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fix(security): persist source_channel to DB, harden cross-channel authorization
Address PR #1590 review feedback: 1. Persist source_channel to DB: Add source_channel column to conversations table in both PostgreSQL (V14 migration) and libSQL (incremental migration + base schema). Add get_conversation_source_channel trait method to ConversationStore with both backend implementations. 2. Fix hydrate_thread_from_db: Read source_channel from DB instead of stamping the requesting message's channel, preventing channel confusion after server restart. 3. Reject reserved WASM channel names: Validate that WASM channels cannot register as "web", "gateway", "cli", or "repl" to prevent authorization bypass via name spoofing. 4. Require pending_approval exists: Authorization check now verifies thread.pending_approval.is_some() before allowing approval-shaped messages to target a thread. 5. Fail-closed for None source_channel: Use "__bootstrap__" sentinel for bootstrap threads (authorized from any channel). None now means "deny by default" instead of "allow by default". 6. Extract and test authorization predicate: is_approval_authorized() helper with 6 unit tests covering same-channel, cross-channel blocked, web/gateway always allowed, None denied, and bootstrap sentinel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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+24
-8
@@ -843,9 +843,10 @@ impl Agent {
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{
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use crate::agent::session::Thread;
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let mut sess = session.lock().await;
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// Bootstrap thread has no incoming message -- use None for
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// source_channel so approvals from any channel are permitted.
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let thread = Thread::with_id(id, sess.id, None);
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// Bootstrap thread has no incoming message -- use the
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// "__bootstrap__" sentinel so approvals from any channel are
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// permitted. None means "deny by default" (fail-closed).
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let thread = Thread::with_id(id, sess.id, Some("__bootstrap__"));
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sess.active_thread = Some(id);
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sess.threads.entry(id).or_insert(thread);
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}
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@@ -1151,11 +1152,26 @@ impl Agent {
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.await;
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let mut sess = session.lock().await;
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if let Some(thread) = sess.threads.get(&target_thread_id) {
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let authorized = thread.source_channel.as_ref().is_none_or(|src| {
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src == &message.channel
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|| message.channel == "web"
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|| message.channel == "gateway"
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});
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// Verify the thread actually has a pending approval before
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// allowing approval-shaped messages to target it. Without this
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// check, an attacker could use approval messages to hijack any
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// thread by UUID.
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if thread.pending_approval.is_none() {
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tracing::warn!(
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%target_thread_id,
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approval_channel = %message.channel,
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"Blocked approval for thread with no pending approval"
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);
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drop(sess);
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return Ok(Some(
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"Error: no pending approval on this thread".into(),
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));
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}
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let authorized = crate::agent::session::is_approval_authorized(
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thread.source_channel.as_deref(),
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&message.channel,
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);
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if !authorized {
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tracing::warn!(
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%target_thread_id,
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