mirror of
https://github.com/outbackdingo/optimclaw.git
synced 2026-09-01 09:09:19 +00:00
fix: eliminate panic paths in production code (#1184)
* fix: eliminate panic paths in production code and document infallible operations PolicyRule::new() now returns Result instead of panicking on invalid caller-supplied regex. CreateJobTool returns ToolError when job_manager is unconfigured instead of panicking. Remaining infallible unwrap/expect calls (hardcoded regexes, compile-time constants, guarded accesses) are annotated with SAFETY comments. Where possible, unwraps are replaced with safer patterns: split_last(), if-let, match-destructure, and reusing peek() values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: use inline lowercase safety comments to match CI pattern The no-panics CI check greps for '// safety:' (lowercase, inline) to suppress false positives. Switch from block SAFETY comments to inline safety comments on the .unwrap() lines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * test: add regression tests for panic-path fixes - PolicyRule::new returns Err on invalid regex (not panic) - CreateJobTool::execute_sandbox returns ToolError when job_manager is None Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix: add inline // safety: comments on all infallible unwrap/expect lines The CI no-panics check requires '// safety:' on the same line as unwrap()/expect() to suppress false positives. Move safety annotations from block comments to inline comments on every infallible production unwrap/expect across all touched files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * chore: trigger CI with skip-regression-check label [skip-regression-check] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * refactor: remove redundant block-level SAFETY comments Each unwrap/expect now carries its own inline // safety: annotation, making the standalone block comments above them redundant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Illia Polosukhin
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.6
Claude Opus 4.6
parent
c79754df28
commit
716629809c
@@ -417,105 +417,105 @@ fn default_patterns() -> Vec<LeakPattern> {
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// OpenAI API keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "openai_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk-(?:proj-)?[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}(?:T3BlbkFJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)?").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk-(?:proj-)?[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}(?:T3BlbkFJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)?").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Anthropic API keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "anthropic_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk-ant-api[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{90,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk-ant-api[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{90,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// AWS Access Key ID
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LeakPattern {
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name: "aws_access_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// GitHub tokens
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LeakPattern {
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name: "github_token".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// GitHub fine-grained PAT
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LeakPattern {
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name: "github_fine_grained_pat".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"github_pat_[a-zA-Z0-9]{22}_[a-zA-Z0-9]{59}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"github_pat_[a-zA-Z0-9]{22}_[a-zA-Z0-9]{59}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Stripe keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "stripe_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk_(?:live|test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sk_(?:live|test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// NEAR AI session tokens
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LeakPattern {
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name: "nearai_session".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sess_[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"sess_[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// PEM private keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "pem_private_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// SSH private keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "ssh_private_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"-----BEGIN\s+(?:OPENSSH|EC|DSA)\s+PRIVATE\s+KEY-----").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"-----BEGIN\s+(?:OPENSSH|EC|DSA)\s+PRIVATE\s+KEY-----").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Critical,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Google API keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "google_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Slack tokens
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LeakPattern {
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name: "slack_token".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"xox[baprs]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]{10,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"xox[baprs]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]{10,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Twilio API keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "twilio_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"SK[a-fA-F0-9]{32}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"SK[a-fA-F0-9]{32}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// SendGrid API keys
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LeakPattern {
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name: "sendgrid_api_key".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Block,
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},
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// Bearer tokens (redact instead of block, might be intentional)
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LeakPattern {
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name: "bearer_token".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Redact,
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},
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// Authorization header with key
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LeakPattern {
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name: "auth_header".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)authorization:\s*[a-zA-Z]+\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)authorization:\s*[a-zA-Z]+\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::High,
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action: LeakAction::Redact,
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},
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@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ fn default_patterns() -> Vec<LeakPattern> {
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// This catches standalone 64-char hex strings (like SHA256 hashes used as secrets).
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LeakPattern {
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name: "high_entropy_hex".to_string(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"\b[a-fA-F0-9]{64}\b").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"\b[a-fA-F0-9]{64}\b").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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severity: LeakSeverity::Medium,
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action: LeakAction::Warn,
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},
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@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@ pub struct PolicyRule {
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impl PolicyRule {
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/// Create a new policy rule.
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///
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/// Returns an error if `pattern` is not a valid regex.
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pub fn new(
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id: impl Into<String>,
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description: impl Into<String>,
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pattern: &str,
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severity: Severity,
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action: PolicyAction,
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) -> Self {
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Self {
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) -> Result<Self, regex::Error> {
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Ok(Self {
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id: id.into(),
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description: description.into(),
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severity,
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pattern: Regex::new(pattern).expect("Invalid policy regex"),
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pattern: Regex::new(pattern)?,
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action,
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}
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})
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}
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/// Check if content matches this rule.
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@@ -130,72 +132,93 @@ impl Default for Policy {
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fn default() -> Self {
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let mut policy = Self::new();
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// Add default rules
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// All regex patterns below are hardcoded literals validated by tests.
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// Block attempts to access system files
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"system_file_access",
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"Attempt to access system files",
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r"(?i)(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|\.ssh/|\.aws/credentials)",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"system_file_access",
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"Attempt to access system files",
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r"(?i)(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|\.ssh/|\.aws/credentials)",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Block cryptocurrency private key patterns
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"crypto_private_key",
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"Potential cryptocurrency private key",
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r"(?i)(private.?key|seed.?phrase|mnemonic).{0,20}[0-9a-f]{64}",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"crypto_private_key",
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"Potential cryptocurrency private key",
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r"(?i)(private.?key|seed.?phrase|mnemonic).{0,20}[0-9a-f]{64}",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Warn on SQL-like patterns
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"sql_pattern",
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"SQL-like pattern detected",
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r"(?i)(DROP\s+TABLE|DELETE\s+FROM|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE\s+\w+\s+SET)",
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Severity::Medium,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"sql_pattern",
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"SQL-like pattern detected",
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r"(?i)(DROP\s+TABLE|DELETE\s+FROM|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE\s+\w+\s+SET)",
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Severity::Medium,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Block shell command injection patterns.
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// Only match actual dangerous command sequences, NOT backticked content
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// (backticks are standard markdown code formatting, not shell injection).
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"shell_injection",
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"Potential shell command injection",
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r"(?i)(;\s*rm\s+-rf|;\s*curl\s+.*\|\s*sh)",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"shell_injection",
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"Potential shell command injection",
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r"(?i)(;\s*rm\s+-rf|;\s*curl\s+.*\|\s*sh)",
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Severity::Critical,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Warn on excessive URLs
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"excessive_urls",
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"Excessive number of URLs detected",
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r"(https?://[^\s]+\s*){10,}",
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Severity::Low,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"excessive_urls",
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"Excessive number of URLs detected",
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r"(https?://[^\s]+\s*){10,}",
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Severity::Low,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Block encoded payloads that look like exploits
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"encoded_exploit",
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"Potential encoded exploit payload",
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r"(?i)(base64_decode|eval\s*\(\s*base64|atob\s*\()",
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Severity::High,
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PolicyAction::Sanitize,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"encoded_exploit",
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"Potential encoded exploit payload",
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r"(?i)(base64_decode|eval\s*\(\s*base64|atob\s*\()",
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Severity::High,
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PolicyAction::Sanitize,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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// Warn on very long strings without spaces (potential obfuscation)
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policy.add_rule(PolicyRule::new(
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"obfuscated_string",
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"Potential obfuscated content",
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r"[^\s]{500,}",
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Severity::Medium,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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));
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policy.add_rule(
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PolicyRule::new(
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"obfuscated_string",
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"Potential obfuscated content",
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r"[^\s]{500,}",
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Severity::Medium,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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)
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.unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded regex literal
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);
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policy
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}
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@@ -252,4 +275,29 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(Severity::High > Severity::Medium);
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assert!(Severity::Medium > Severity::Low);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_new_returns_error_on_invalid_regex() {
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let result = PolicyRule::new(
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"bad_rule",
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"Invalid regex",
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r"[invalid((",
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Severity::High,
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PolicyAction::Block,
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);
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assert!(result.is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_new_returns_ok_on_valid_regex() {
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let result = PolicyRule::new(
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"good_rule",
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"Valid regex",
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r"hello\s+world",
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Severity::Low,
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PolicyAction::Warn,
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);
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assert!(result.is_ok());
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assert!(result.unwrap().matches("hello world"));
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}
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}
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@@ -160,30 +160,30 @@ impl Sanitizer {
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let pattern_matcher = AhoCorasick::builder()
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.ascii_case_insensitive(true)
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.build(&pattern_strings)
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.expect("Failed to build pattern matcher");
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.expect("Failed to build pattern matcher"); // safety: hardcoded string literals
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// Regex patterns for more complex detection
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// Regex patterns for more complex detection.
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let regex_patterns = vec![
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RegexPattern {
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)base64[:\s]+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{50,}").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)base64[:\s]+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{50,}").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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name: "base64_payload".to_string(),
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severity: Severity::Medium,
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description: "Potential encoded payload".to_string(),
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},
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RegexPattern {
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)eval\s*\(").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)eval\s*\(").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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name: "eval_call".to_string(),
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severity: Severity::High,
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description: "Potential code evaluation attempt".to_string(),
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},
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RegexPattern {
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)exec\s*\(").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)exec\s*\(").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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name: "exec_call".to_string(),
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severity: Severity::High,
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description: "Potential code execution attempt".to_string(),
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},
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RegexPattern {
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regex: Regex::new(r"\x00").unwrap(),
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regex: Regex::new(r"\x00").unwrap(), // safety: hardcoded literal
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name: "null_byte".to_string(),
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severity: Severity::Critical,
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description: "Null byte injection attempt".to_string(),
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