feat: multi-tenant auth with per-user workspace isolation (#1118)

* feat: multi-tenant auth with per-user scoping

Multi-user authentication and authorization for IronClaw gateway:
- Token-based auth mapping tokens to user IDs via GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS
- Per-user SSE broadcast scoping
- Per-user rate limiting with poisoned lock recovery
- Handler auth and ownership checks for jobs, settings, routines
- Extension secrets scoped per-user
- Chat handlers use authenticated identity
- Reverse proxy deployment documentation
- Comprehensive integration tests for auth, SSE, rate limiting, and job isolation

* fix: scope memory tools per-user in multi-tenant mode

Memory tools (search, write, read, tree) held a single workspace
created at startup with GATEWAY_USER_ID. In multi-tenant mode, all
users' tool calls searched the default user's scope.

Add WorkspaceResolver trait that resolves workspaces per-request using
JobContext.user_id. In single-user mode, returns the startup workspace.
In multi-tenant mode (GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS configured), creates and
caches per-user workspaces on demand.

Includes regression tests for workspace resolution and user isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix: comprehensive multi-tenant isolation audit

Address all review findings from @serrrfirat plus 7 additional gaps
found via full security audit:

Reviewer findings (5):
- WorkspacePool now applies search config, memory layers, embedding
  cache, identity read scopes, and global config scopes (was bare)
- jobs_summary_handler uses per-user queries instead of global counters
- jobs_prompt_handler restructured to not 404 agent jobs + ownership check
- jobs_restart_handler agent branch now verifies user ownership
- agent_job_summary_for_user added to Database trait + both backends

Audit findings (7):
- Delete dead handlers/memory.rs (stale copies with no auth)
- Add AuthenticatedUser to logs_events, logs_level_get, logs_level_set
- Add AuthenticatedUser to extensions_tools_handler, gateway_status_handler
- Add auth + ownership checks to all 6 routines handlers
- Add auth to all 4 skills handlers with audit logging on mutations
- Scope extension setup SSE broadcast to user (broadcast_for_user)
- Fix pre-existing test compilation errors in extensions/manager.rs

17 new multi-tenant isolation tests covering:
- WorkspacePool config propagation and scope merging
- Jobs handler per-user isolation (summary, restart, prompt, cancel)
- Routines handler auth enforcement and cross-user rejection
- Auth middleware enforcement on logs, skills, status endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix: second-pass multi-tenant audit — scope SSE broadcasts, DB queries, dead handlers

Second audit pass applying learned patterns across the codebase:

- OAuth callback SSE broadcasts now use broadcast_for_user (lines 773, 912)
- jobs_list_handler uses list_agent_jobs_for_user instead of fetching
  all users' jobs and filtering in Rust
- list_agent_jobs_for_user added to Database trait + postgres + libsql
- Dead handler files (extensions.rs, static_files.rs) hardened with
  AuthenticatedUser to prevent auth regression if migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix: address review findings — token hashing, broadcast scoping, error handling

Security fixes:
- Hash tokens with SHA-256 at construction time so authentication
  compares fixed-size 32-byte digests, eliminating length-oracle
  timing leaks
- Scope auth SSE broadcasts per-user in chat_auth_token_handler —
  AuthRequired/AuthCompleted events were leaking across tenants
- Propagate DB errors in restart handlers instead of silently
  swallowing via `if let Ok(Some(...))` pattern

Code quality:
- Log SSE serialization failures instead of silently producing empty
  strings via unwrap_or_default()
- Remove dead `pub type AuthState = MultiAuthState` alias
- Replace `.unwrap()` with `Arc::clone(db)` in app.rs multi-tenant
  workspace setup (db is guaranteed Some in context, but unwrap
  violates project convention)
- Fix telegram setup test to inject UserIdentity into request
  extensions (handler now requires AuthenticatedUser)
- Add safety comments on test-only expect/unwrap calls for CI
- Apply cargo fmt to fix pre-existing formatting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix: address review findings — unify workspace pool, fix SSE regression, cache job owners

- Unify WorkspacePool and PerUserWorkspaceResolver: WorkspacePool now
  implements WorkspaceResolver, eliminating duplicate per-user workspace
  construction logic. app.rs uses WorkspacePool directly.

- Fix sse_tx: None scheduler regression: change scheduler/worker SSE
  broadcasting from broadcast::Sender<SseEvent> to Arc<SseManager>,
  restoring SSE event delivery for scheduled agent jobs.

- Cache job owner in orchestrator: add job_owner_cache to
  OrchestratorState so job_event_handler avoids a DB round-trip on
  every event after the first per job.

- Deduplicate ext_user_id computation in main.rs.

- Remove unused _gateway_state variable.

- Fix pre-existing test: first_token() returns None in multi-user mode
  by design; align test assertion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* style: fix formatting in app.rs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* refactor: extract memory handlers back into handlers/memory.rs

Move memory API handlers out of server.rs into their own module,
consistent with how jobs, routines, and skills handlers are organized.
The resolve_workspace() helper moves with them since it is only used
by memory handlers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: [email protected] <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
standardtoaster
2026-03-23 20:50:05 -07:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.6 [email protected] <[email protected]>
parent fa51b9f52d
commit b441ebec02
46 changed files with 5074 additions and 1204 deletions
+142
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use secrecy::SecretString;
use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::bootstrap::ironclaw_base_dir;
use crate::config::helpers::{optional_env, parse_bool_env, parse_optional_env};
@@ -45,6 +46,26 @@ pub struct GatewayConfig {
/// Bearer token for authentication. Random hex generated at startup if unset.
pub auth_token: Option<String>,
pub user_id: String,
/// Additional user scopes for workspace reads.
///
/// When set, the workspace will be able to read (search, read, list) from
/// these additional user scopes while writes remain isolated to `user_id`.
/// Parsed from `WORKSPACE_READ_SCOPES` (comma-separated).
pub workspace_read_scopes: Vec<String>,
/// Memory layer definitions (JSON in env var, or from external config).
pub memory_layers: Vec<crate::workspace::layer::MemoryLayer>,
/// Multi-user token map. When set, each token maps to a user identity.
/// Parsed from `GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS` (JSON string). When absent, falls back
/// to single-user mode via `auth_token` + `user_id`.
pub user_tokens: Option<HashMap<String, UserTokenConfig>>,
}
/// Per-user token configuration for multi-user mode.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserTokenConfig {
pub user_id: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_read_scopes: Vec<String>,
}
/// Signal channel configuration (signal-cli daemon HTTP/JSON-RPC).
@@ -115,6 +136,118 @@ impl ChannelsConfig {
.or_else(|| cs.gateway_user_id.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| owner_id.to_string());
let memory_layers: Vec<crate::workspace::layer::MemoryLayer> =
match optional_env("MEMORY_LAYERS")? {
Some(json_str) => {
serde_json::from_str(&json_str).map_err(|e| ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: format!("must be valid JSON array of layer objects: {e}"),
})?
}
None => crate::workspace::layer::MemoryLayer::default_for_user(&user_id),
};
// Validate layer names and scopes
for layer in &memory_layers {
if layer.name.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: "layer name must not be empty".to_string(),
});
}
if layer.name.len() > 64 {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: format!("layer name '{}' exceeds 64 characters", layer.name),
});
}
if !layer
.name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_' || c == '-')
{
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: format!(
"layer name '{}' contains invalid characters \
(allowed: a-z, A-Z, 0-9, _, -)",
layer.name
),
});
}
if layer.scope.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: format!("layer '{}' has an empty scope", layer.name),
});
}
}
// Check for duplicate layer names
{
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for layer in &memory_layers {
if !seen.insert(&layer.name) {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "MEMORY_LAYERS".to_string(),
message: format!("duplicate layer name '{}'", layer.name),
});
}
}
}
let user_tokens: Option<HashMap<String, UserTokenConfig>> =
match optional_env("GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS")? {
Some(json_str) => {
let tokens: HashMap<String, UserTokenConfig> = serde_json::from_str(
&json_str,
)
.map_err(|e| ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS".to_string(),
message: format!(
"must be valid JSON object mapping tokens to user configs: {e}"
),
})?;
if tokens.is_empty() {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS".to_string(),
message:
"token map is empty — remove the variable to use single-user mode"
.to_string(),
});
}
for (tok, cfg) in &tokens {
if cfg.user_id.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "GATEWAY_USER_TOKENS".to_string(),
message: format!(
"token '{}...' has an empty user_id",
&tok[..tok.len().min(8)]
),
});
}
}
Some(tokens)
}
None => None,
};
let workspace_read_scopes: Vec<String> = optional_env("WORKSPACE_READ_SCOPES")?
.map(|s| {
s.split(',')
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
for scope in &workspace_read_scopes {
if scope.len() > 128 {
return Err(ConfigError::InvalidValue {
key: "WORKSPACE_READ_SCOPES".to_string(),
message: format!("scope '{}...' exceeds 128 characters", &scope[..32]),
});
}
}
Some(GatewayConfig {
host: optional_env("GATEWAY_HOST")?
.or_else(|| cs.gateway_host.clone())
@@ -126,6 +259,9 @@ impl ChannelsConfig {
auth_token: optional_env("GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN")?
.or_else(|| cs.gateway_auth_token.clone()),
user_id,
workspace_read_scopes,
memory_layers,
user_tokens,
})
} else {
None
@@ -281,6 +417,9 @@ mod tests {
port: 3000,
auth_token: Some("tok-abc".to_string()),
user_id: "default".to_string(),
workspace_read_scopes: vec![],
memory_layers: vec![],
user_tokens: None,
};
assert_eq!(cfg.host, "127.0.0.1");
assert_eq!(cfg.port, 3000);
@@ -295,6 +434,9 @@ mod tests {
port: 3001,
auth_token: None,
user_id: "anon".to_string(),
workspace_read_scopes: vec![],
memory_layers: vec![],
user_tokens: None,
};
assert!(cfg.auth_token.is_none());
}