Add WeChat image messaging and QR login polish

src/agent/dispatcher.rs

@@ -295,7 +295,6 @@ impl<'a> LoopDelegate for ChatDelegate<'a> {
         } else {
             tool_defs
         };
-
         // Update context for this iteration
         reason_ctx.available_tools = tool_defs;
         reason_ctx.system_prompt = Some(if force_text {

src/agent/thread_ops.rs

@@ -31,7 +31,58 @@ fn requires_preexisting_uuid_thread(channel: &str) -> bool {
     matches!(channel, "gateway" | "test")
 }
 
+fn validate_inbound_text_for_message(
+    safety: &crate::safety::SafetyLayer,
+    content: &str,
+    attachments: &[crate::channels::IncomingAttachment],
+) -> crate::safety::ValidationResult {
+    if content.trim().is_empty() && !attachments.is_empty() {
+        crate::safety::ValidationResult::ok()
+    } else {
+        safety.validate_input(content)
+    }
+}
+
 impl Agent {
+    fn reject_unsafe_inbound_user_message(
+        &self,
+        message: &IncomingMessage,
+        content: &str,
+    ) -> Option<SubmissionResult> {
+        let validation =
+            validate_inbound_text_for_message(self.safety(), content, &message.attachments);
+        if !validation.is_valid {
+            let details = validation
+                .errors
+                .iter()
+                .map(|e| format!("{}: {}", e.field, e.message))
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                .join("; ");
+            return Some(SubmissionResult::error(format!(
+                "Input rejected by safety validation: {details}",
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let violations = self.safety().check_policy(content);
+        if violations
+            .iter()
+            .any(|rule| rule.action == crate::safety::PolicyAction::Block)
+        {
+            return Some(SubmissionResult::error("Input rejected by safety policy."));
+        }
+
+        if let Some(warning) = self.safety().scan_inbound_for_secrets(content) {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                user = %message.user_id,
+                channel = %message.channel,
+                "Inbound message blocked: contains leaked secret"
+            );
+            return Some(SubmissionResult::error(warning));
+        }
+
+        None
+    }
+
     /// Hydrate a historical thread from DB into memory if not already present.
     ///
     /// Called before `resolve_thread` so that the session manager finds the
@@ -226,34 +277,11 @@ impl Agent {
                         }
 
                         // Run the same safety checks that the normal path applies
-                        // (validation, policy, secret scan) so that blocked content
-                        // is never stored in pending_messages or serialized.
-                        let validation = self.safety().validate_input(content);
-                        if !validation.is_valid {
-                            let details = validation
-                                .errors
-                                .iter()
-                                .map(|e| format!("{}: {}", e.field, e.message))
-                                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-                                .join("; ");
-                            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error(format!(
-                                "Input rejected by safety validation: {details}",
-                            )));
-                        }
-                        let violations = self.safety().check_policy(content);
-                        if violations
-                            .iter()
-                            .any(|rule| rule.action == crate::safety::PolicyAction::Block)
+                        // so blocked content is never stored in pending_messages.
+                        if let Some(rejection) =
+                            self.reject_unsafe_inbound_user_message(message, content)
                         {
-                            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error("Input rejected by safety policy."));
-                        }
-                        if let Some(warning) = self.safety().scan_inbound_for_secrets(content) {
-                            tracing::warn!(
-                                user = %message.user_id,
-                                channel = %message.channel,
-                                "Queued message blocked: contains leaked secret"
-                            );
-                            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error(warning));
+                            return Ok(rejection);
                         }
 
                         if !thread.queue_message(content.to_string()) {
@@ -307,39 +335,11 @@ impl Agent {
             }
         }
 
-        // Safety validation for user input
-        let validation = self.safety().validate_input(content);
-        if !validation.is_valid {
-            let details = validation
-                .errors
-                .iter()
-                .map(|e| format!("{}: {}", e.field, e.message))
-                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-                .join("; ");
-            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error(format!(
-                "Input rejected by safety validation: {}",
-                details
-            )));
-        }
-
-        let violations = self.safety().check_policy(content);
-        if violations
-            .iter()
-            .any(|rule| rule.action == crate::safety::PolicyAction::Block)
-        {
-            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error("Input rejected by safety policy."));
-        }
-
-        // Scan inbound messages for secrets (API keys, tokens).
-        // Catching them here prevents the LLM from echoing them back, which
-        // would trigger the outbound leak detector and create error loops.
-        if let Some(warning) = self.safety().scan_inbound_for_secrets(content) {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                user = %message.user_id,
-                channel = %message.channel,
-                "Inbound message blocked: contains leaked secret"
-            );
-            return Ok(SubmissionResult::error(warning));
+        // Validate inbound content before the turn is created. Attachment-only
+        // messages are allowed to pass through so multimodal channels can send
+        // an empty text body alongside real image/document payloads.
+        if let Some(rejection) = self.reject_unsafe_inbound_user_message(message, content) {
+            return Ok(rejection);
         }
 
         // Handle explicit commands (starting with /) directly
@@ -1880,6 +1880,9 @@ fn rebuild_chat_messages_from_db(
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use crate::channels::{AttachmentKind, IncomingAttachment};
+    use crate::config::SafetyConfig;
+    use crate::safety::SafetyLayer;
 
     #[test]
     fn test_rebuild_chat_messages_user_assistant_only() {
@@ -2017,6 +2020,45 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(result[7].content, "Written");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_inbound_text_rejects_empty_text_without_attachments() {
+        let safety = SafetyLayer::new(&SafetyConfig {
+            max_output_length: 10_000,
+            injection_check_enabled: true,
+        });
+
+        let result = validate_inbound_text_for_message(&safety, "", &[]);
+        assert!(!result.is_valid);
+        assert_eq!(result.errors.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(result.errors[0].field, "input");
+        assert_eq!(result.errors[0].message, "Input cannot be empty");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_inbound_text_allows_empty_text_when_attachments_exist() {
+        let safety = SafetyLayer::new(&SafetyConfig {
+            max_output_length: 10_000,
+            injection_check_enabled: true,
+        });
+
+        let attachments = vec![IncomingAttachment {
+            id: "image-1".to_string(),
+            kind: AttachmentKind::Image,
+            mime_type: "image/jpeg".to_string(),
+            filename: Some("photo.jpg".to_string()),
+            size_bytes: Some(128),
+            source_url: Some("https://example.com/photo.jpg".to_string()),
+            storage_key: None,
+            extracted_text: None,
+            data: vec![1, 2, 3],
+            duration_secs: None,
+        }];
+
+        let result = validate_inbound_text_for_message(&safety, "", &attachments);
+        assert!(result.is_valid);
+        assert!(result.errors.is_empty());
+    }
+
     fn make_db_msg(role: &str, content: &str) -> crate::history::ConversationMessage {
         crate::history::ConversationMessage {
             id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4(),