt "near-agent-secrets-v1" (changing would break existing secrets)
- WIT interface names (near::agent::*)
- NEAR AI provider config (NEARAI_* env vars)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
Implements a general-purpose Docker sandbox (inspired by Codex) that provides:
- Container isolation for shell commands with ephemeral containers
- HTTP proxy for network access control with domain allowlist
- Credential injection by proxy (secrets never enter containers)
- Three security policies: ReadOnly, WorkspaceWrite, FullAccess
- Resource limits (memory, CPU, timeout enforcement)
Key components:
- SandboxManager: Main entry point coordinating proxy and containers
- NetworkProxy: HTTP proxy validating requests and injecting credentials
- ContainerRunner: Docker lifecycle management via bollard
- DomainAllowlist: Pattern matching for allowed network destinations
The ShellTool now routes commands through the sandbox when enabled,
with automatic fallback to direct execution if Docker is unavailable.
Configuration via SANDBOX_ENABLED, SANDBOX_POLICY, SANDBOX_TIMEOUT_SECS,
SANDBOX_MEMORY_LIMIT_MB, SANDBOX_IMAGE, SANDBOX_EXTRA_DOMAINS env vars.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
Enable instant message delivery for Telegram via webhooks instead of polling.
Key changes:
- Add tunnel URL configuration for local development (ngrok, cloudflare)
- Auto-register webhook with Telegram API on startup using setWebhook
- Implement webhook secret validation via X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header
- Add credential injection for bot token via URL placeholder substitution
- Fix metadata preservation in respond() to route replies correctly
- Fix serde flatten with Option<T> issue in capabilities schema parsing
The credential injection pattern replaces {TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN} placeholders
in URLs with the actual token from the secrets store, keeping credentials
out of WASM module memory until the HTTP request is made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
Introduces a new CLI module with subcommands for managing WASM tools:
- `tool install`: Build and install tools from source or .wasm files
- `tool list`: List installed tools with optional verbose output
- `tool remove`: Remove installed tools
- `tool info`: Show detailed tool information including capabilities
The install command supports building from Cargo source directories using
cargo-component, or installing pre-compiled .wasm files directly. It
auto-detects capabilities JSON sidecar files and validates them before
installation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
- Store event_tx in Arc<Mutex<>> so respond() can send to TUI
- Fix run_event_loop to take owned receiver
- Switch main.rs from SimpleCliChannel to TuiChannel
- Add proper terminal cleanup on TUI error
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
Extends the WASM sandbox with HTTP API capabilities, secrets management,
tool aliasing, and leak detection. Key security principle: WASM never
sees credentials, injection happens at host boundary.
New modules:
- secrets: AES-256-GCM encrypted storage with HKDF key derivation
- leak_detector: Aho-Corasick + regex pattern matching for secret exfiltration
- capabilities: Extended capability system (HTTP, ToolInvoke, Secrets)
- allowlist: HTTP endpoint validation with glob patterns
- credential_injector: Host-boundary credential injection
- rate_limiter: Sliding window per-tool rate limiting
- storage: WASM binary storage with BLAKE3 integrity verification
Leak detection happens at two points:
1. Before HTTP request (prevents exfiltration via URL/headers/body)
2. After response (prevents exposure in outputs returned to WASM)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>
