fix: 5 critical/high-priority bugs (auth bypass, relay failures, unbounded recursion, context growth) (#1083)

* fix: address 5 critical and high-priority bugs from issue tracker

- #1033: reject webhook requests when secret is cleared at runtime via
  update_secret(None), preventing auth bypass through SIGHUP hot-swap
- #908: reset consecutive_failures counter on successful SSE stream
  reconnection in relay channel, so circuit breaker counts truly
  consecutive failures
- #975: add depth limit (16) to validate_tool_schema() to prevent
  stack overflow on deeply nested schemas
- #974: add depth limit (8) to resolve_nested() to prevent stack
  overflow on deeply nested capabilities wrappers
- #826: truncate oversized tool outputs (>8KB) in routine lightweight
  loop to prevent unbounded context growth across iterations

Each fix includes a regression test.

Closes #1033, #908, #975, #974, #826

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: 5 more high-priority bugs (routine cache, job signals, input limits)

- #1077: recompute next_fire_at when re-enabling cron routines via web
  toggle, mirroring CLI behavior so cron ticker picks them up
- #1076: refresh event trigger cache after web toggle/delete operations
  so event/system_event routines reflect changes immediately
- #892: remove Stuck from check_signals() stop-states in JobDelegate
  since Stuck is recoverable (Stuck -> InProgress via self-repair)
- #976: truncate oversized description strings in CapabilitiesFile to
  4KB to prevent memory abuse from malicious capabilities files
- #977: drop oversized parameters schema JSON (>64KB) in
  CapabilitiesFile to prevent unbounded memory growth

Each fix includes regression tests where applicable.

Closes #1077, #1076, #892, #976, #977

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* fix: prevent ReDoS in event trigger regex patterns

- #825: use RegexBuilder with 64KB size limit when compiling
  user-supplied event trigger patterns, both at creation time
  (routine tool) and at cache refresh (routine engine)

Note: Rust's regex crate already guarantees O(n) matching, so the
size limit prevents excessive memory use during compilation rather
than catastrophic backtracking at match time.

Closes #825

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

* Harden HTTP SSRF IP filtering

* Apply rustfmt after staging merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Zaki Manian
2026-03-13 16:04:55 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.6
parent 1e00b1fed5
commit e805ec61aa
9 changed files with 277 additions and 37 deletions
+3
View File
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ fn is_disallowed_ipv4(v4: &Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
|| v4.is_multicast()
|| v4.is_unspecified()
|| *v4 == Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 169, 254)
|| (v4.octets()[0] == 100 && (v4.octets()[1] & 0xC0) == 64)
}
fn is_disallowed_ip(ip: &IpAddr) -> bool {
@@ -913,6 +914,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(
169, 254, 169, 254
))));
// Carrier-grade NAT
assert!(is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(100, 64, 0, 1))));
// Public
assert!(!is_disallowed_ip(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8))));
}
+7 -3
View File
@@ -199,9 +199,13 @@ impl Tool for RoutineCreateTool {
"event trigger requires 'event_pattern'".to_string(),
)
})?;
// Validate regex
regex::Regex::new(pattern)
.map_err(|e| ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("invalid regex: {e}")))?;
// Validate regex with size limit to prevent ReDoS (issue #825)
regex::RegexBuilder::new(pattern)
.size_limit(64 * 1024)
.build()
.map_err(|e| {
ToolError::InvalidParameters(format!("invalid or too complex regex: {e}"))
})?;
let channel = params
.get("event_channel")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+48 -3
View File
@@ -430,9 +430,24 @@ pub fn redact_params(params: &serde_json::Value, sensitive: &[&str]) -> serde_js
/// Properties without a `"type"` field are allowed (freeform/any-type).
/// This is an intentional pattern used by tools like `json` and `http` for
/// OpenAI compatibility, since union types with arrays require `items`.
/// Maximum nesting depth for tool schema validation to prevent stack overflow
/// on maliciously crafted schemas.
const MAX_SCHEMA_DEPTH: usize = 16;
pub fn validate_tool_schema(schema: &serde_json::Value, path: &str) -> Vec<String> {
validate_tool_schema_inner(schema, path, 0)
}
fn validate_tool_schema_inner(schema: &serde_json::Value, path: &str, depth: usize) -> Vec<String> {
let mut errors = Vec::new();
if depth > MAX_SCHEMA_DEPTH {
errors.push(format!(
"{path}: schema nesting exceeds maximum depth of {MAX_SCHEMA_DEPTH}"
));
return errors;
}
// Rule 1: must have "type": "object" at this level
match schema.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) {
Some("object") => {}
@@ -474,14 +489,17 @@ pub fn validate_tool_schema(schema: &serde_json::Value, path: &str) -> Vec<Strin
if let Some(prop_type) = prop.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) {
match prop_type {
"object" => {
errors.extend(validate_tool_schema(prop, &prop_path));
errors.extend(validate_tool_schema_inner(prop, &prop_path, depth + 1));
}
"array" => {
if let Some(items) = prop.get("items") {
// If items is an object type, recurse
if items.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("object") {
errors
.extend(validate_tool_schema(items, &format!("{prop_path}.items")));
errors.extend(validate_tool_schema_inner(
items,
&format!("{prop_path}.items"),
depth + 1,
));
}
} else {
errors.push(format!("{prop_path}: array property missing \"items\""));
@@ -810,6 +828,33 @@ mod tests {
assert!(errors[0].contains("\"missing_field\""));
}
/// Regression test for issue #975: deeply nested schemas must not cause
/// stack overflow. The validator should stop at MAX_SCHEMA_DEPTH and
/// report an error instead of recursing infinitely.
#[test]
fn test_validate_schema_depth_limit() {
// Build a schema nested 20 levels deep (exceeds MAX_SCHEMA_DEPTH=16)
let mut schema = serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"leaf": { "type": "string" }
}
});
for _ in 0..20 {
schema = serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"nested": schema
}
});
}
let errors = validate_tool_schema(&schema, "test");
assert!(
errors.iter().any(|e| e.contains("maximum depth")),
"expected depth limit error, got: {errors:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_approval_context_autonomous_allows_unless_auto_approved() {
let ctx = ApprovalContext::autonomous();
+114 -4
View File
@@ -101,24 +101,75 @@ pub struct CapabilitiesFile {
pub capabilities: Option<Box<CapabilitiesFile>>,
}
/// Maximum length for the description field to prevent memory abuse.
const MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS: usize = 4096;
/// Maximum serialized size of the parameters schema JSON.
const MAX_PARAMETERS_SCHEMA_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
impl CapabilitiesFile {
/// Parse from JSON string.
pub fn from_json(json: &str) -> Result<Self, serde_json::Error> {
serde_json::from_str::<Self>(json).map(Self::resolve_nested)
let mut caps = serde_json::from_str::<Self>(json).map(Self::resolve_nested)?;
caps.enforce_limits();
Ok(caps)
}
/// Parse from JSON bytes.
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, serde_json::Error> {
serde_json::from_slice::<Self>(bytes).map(Self::resolve_nested)
let mut caps = serde_json::from_slice::<Self>(bytes).map(Self::resolve_nested)?;
caps.enforce_limits();
Ok(caps)
}
/// Truncate oversized fields to prevent unbounded memory usage.
fn enforce_limits(&mut self) {
// Truncate oversized description (issue #976)
if let Some(ref desc) = self.description
&& desc.len() > MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS
{
let truncated = &desc[..desc.floor_char_boundary(MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS)];
tracing::warn!(
"Capabilities description truncated from {} to {} chars",
desc.len(),
MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS,
);
self.description = Some(truncated.to_string());
}
// Drop oversized parameters schema (issue #977)
if let Some(ref params) = self.parameters {
let size = params.to_string().len();
if size > MAX_PARAMETERS_SCHEMA_BYTES {
tracing::warn!(
"Capabilities parameters schema dropped ({} bytes exceeds {} limit)",
size,
MAX_PARAMETERS_SCHEMA_BYTES,
);
self.parameters = None;
}
}
}
/// Merge nested `capabilities` wrapper into top-level fields.
///
/// Channel-level JSON nests tool capabilities under `"capabilities"`.
/// This promotes the inner fields so callers can access them uniformly.
fn resolve_nested(mut self) -> Self {
/// Maximum nesting depth for capabilities resolution.
const MAX_NESTED_DEPTH: usize = 8;
fn resolve_nested(self) -> Self {
self.resolve_nested_inner(0)
}
fn resolve_nested_inner(mut self, depth: usize) -> Self {
if depth > Self::MAX_NESTED_DEPTH {
tracing::warn!(
"Capabilities nesting exceeds maximum depth of {}, stopping resolution",
Self::MAX_NESTED_DEPTH
);
return self;
}
if let Some(inner) = self.capabilities.take() {
let inner = inner.resolve_nested();
let inner = inner.resolve_nested_inner(depth + 1);
self.description = self.description.or(inner.description);
self.parameters = self.parameters.or(inner.parameters);
self.http = self.http.or(inner.http);
@@ -1383,4 +1434,63 @@ mod tests {
"Outer description should take precedence over inner"
);
}
/// Regression test for issue #974: deeply nested capabilities wrappers
/// must not cause stack overflow. resolve_nested should stop at
/// MAX_NESTED_DEPTH and return gracefully.
#[test]
fn test_resolve_nested_depth_limit() {
// Build a capabilities file nested beyond MAX_NESTED_DEPTH (8).
// The description is at the innermost level which is beyond the limit,
// so it won't be resolved — the key assertion is no stack overflow.
let mut json = r#"{ "description": "leaf" }"#.to_string();
for _ in 0..20 {
json = format!(r#"{{ "capabilities": {json} }}"#);
}
// Should not stack overflow — this is the primary assertion.
let _caps = CapabilitiesFile::from_json(&json).unwrap();
}
/// Regression test for issue #976: oversized description strings are truncated.
#[test]
fn test_description_truncated_at_limit() {
let long_desc = "x".repeat(10_000);
let json = format!(r#"{{ "description": "{long_desc}" }}"#);
let caps = CapabilitiesFile::from_json(&json).unwrap();
let desc = caps.description.unwrap();
assert!(
desc.len() <= super::MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS + 50, // allow for minor overhead
"description should be truncated to ~{} chars, got {}",
super::MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS,
desc.len()
);
}
/// Regression test for issue #977: oversized parameters schema is dropped.
#[test]
fn test_oversized_parameters_schema_dropped() {
// Build a parameters schema larger than MAX_PARAMETERS_SCHEMA_BYTES
let mut properties = serde_json::Map::new();
for i in 0..2000 {
properties.insert(
format!("field_{i}"),
serde_json::json!({
"type": "string",
"description": "x".repeat(50)
}),
);
}
let schema = serde_json::json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": properties,
});
let json = serde_json::json!({
"parameters": schema,
});
let caps = CapabilitiesFile::from_json(&json.to_string()).unwrap();
assert!(
caps.parameters.is_none(),
"oversized parameters schema should be dropped"
);
}
}