2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
3 people	5a62ceaa99	refactor: extract safety module into ironclaw_safety crate (#1024) ... * refactor: extract safety module into ironclaw_safety crate Move prompt injection defense, input validation, secret leak detection, and safety policy enforcement into a standalone crate under crates/. The safety module was a leaf dependency with no async, no database, and no other ironclaw traits — only pure computation with pattern matching. SafetyConfig (2 fields) moves into the crate; env-var resolution stays in ironclaw's config module as a free function. src/safety/mod.rs becomes a thin re-export so all existing `crate::safety::*` imports keep working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * docs: update CLAUDE.md for ironclaw_safety crate extraction Add guidance to migrate imports from crate::safety to ironclaw_safety when touching files. Update project structure to reflect crates/ dir. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * refactor: move safety fuzz targets into ironclaw_safety crate Split fuzz infrastructure: - crates/ironclaw_safety/fuzz/ — 5 safety-only targets (sanitizer, validator, leak_detector, credential_detect, config_env) depending only on ironclaw_safety for faster builds - fuzz/ — keeps fuzz_tool_params which needs ironclaw::tools Add seed corpus files (51 total) covering each pattern family: sanitizer injection patterns, validator edge cases, leak detector secret formats, credential detect HTTP param shapes. Add new fuzz_credential_detect target exercising params_contain_manual_credentials with arbitrary JSON. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: address PR review — single-pass XML escaping and versioned path dep Rewrite escape_xml_attr from chained .replace() to single-pass char iteration (O(n) instead of O(4n) with intermediate allocations). Add version = "0.1.0" to ironclaw_safety path dep to satisfy cargo-deny wildcards = "deny". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>	2026-03-12 17:54:24 +00:00
3 people	c148dd2b5b	feat: add fuzzing targets for untrusted input parsers (#835) ... * feat: add fuzzing targets for untrusted input parsers Add cargo-fuzz infrastructure with 5 fuzz targets exercising security-critical code paths: - fuzz_safety_sanitizer: Aho-Corasick + regex injection detection - fuzz_safety_validator: Input validation (length, encoding, patterns) - fuzz_leak_detector: Secret leak scanning (API keys, tokens) - fuzz_tool_params: Tool parameter JSON validation - fuzz_config_env: TOML/JSON config parsing Each target exercises real IronClaw business logic with invariant assertions. Includes corpus directories and setup documentation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: improve fuzz targets to exercise real IronClaw code paths - fuzz_config_env: exercise SafetyLayer end-to-end (sanitize, validate, policy check) instead of generic TOML/JSON parsing - fuzz_tool_params: add validate_tool_schema coverage alongside validate_tool_params - Add "fuzz" to workspace exclude in root Cargo.toml - Update README descriptions to match actual target behavior [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: replace redundant detect() call with meaningful invariant assertion Replace the double sanitize()+detect() call with an assertion that critical severity warnings always trigger content modification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> * fix: rewrite fuzz_config_env to exercise IronClaw safety code directly Replace SafetyLayer wrapper usage with direct Sanitizer, Validator, and LeakDetector instantiation and invocation. Adds meaningful consistency assertions (non-empty output, valid-means-no-errors, scan/clean agreement). Removes the config construction that was only exercising struct instantiation. [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>	2026-03-10 11:06:50 -07:00